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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that belong to the realm of household finance
and banking.
The first essay develops a structural model of mortgage demand and lender com-
petition to study how leverage regulation a affects the equilibrium in the UK mort-
gage market. Using variation in risk-weighted capital requirements across lenders
and across mortgages with differential loan-to-values, I show that a one-percentage-
point increase in risk-weighted capital requirements increases the interest rate by 10
percent for the average mortgage product. The estimated model implies that het-
erogeneous leverage regulation increases the concentration of mortgage originations,
as large lenders exploit a regulatory cost advantage. Counterfactual analyses un-
cover potential unintended consequences of policies regulating household leverage,
since banning the highest loan-to-value mortgages may reduce large lenders’ equity
buyers, thereby affecting risk.
The second essay, co-authored with Davide Fantino, exploits an allocation rule by
the ECB for Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations on banks’ borrowing limit
as an instrument to identify the effects of an expansion in banks’ funding availability
on the cost of credit. Using transaction-level data from the Italian credit register
and a difference-in-difference identification strategy, we show that treated banks
decrease loan rates to the same firm by approximately 20 basis points relative to
control banks. We then study how the effects of the liquidity injection vary with
competition in the banking sector, exploiting the local nature of bank-firm lending
relationships and exogenous variation from the historical development of Italian
cities during the Renaissance. Our results suggest that banks’ market power can
significantly impair the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy, especially
for safer and smaller firms.
The third essay, co-authored with Philippe Bracke and Nic Garbarino, presents
new evidence that lenders use down payment size to price unobservable borrower
risk. We exploit the contractual features of a UK scheme that helps home buyers
top up their down payments with equity loans. A 20 percentage point smaller down
payment is associated with a 22 basis point higher interest rate at origination, and a
higher ex-post default rate. Lenders see down payment as a signal for unobservable
borrower risk, but the relative importance of this signal is limited, as it accounts
for only 10% of the difference in interest rates between standard mortgages with 5%
relative to 25% down payment.
Chapter 1
Leverage Regulation and Market
Structure: An Empirical Model of
the UK Mortgage Market
1.1 Introduction
Mortgages represent the most important liability for households in developed coun-
tries and they played a central role in the financial crisis and its aftermath (Campbell
and Cocco, 2003; Mian and Sufi, 2011; Corbae and Quintin, 2015). To prevent ex-
cessive leverage in the mortgage market, several European countries and the U.S.
have introduced new regulations, such as minimum capital requirements for lenders
and limits to loan-to-income and loan-to-value for households (Acharya et al., 2014;
Behn et al., 2016a; DeFusco et al., 2016; Jime´nez et al., 2017). Despite the growing
importance of leverage regulations, there is scarce empirical evidence on their costs
and wider effects on the mortgage market.
While the majority of policy makers and academics favor increases in capital
requirements for lenders to enhance the stability of the financial system, financial
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intermediaries oppose them as they raise compliance costs, potentially increasing
lending rates and impairing credit access (Hanson et al., 2011; Admati and Hell-
wig, 2014; Kisin and Manela, 2016; Dagher et al., 2016). Following the financial
crisis, policy makers allowed lenders to invest in internal rating-based models to
tie capital requirements to asset classes with different risks. Large lenders adopted
internal rating-based models, while the vast majority of small lenders opted for the
standard regulatory approach. As a result, a two-tier system prevails to calculate
risk-weighted capital requirements. This heterogeneity across different lenders and
asset classes can have unintended consequences, such as potential regulatory arbi-
trage and reduced competition in the market (Acharya et al., 2013; Behn et al.,
2016b; Greenwood et al., 2017).
In this paper I develop an empirical model to quantify the cost of risk-weighted
capital requirements and to study the equilibrium impact of heterogeneous leverage
regulation on credit access, risk-taking and market structure. To capture the richness
in product differentiation, households’ choices and lenders’ capital requirements in
the UK mortgage market, I take an approach inspired by the industrial organization
literature on differentiated product demand. I estimate my model using loan-level
data on the universe of mortgage originations in the UK and a new identification
strategy that exploits exogenous variation from leverage regulation across lenders
and mortgages with differential loan-to-values.
On the demand side, I model households’ mortgage choice as a discrete logit
function of interest rates, characteristics (rate type, lender and maximum leverage)
and latent demand, and I use Roy’s identity to derive the continuous conditional
loan demand from the indirect utility. The discrete-continuous choice allows me to
decompose the elasticity of demand to the interest rate into a product elasticity
and a loan demand elasticity. The former captures the effect of the interest rate on
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product market shares; the latter captures the effect of the interest rate on loan size,
conditional on mortgage product. In this way I can disentangle the separate effects
of higher rates on substitution across mortgage products and aggregate deleverag-
ing. I identify the demand side with two exclusion restrictions. First, I assume
that local branch presence affects the probability of choosing a mortgage but not
the conditional loan demand. This exclusion restriction allows the separation of
the discrete and continuous parts of the demand model. Second, I assume that the
risk-weighted capital requirements are uncorrelated with the unobservable demand
shocks and use them as instruments to identify the demand elasticity to the endoge-
nous interest rate. I find that a 10 basis points increase in the interest rate of all
mortgages offered by a lender results in a 0.25 percent decrease in loan demand and
a 17 percent market share decline for the average lender.
On the supply side, I model lenders as heterogeneous multi-product firms offer-
ing differentiated mortgages and competing on interest rates, subject to regulatory
leverage constraints. I use the elasticity parameters from the demand estimation
together with lenders’ optimal interest rates and additional loan-level data on ar-
rears and refinancing to back out unobservable marginal costs at the product level.
I estimate the supply side with a difference-in-difference identification strategy that
exploits variation in risk-weighted capital requirements across lenders and across
leverage levels. This strategy allows me to identify the shadow value of capital regu-
lation controlling for: 1) differences across lenders, that are common among products
(lender shocks), and 2) differences across products, that are common across lenders
(market shocks). I find that a one-percentage-point higher risk-weighted capital
requirement increases the marginal cost by 11 percent and the interest rate by 10
percent for the average mortgage product.
I use the estimated structural parameters, together with exogenous variation
from changes in capital requirements and leverage limits, to investigate the equi-
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librium effects of counterfactual leverage regulations in the mortgage market. The
structural model allows me to account for changes in the best response of lenders
affected by the new regulation as well as for changes in their competitors’ behav-
ior. Motivated by proposals to reform capital requirements (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2016a,b), I compare a regime in which all lenders are subject
to the same regulatory risk-weighted capital requirements to an alternative case in
which all lenders are entitled to an internal model to calculate the risk weights.
Imposing the same regulatory risk weights increases costs for large lenders, who
pass it on to borrowers with large decreases in demand along both the intensive
and extensive margins. Providing an internal model to small lenders also addresses
competitive distortions due to differential regulatory treatment but with limited im-
pact on credit access and no effects on the riskiness of the largest lenders. Overall,
removing the policy-driven difference in risk weights reduces concentration in the
market by between 20 and 30 percent.
Finally, I explore with the estimated model possible interactions between capital
requirements and limits to household leverage that have recently been discussed and
implemented in some countries (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2013; Bank
of England, 2014; DeFusco et al., 2016). I introduce a maximum loan-to-value limit
that rules out mortgages with a leverage larger than 90 percent, both in an econ-
omy with risk-weighted capital requirements and in a counterfactual economy with
homogeneous capital requirements (which was the case before the financial crisis
under Basel I). I find that a regulation removing high loan-to-value mortgages is ef-
fective in reducing borrower defaults, but can have a negative impact on originations
and consumer surplus, as first-time buyers value mortgages with high leverage. My
counterfactual analysis also uncovers potential unintended consequences of policies
regulating household leverage, as banning the highest loan-to-value mortgages re-
duces large lenders’ risk-weighted equity buffers, potentially affecting systemic risk.
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Related literature. This paper contributes to three main strands of litera-
ture. First, I provide a new framework to study households’ mortgage demand
and optimal leverage, which complements existing approaches in household finance
(Campbell and Cocco, 2003; Campbell, 2013; Best et al., 2015; Fuster and Zafar,
2015; DeFusco and Paciorek, 2017). My structural model is inspired by the in-
dustrial organization literature on differentiated product demand systems and on
multiple discrete-continuous choice models (Lancaster, 1979; Dubin and McFadden,
1984; Berry et al., 1995; Hendel, 1999; Thomassen et al., 2017). The characteristics
approach captures rich heterogeneity in household preferences and product avail-
ability along several dimensions, which are otherwise hard to model together. The
discrete-continuous approach allows me to decompose the impact of interest rates on
households’ choice of the lender, leverage and house size, which I could not achieve
with a purely reduced form strategy. Within the household finance literature, my
paper is the first to also account for lenders’ response to demand preferences with a
structural equilibrium model.
Second, my work contributes to recent papers that employ structural techniques
to understand competition in financial markets, like retail deposits (Egan et al.,
2017; ?), insurance (Koijen and Yogo, 2016), corporate lending (Crawford et al.,
2015) and pensions (Hastings et al., 2013). To the best of my knowledge, this pa-
per is one of the first to apply similar techniques to the mortgage market and to
study the implications of leverage regulation for consumers and market structure.
Most notably, while previous studies focused on a “representative” product for each
provider and only model the choice across providers, I exploit more granular varia-
tion in risk weights within a lender across asset classes to identify the elasticity of
demand and the impact of leverage regulation.
Finally, my paper contributes to the growing literature assessing the effectiveness
of new macro-prudential regulation both theoretically (Freixas and Rochet, 2008b;
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Rochet, 2009; Vives, 2010; Admati and Hellwig, 2014) and empirically (Hanson
et al., 2011; Acharya et al., 2014; Behn et al., 2016a; DeFusco et al., 2016) and the
role of lenders’ market power for the transmission of policy interventions (Scharf-
stein and Sunderam, 2014; Drechsler et al., 2017; Agarwal et al., 2017). I develop a
tractable empirical equilibrium model of the UK mortgage market, that allows me to
quantify the trade-offs between risk, competition and access to credit, and evaluate
counterfactual policies. I explicitly model the interaction between leverage regula-
tion and the competitive environment, and its implication for the pass-through of
capital requirements to lending rates, thus providing a building block for a more
general equilibrium analysis of macro-prudential regulation (Justiniano et al., 2015;
Greenwald, 2016; Begenau and Landvoigt, 2016; Corbae and D’Erasmo, 2017).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data
sources and provides motivating evidence and empirical facts in the UK mortgage
market. Section 1.3 develops the demand and supply model. Section 1.4 describes
the estimation approach and the identification strategy. Section 1.5 discusses the re-
sults. Section 1.6 describes the estimates from the counterfactual exercises. Finally,
Section 3.5 concludes.
1.2 Data and Setting
1.2.1 Data
My main dataset is the Product Sales Database (PSD) on residential mortgage orig-
inations collected by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The dataset includes
the universe of residential mortgage originations by regulated entities since 2005.1
1The FCA Product Sales Data include regulated mortgage contracts only, and therefore exclude
other regulated home finance products such as home purchase plans and home reversions, and
unregulated products such as second charge lending and buy-to-let mortgages.
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I observe the main contract characteristics of the loan (rate type, repayment type,
initial period, interest rate, lender); the borrowers (income, age) and the property
(value, location, size). For the structural estimation I focus on the years 2015 and
2016, in which all lenders report the information about all contract characteristics
that I exploit in the analysis.
I complement information about mortgage originations with four additional
datasets. First, I use an additional source also collected by the FCA with infor-
mation from lenders’ balance sheets on the performances of outstanding mortgages
in June 2016. Second, I exploit data on lenders’ capital requirement and resources
from the historical regulatory databases held by the Bank of England (Harimohan
et al., 2016; De Ramon et al., 2016); together with additional information from
a survey of all lenders adopting Internal Rating Based Models in the UK on risk
weights applied to mortgages by loan-to-value.2 Third, I collect for all lenders in my
sample postcode level data on their branches in the UK in 2015 from SNL financial.
Fourth, I match the borrower’ house with geographical information on both the
distance from the lenders’ headquarters and the house price index at the postcode
level from the ONS statistics database.
Panel A of Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for the universe of mortgages
originated in the UK in 2015 and 2016 with a loan-to-value above 50 percent.3 In
Panel A I show the main dataset about mortgage originations. I observe more than
1 million mortgage contracts, with an average rate of about 2.7 percentage points
and an origination fee of £600. Mortgages fixed for 2 and 5 years account together
for more than 85 percent of all originations.4 he average loan value is about £170
2This information has been collected by the Bank of England and the Competition and Market
Authority to study the effects of the change from Basel I to Basel II on mortgage prices and it is
described in details in Benetton et al. (2016).
3My analysis focuses on leverage regulation and risk, so I exclude all mortgage transactions
in which borrowers have more than 50 percent of their equity in the house. These are mainly
remortgagers with a probability to be in arrears below 0.1 percent.
4Badarinza et al. (2014) study mortgage rates both across countries and over time. They show
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
obs mean sd min max
Panel A: loan-borrower
Interest Rate (%) 1155079 2.65 0.81 1.24 5.19
Fee (£) 1155079 631.50 602.25 0.00 2381.00
Fix 2 years 1155079 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00
Fix 5 years 1155079 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Loan value (£.000) 1155079 177.89 93.94 47.99 631.29
LTV (%) 1155079 77.60 12.16 50.00 95.00
LTI (%) 1155079 3.32 0.89 1.09 5.00
First-time buyers (%) 1155079 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Home movers (%) 1155079 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Remortgagers (%) 1155079 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Maturity (Years) 1155079 25.69 6.64 5.00 40.00
Gross income (£.000) 1155079 57.08 30.86 16.79 233.72
Age (Years) 1155079 35.73 8.15 17.00 73.00
Panel B: lender
Capital ratio tier 1 (%) 192 17.24 7.19 6.93 43.50
Capital ratio total (%) 192 21.11 6.73 9.90 44.20
Capital requirement (%) 192 12.03 2.40 8.00 22.54
Risk weights (%) 224 27.01 23.34 2.81 140.40
Branches (Number) 1506 6.90 7.10 1.00 63.00
The table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. In panel A I show the main
variable used in our analysis for the universe of mortgages originated in the UK in 2015 and 2016 with a LTV above
50 percent. Interest rate is the interest rate at origination expressed in percentage points; fee are origination fee
in pounds; fix for two and five years are dummies for products with an initial period of two and five years; loan
value is the loan amount borrowed in thousands pounds; LTV and LTI are the loan-to-value and loan-to-income in
percentage points; first-time buyers, home movers and remortgagers are dummies for type of borrowers; maturity is
the original maturity of the mortgage in years; gross income is the original gross income in thousands pounds; age
is the age of the borrowers in years. In panel B I show variables for the lenders. The capital requirements include
both minimum requirements under Basel II (Pillar I, or 8 percent of RWAs) as well as lender-specific supervisory
add-ons (Pillar II). Total capital resources include all classes of regulatory capital, including Common Equity Tier 1,
additional Tier 1, and Tier 2. I report them as a percentage of total risk-weighted assets. Risk weights are expressed
in percentgage points. Branches is the number of branches for each lender in each postcode area.
thousands, with a loan-to-value of 77 percent and a loan-to-income of 3.3. The
sample is balanced across first-time buyers, home movers and remortgagers. The
average maturity is 25 years, and the average borrower is 35 years old with an income
of around £57 thousands.
In Panel B of Table 1.1 I show summary statistics for lenders’ capital require-
that in the US the dominant mortgage is normally a 30-year fixed rate mortgage, but they also
find that adjustable rate mortgages were popular in the late 1980s, mid 1990s, and mid 2000s. My
evidence for the UK is consistent with their finding that in the UK most mortgages have a fixation
period for the interest rate that is below five years.
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ments, risk weights and branches. The capital requirement includes both minimum
requirements under Basel II (Pillar I, or 8 percent of RWAs) as well as lender-specific
supervisory add-ons (Pillar II). Total capital resources include all classes of regula-
tory capital, including Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1, and Tier 2. The
average capital divided by total risk-weighted assets is 17 percent, when I focus only
on Tier 1, and 21 percent, when I include all classes of regulatory capital; the av-
erage capital requirement is 12 percent, ranging from the minimum requirement of
8 percent to a maximum of 22 percent, including all the add-ons. The average risk
weight is 27 percent and there is a lot of variation across lenders, leverage and over
time: the standard deviation is 23 percent and risk weights rate from a minimum
of 3 percent to a maximum of almost 150 percent. The average number of lenders’
branches in each postcode area is about 7, from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of
63.
1.2.2 Institutional Background
Since 2008 two approaches to calculate capital requirements coexist: the standard
approach (SA) and the internal rating-based approach (IRB). Figure 1-1 shows risk
weights for UK lenders in 2015 as a function of the loan-to-value. For lenders
adopting the standardized approach risk weights are fixed at 35 percent for loan-
to-values up to 80 percent, and they increase to 75 percent on incremental balances
above 80 percent. In contrast, lenders adopting an internal rating based model
have risk weights that increase with the loan-to-values along the whole distribution.
The gap between the average IRB risk weight and the SA risk weight is about 30
percentage points for loan-to-values mortgages below 50 percent, compared to less
than 15 percentage points for mortgages with leverage above 80 percent.
The largest six lenders in the UK (the so called “big six”) all adopted internal
rating based models since 2008 when the capital regulation changed from Basel I to
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Figure 1-1: Risk-weights across lenders and loan-to-values
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The figure shows the average risk weight for two groups of lenders at different loan-to-values. IRB includes all
lenders in the sample adopting an internal rating base model for the calculation of their capital requirements. The
internal model of the lender are subject to supervisory approval. The distributions of IRB risk weights within
each loan-to-value band are represented by Tukey boxplots, where the box represents the interquartile range (IQR)
and the whiskers represent the most extreme observations still within 1.5 × IQR of the upper/lower quartiles. SA
includes all lenders in the sample that adopt the standardized approach. For the latter group the risk weights are
set by the regulator in a homogeneous manner across bank and varies between 35 percent and 45 percent based on
the loan-to-value of the loan.
Basel II. Medium and small lenders, with very few exceptions, opted for the standard
approach, mostly because of the large fixed compliance cost associated with internal
rating-based models (Competition and Markets Authority, 2015; Benetton et al.,
2016).
1.2.3 Facts
In this section, I document some stylized facts about the UK mortgage market on
pricing, originations and performances that guide both the empirical model and
the identification strategy. I start with two definitions for the key variables in my
analysis: market and product.
In my setting a market is a borrower type-quarter combination. I define a bor-
rower type based on the purpose of the transaction: refinancing an existing property
(remortgager), buying a property (home mover), or buying a property for the first
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Figure 1-2: Choice-set
The figure shows a snapshot from https://www.moneysupermarket.com/mortgages/ of the cheapest five mortgages
offered in a market after filling information about the value of the property and the loan amount.
time (first-time buyer).5 A product is a combination of brand, interest rate type and
maximum loan-to-value (e.g., Barclays, two year fixed rate, 90 percent maximum
loan-to-value). In Figure 1-2 I show a snapshot from a popular search platform
for mortgages in the UK after filling information on the value of the property and
the loan amount. The key mortgage characteristics are the provider of the loan,
the type of interest and the maximum loan-to-value. The market and the chosen
product determine jointly the borrower monthly cost.
The UK mortgage market has been historically very innovative, with a large
number of products offered (Cocco, 2013). However, the market is concentrated
in terms of both lenders and interest rate types. The largest six lenders account
for about 70% of new mortgage originations and the most popular product is the
fixed rate for two years, which accounts for more than 60% of originations to first-
5I focus on these three categories of owner occupied mortgages, that account for more than 95%
of originations in 2015-2016, and exclude buy to let. While some products are offered across all
types, others are tailored to the type. In Section 1.4.1 I describe in details how I construct the
borrower specific choice set.
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time buyers and more than 50% to home movers and remortgagers.6 In terms of
the maximum loan-to-value there is more heterogeneity depending on the borrower
type. First-time buyers take higher leverage mortgages, with almost 60 percent
borrowing more than 80 percent of the value of the house. Home movers are more
evenly distributed across loan-to-values, while more than 50 percent of remortgagers
refinance less than 75 percent of the value of their property.
Pricing
The price of the loan is given by the interest rate and the origination fee. In the
UK, unlike other countries such as the US and Canada, there is no consumer based
pricing or negotiation between the borrower and the lender (Allen et al., 2014). As
a result, the advertised rate is the rate that the borrower pays.7 I test this claim in
Appendix A.1 in which I show the results of a regression of the loan-level interest rate
on product fixed effects and additional controls. My product definition based on the
type of mortgage, the lender and the maximum loan-to-value captures more than 70
percent of the full variation in the loan-level rate. The R2 reaches 85 percent when I
interact the product dummies with time dummies, and more than 90 percent when
I also include dummies for the origination fees. Adding dummies for the location of
the house and borrower level controls (age, income, house value, joint application,
employment status) does not explain the residual variation in the rate.8
6In Appendix A.1 I report the market shares of prime residential mortgages originated in 2015-
2016. The products that I consider, account for more than 80% of originations for first-time buyers,
and more than 70% for home movers and remortgagers.
7Moneyfacts reports: “A personal Annual Percentage Rate is what you will pay. For a mortgage
this will be the same as the advertised APR, as with a mortgage you can either have it or you
can’t. If you can have the mortgage, the rate doesn’t change depending on your credit score,
which it may do with a credit card or a loan” (source: https://moneyfacts.co.uk/guides/
credit-cards/what-is-an-apr240211/).
8The remaining variation is due to two possible reasons. First, unobservable product charac-
teristics. Even if I control for the main factors affecting price, there can be some other product
characteristics that lenders use to segment the market. Second I observe the date when the bor-
rower gets a mortgage, but I do not know when exactly the deal was agreed. The time dummies
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Figure 1-3 explores the variation in rates across different product characteristics
and lenders. First, I show the mean predicted interest rates from a regression includ-
ing mortgage and borrowers controls as a function of the loan-to-value. I see that
the lenders set the interest rate as a increasing schedule of the loan-to-value, which
captures default risk (Schwartz and Torous, 1989; Campbell and Cocco, 2015), with
discrete jumps at certain maximum loan-to-value thresholds as already documented
by Best et al. (2015).
Second, I explore the heterogeneity in pricing by loan-to-value according to the
interest rate type. Both mortgage types show an increasing step-wise schedule with
longer fixed rate mortgages always more expensive than shorter ones. This is due
to the higher refinancing risk embedded in a contract with a longer fixed duration
(Deng et al., 2000; Rose, 2013; Beltratti et al., 2017).
Third, I study the effect of regulation on risk-weights for mortgage rates and in
Figure 1-3 (b) I compare a representative large lender adopting an internal model
with a small lender using the standardized approach. The rate schedule of the large
lender shows clear discontinuous jumps at maximum loan-to-values, while the small
lender increases the rate only for loan-to-values above 80 percent, when risk weights
start increasing as shown in Figure 1-1. The large lender offers a more competitive
interest for low loan-to-value mortgages. The gap in prices closes for intermediate
loan-to-value mortgages and even reverses for products with a loan-to-value above
85 percent, consistent with the shrinking gap in the risk weights between internal
model and standardized approach.
capture the variation in the price imperfectly. I also replicate the exercise for origination fees, also
reported in Appendix A.1. The product market fixed effects explain only about 35 percent of the
loan-level variation, adding dummies for interest rate increases the R2 to about 65 percent, and
adding location and demographics bring it to about 70 percent. The larger dispersion that we
find in the loan-level fees can by attributable to the same unobservable attributes that could affect
the rate. Moreover, while the interest rates are not negotiated, there can be more flexibility with
respect to fees. For example, borrowers have the opportunity to roll-over the fees on their loans
and this option is often used.
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Figure 1-3: Pricing
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The figures show the conditional interest rate from the following regression: rjt = γj +
∑95
j=50 ltvj , where γj are
fixed effects for market, type and lenders and ltvj are loan-to-value bins. The dotted vertical lines denotes the
maximum loan-to-value of 60, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, and 95 percent. Panel (a) shows the average schedule in the
first-time buyers market for products with the two most popular products: fixed rate mortgages for 2 and 5 years.
Panel (b) reports the schedule for a representative large lender adopting the internal model and a representative
small lender opting for the standardized approach.
Originations
Figure 1-4 explores equilibrium loan-to-values. Figure 1-4 (a) shows the loan-to-
value choice of first-time-buyers. The vast majority of first-time buyers are con-
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centrated at high maximum loan-to-values, with more than 25 percent borrowing
(almost) exactly 90 percent of the value of their house.9. This behavior allows me
to model the leverage choice as a discrete choice. Figure 1-4 (b) shows the portfolio
share of a large lender adopting the internal rating based model and a small lender
with the standardized approach. The large lender portfolio is evenly distributed
across all leverage levels, while the small lender issues most mortgages at high loan-
to-values, where the risk-weight gap with the large lender is lower and its pricing is
more competitive (see Figures 1-1 and 1-3 (b), respectively).
Figure 1-5 explores the lender choice. Figure 1-5 (a) shows the price and market
share for two mortgage products with the same maximum loan-to-value (60 per-
cent), interest rate type (2 years fixed), and loan size (£140-160.000) but offered by
two different lenders. The mortgage with the higher price has the higher market
share for the whole period under analysis. In my empirical model I account for fac-
tors (e.g., brand value) that can explain this counter-intuitive effect and I explore
with the available data the role of lenders’ branch network in affecting borrowers’
choices.10 Figures 1-5 (b) and (c) show that areas in which a lender has a large
share of branches, the same lender originates more mortgages.11 Accounting for
9Best et al. (2015) show a similar but less pronounced pattern for remortgagers.
10A possible explanation also comes from the supply side, with the low price - low market share
products only approved to some customers. Due to data limitations I cannot test this hypothesis,
but given the low leverage (60 percent), rejections are less likely to be a concern. I do not have
information on the lenders approval decision, so I need to assume that all borrowers of a certain
type have access to the advertised rate and take the best alternative. To limit concerns about
rejection, I restrict the choice set based on observable borrowers characteristics and affordability
criteria as explained in Section 1.4.1. Furthermore, a prohibitive high interest rate for a mortgage
product will make demand for that product close to zero, thus resembling an indirect form of
rejection as discussed in Crawford et al. (2015).
11This relation is not driven by smaller lenders (e.g. building societies). In Appendix A.1 I
show the correlation for the largest lenders between the branch share and the mortgage share in
each postcode area, and I find a strong positive relationship. To control for differences in the
nationwide popularity and to local differences in market demand and branch networks, I run a
difference-in-difference specification with lender and area fixed effects. I find that a lender has
a 3 percent higher mortgage share in an area where it is in the top quintile of the branch share
distribution compared to an area where it has no branches.
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Figure 1-4: Leverage
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Panel (a) shows the share of mortgages originated at different loan-to-value bins for first-time buyers. Each bin is
0.5pp wide. The blue line shows the plain distribution where the loan-to-value is computed as the ratio between the
loan value divided by the house value. The red line control for the fees, by subtracting the fees added to the loan
from the loan value. The dotted vertical lines denotes the maximum loan-to-value of 60, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, and 95
percent. Panel (b) shows the portfolio shares for a representative large lender adopting the internal model and a
representative small lender opting for the standardized approach.
these features in the demand model is important to capture factors that can affect
the demand elasticity (e.g. limited substitution due to local shopping), as the dis-
tance between the borrower and the lender continues to play an important role even
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Figure 1-5: Lender
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Panel (a) shows the price and market shares for two products for first-time buyers offered by two different lenders
with the same initial period (2 years), the same maximum loan-to-value (70 percent) and similar quantities (£140-
160.000). The price is the full APR which include the initial interest rate and the origination fees. The market share
is computed as the fraction of people buying that product in a specific quarter over the total of mortgage borrowers
in that quarter. Panel (b) shows the market share of all branches for a lender in the sample by postcode area in the
UK. Panel (c) shows the market share of the same lender for mortgage originations.
in modern lending markets (Becker, 2007; Scharfstein and Sunderam, 2014).
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Table 1.2: Performances
Arrears Refinancing SVR
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample 1.5 78.5 3.8
Lender
Big six 1.7 79.9 3.7
Challenger 1.9 78.7 4.0
Building society 0.8 76.1 4.0
Max LTV
50-60 0.7 83.5 3.8
60-70 0.9 79.9 3.9
70-75 1.0 78.8 4.0
75-80 1.0 78.2 4.0
80-85 1.4 76.7 4.0
85-90 1.5 77.2 3.8
90-95 4.2 75.0 3.7
Notes: the table reports the fraction of mortgages in arrears, the fraction of borrowers paying the standard variable
rate and the median standard variable rate for different lenders and maximum loan-to-values.
Performances
Finally, in Table 1.2 I study some patterns in default and refinancing for different
lenders and maximum loan-to-values. I capture the default risk by looking at mort-
gages originated since 2005, that are in arrears in 2016. Column (1) of Table 1.2
reports the fraction of outstanding mortgages in 2016 which are in late payment (90
days delinquent) out of total number of mortgages in lenders’ balance sheet for each
specific product. The average fraction of arrears is around 1.5 percent. Building so-
cieties have less than 1 percent mortgages in arrears, followed by the big six lenders,
at about 1.7 percent, and by challengers banks at almost 2 percent. The fraction
of arrears increases monotonically with the maximum loan-to-value. This pattern is
reflected in the pricing schedules of Figure 1-3.12
To capture refinancing risk, I consider for each product the fraction of outstand-
12The increase in arrears with the loan-to-value can be due to both adverse selection, with
more risky borrowers choosing higher LTV mortgages, and moral hazard, because the higher rate
increase the likelihood of default. Even if we cannot distinguish between these different sources,
we consider in the pricing model how lenders account for asymmetric information and default risk
when setting mortgage prices.
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ing mortgages in 2016 that are on a standard variable rate (SVR) out of the total
mortgages in the lenders’ balance sheet. In the UK mortgage market the SVR is
the reset rate that borrowers pay at the end of the initial fixed or discounted period.
The refinancing variable is defined as one minus the share paying the SVR. From
Table 1.2 I see that in 2016 almost 80 percent of consumers refinance their mortgage
before the switch to the SVR. The fraction of borrower refinancing is similar across
lender types, while it seems to decrease with loan-to-value.
Finally, column (3) of Table 1.2 shows the SVR. The standard variable rate is
always around 4 percent. Challenger lenders and building societies have a higher
SVR, while the SVR does not seem to vary across loan-to-values, in a way similar
to the origination rate. The SVR is almost always larger than the origination rate,
giving a strong incentive to refinance the mortgage at the end of the initial period
(Best et al., 2015).
1.3 A Structural Model of the UK Mortgage Mar-
ket
In this section I develop a structural model of mortgage demand and pricing to
study the equilibrium implications of changes in leverage regulation. First, I specify
household utility as a function of product characteristics and derive both product
and loan demand. Then, I develop a pricing equation that incorporates capital
requirements and the empirical facts described in Section 1.2.3.
1.3.1 Household Demand
In each market m there are Im heterogeneous households indexed by i, choosing a
mortgage to buy a house. Households choose simultaneously their mortgage prod-
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uct, among all lenders, rate types and maximum loan-to-values available to them
(discrete product choice), and their loan amount, given their preferences and bud-
get constraint (continuous quantity choice). I follow the characteristics approach
(Lancaster, 1979) and assume that each mortgage can be represented as a bundle
of attributes and that borrowers have preferences over these attributes. Building
on Dubin and McFadden (1984), I assume that the indirect utility for household i
taking product j in market m is given by:
Vijm = V¯ijm(Yi, Di, Xj, rjm, Aij(l), ζi, ξjm; θi) + εijm, (1.1)
where Yi is household income; Di are other household demographics (e.g. age,
location); rjm is the interest rate for product j in market m; Xj are time invariant
product characteristics (rate type, lender, maximum loan-to-value); Aij(l) is lender l
branch network; ζi captures household unobserved characteristics (e.g. wealth, risk-
aversion, housing preferences); ξjm captures unobservable product characteristics
(e.g. advertising, screening) affecting the utility of all borrowers in market m; εijm
is an idiosyncratic taste shock and θi collects the demand parameters that I allow
to vary across households.
I assume households choose the mortgage product that gives them the highest
utility, among the products available to them. This assumption is particularly suit-
able for the mortgage market, in which the vast majority of borrowers take only
one product at a time. I construct the choice set comparing borrowers with similar
observable characteristics and I impose two additional restrictions based on afford-
ability and liquidity constraints. First, households may not be able to borrow up to
the desired leverage, due to supply side restrictions (such as loan-to-value or loan-to-
income limits). Second, liquidity constraints may limit the ability of the household
to increase the down-payment and consider products with lower maximum lever-
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age. Both types of constraints restrict the choice set of the households in terms of
maximum loan-to-value accessible among the full set available in the market.13
The constrained problem becomes:
max
j∈Ji
Vijm = V¯ijm + εijm,
with Ji ⊆ Jm Affordability constraint
j ∈ Ji if j ∈
{
max LTVchosen − 1,max LTVchosen,max LTVchosen + 1} ,
where Jm is the total number of products available in a given market m. In the
standard case the borrower has access to all products, so that Ji ≡ Jm. I implement
affordability constraints by: 1) restricting the choice set of the borrower to products
with the chosen maximum loan-to-value and only one step above and below; and
2) considering a representative product with the chosen maximum loan-to-value
as the outside option. An individual chooses product j if Vijm > Vikm, ∀j ∈ Ji.
I assume that εijm in equation (1.1) is identically and independently distributed
across households and mortgage products with a type I extreme value distribution.
Then, the demand by borrower i in market m for product j is given by:
sijm =
exp(V¯ijm)∑Ji
k=0 exp(V¯ikm)
. (1.2)
At the chosen product, the borrower decides the optimal quantity (qijm), which I
obtained using Roy’s identity:
qijm = −
∂Vijm
∂rjm
∂Vijm
∂Yi
= qijm(Yi, Di, Xj, rjm, ζi, ξjm; θi). (1.3)
The demand model jointly described by equations (1.2) and (1.3) captures in a
13I discuss in detail the construction of the borrower specific choice set in Section 1.4.1.
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flexible ways several factors that are likely to affect households’ mortgage choice.
First, the sensitivity to the interest rate rjm, which I allow to vary across different
products consistent with the non-linearities in the pricing schedules from Section
1.2.3.14 In this way I capture a standard intertemporal trade off between consump-
tion today and consumption tomorrow (Brueckner, 1994). A higher leverage (i.e.,
a larger maximum loan-to-value captured in the Xj) implies a higher repayment
burden in the future, thus lowering consumption via a larger monthly payment.
Second, additional characteristics such as the interest type and brand in Xj
allow for horizontal differentiation and the number of branches of the lender in
the postcode area of borrowers’ house (Aij(l)) allows for spatial differentiation. In
this way I account for borrowers’ costs associated with the application process and
the formation of the choice set, along the lines of Hastings et al. (2013). Higher
branch presence can increase the utility for households, because they generate spatial
differentiation. For example, a large branch presence allows the household to walk in
to a branch when needed, thus lowering transaction costs. However, more branches
can make the lender more salient to the borrower, by increasing the probability that
the borrower will consider it. Moreover, in the absence of data on borrowers’ assets,
the local share of branches can proxy for pre-existing relations between the borrower
and the lender (e.g., current account).15
Third, I allow for unobservable product heterogeneity (ξjm) to affect the house-
hold mortgage and quantity choice. In the case of mortgage products the unob-
servable term can capture “quality” as in standard IO models (Berry et al., 1995;
14The evidence supports my assumption that in the UK mortgage market lenders set for each
product they offer national prices, which do not vary geographically or based on borrowers’ demo-
graphics. In priciple individual specific pricing can be accommodated in the model by allowing the
interest rate to vary across individuals given a product-market pair (rijm in place of rjm).
15In the UK mortgage market borrowers search for mortgage products and apply via branches,
intermediaries and on-line comparison website. The application process is long and can be very
costly. Ideally I would like to observe the true household choice set when applying for mortgages,
but this information is not available in most settings. See Basten and Koch (2015) and Michelangeli
and Sette (2016) for examples of settings in which the choice sets are observable.
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Nevo, 2001). Even if I observe the most relevant mortgage characteristics, lenders
can offer optional services and contracts can include additional features (e.g., cash
back, payment holidays) that may increase the “quality” of the product, coeteris
paribus. Advertising plays an important role in the mortgage industry and could
also justify the inclusion of unobservable product heterogeneity (Goeree, 2008; ?).16
Two remarks are in order. First, I fix the interest rate set at origination, which
implies that borrowers expect future interest rates to reflect current interest rates.
This assumption holds for fixed rate mortgages until the end of the initial period
and is reasonable for variable rate mortgages, given the short horizon before remort-
gaging. Second, I develop a static model, which does not allow us to study issues
related to the timing of the purchase, refinance or default. This will complicate the
analysis, given that the timing will be affected by many additional factors not lim-
ited to the mortgage (e.g., housing and labor markets). My static model assumption
is supported by the fact that the vast majority of households refinance at the end
of the initial period or shortly thereafter, to avoid paying the significantly higher
reset rate (see Section 1.2.3 and Best et al. (2015)). Furthermore, strategic default
is unlikely to be present since in the UK mortgage market all loans are recourse,
which implies that households are responsible for payment even beyond the value of
the house. Defaults on mortgages are therefore very costly and empirical evidence
from survey data confirms that arrears are the consequence of inability to meet the
monthly payment, rather than a choice.17
16So far I have assumed that borrowers have full knowledge of prices and characteristics of all
mortgages in their choice set when they make their decision. The UK mortgage market has a
large number of products and both the turnover rate and the frequency of price change are high.
However, detailed information about products is readily available from price comparison websites
and many borrowers use a broker to arrange the transaction. Given the relevance of the choice
for the household budget it is likely that borrowers will collect all the relevant information before
making a decision. With additional information on advertising analyzing its effect for mortgage
choice with a limited information model will be an interesting area for future research.
17This is consistent with recent evidence from the US. Ganong and Noel (2017) study underwater
borrowers in the US and find that default is driven by cash-flow shocks such as unemployment
rather than by future debt burdens.
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1.3.2 Lender Pricing
In each market m there are Lm lenders that maximize (expected) profits by setting
a price for each product they offer.18 My focus is on acquisition pricing: initial
rate and origination fees. I assume the main source of revenue for lenders is the
net interest income from the monthly payments. The present value of net interest
income from a risk-free mortgage with fixed rate rjm until maturity Ti is given by:
PV (qijm, rjm, cjm, Ti) = qijm
Ti∑
k=1
[
rjm(1 + rjm)
Ti
(1 + rjm)Ti − 1 −
cjm(1 + cjm)
Ti
(1 + cjm)Ti − 1
]
, (1.4)
where qijm is the outstanding mortgage quantity and cjm is the marginal cost of
providing mortgage j in market m.
Equation (1.4) does not account for the two key risks in the mortgage market:
default and refinancing. First, default risk raises the expected cost for the lender
to issue a mortgage. I assume that lenders setting interest rate do not forecast the
probability of default in each period, but consider an average expected probability
of default, as in Crawford et al. (2015). Second, given the high level of refinancing
at the end of the initial period it is unreasonable to assume that lenders compute
the present value as if all mortgages are held until maturity. I assume that lenders
expect borrowers to refinance at the end of the initial period.19
18Unlike other retail products, such as cars, I cannot simply take the difference between the price
and the unit cost to study the incremental profitability from an additional sale. The key difference
in the case of loans is that the profitability from a sale is not realized when the sale takes place,
but over time.
19In Appendix A.2 I allow for a more flexible specification in which some borrowers fail to
refinance at the end of the initial period and pay the standard variable rate until maturity. Even
if borrowers can refinance the mortgage in any month, I capture this risk in a simpler way by
allowing one remortgaging opportunity at the end of the initial period. As already mentioned in
Section 1.2.3 the vast majority of borrowers refinance their mortgage at the time their initial rate
expires. Furthermore, in the period I analyze there is almost no variation over time in the standard
variable rate, so that it is captured by the lender dummies.
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For long maturity, equation (1.4) with refinancing and default risks becomes:
PV (qijm, rjm, cjm, tj, dijm) ≈ qijmtj(rjm−cjm)−dijmqijmtjrjm = qijmtjrjm(1−dijm)−qijmtjcjm,
(1.5)
where tj is the initial period and dijm is the expected default probability for borrower
i taking product j in market m, which I allow to also be a function of the interest
rate.20 Lenders decide in each market m the initial rate for each product j they
offer, taking as given the rates set by their competitors. Given the demand system
and the approximation of the present value of the net revenue from interest payment
(1.5), I can write the problem of the lender as:
max
r
Πlm(rjm) =
∑
j∈Jlm
Πjm(rjm) =
=
∑
j∈Jlm
∑
i∈Im
sijm(rjm, r−jm)× PV (rjm) =
=
∑
j∈Jlm
∑
i∈Im
sijm(rjm, r−jm)× qijm(rjm)× [tjrjm(1− dijm)− tjcjm] .
(1.6)
I sum over all products offered by lender l in market m (
∑
j∈Jlm) and over all
borrowers in market m (
∑
i∈Im) to compute expected demand at the product level.
Note that the price of other products enter the product demand (sijm), but not
the present-value, which only depends on the conditional loan demand (qijm). The
20Equation (1.5) assumes that the remaining interest payment is lost upon default. In the case of
collateralized lending, such as mortgage lending, the lender may be able to recover some fraction
of the balance from the house sale and further actions against the defaulted borrower. Adding
a positive recovery rate in case of default would increase the complexity of the model requiring
lenders to form expectation on future house price values, but would not affected the cross-sectional
nature of regulation and competition which is the focus of this paper.
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derivative of the profits with respect to the price of product j is given by:
∂Πj
∂rj
= SjQj(1−Dj)tj + Sj ∂Qj
∂rj
[tjrj(1−Dj)− tjcj]
+
∑
k∈Jl
∂Sk
∂rj
PVk − SjQj ∂Dj
∂rj
(tjrj) = 0, (1.7)
where I remove the market subscript m for simplicity and the capital letters denote
aggregate values at the product level after summing across all households in a mar-
ket. The first term gives the extra profits from the higher rate on the quantity sold;
the second term captures the changes in loan demand from a higher rate; the third
term collects the impact of a higher rate on the choice probability for all products
offered by the lender; and the last term captures the impact of the higher rate on
the default probability. Solving for the initial interest rate gives:
r∗j =
Effective marginal cost︷ ︸︸ ︷
cj
(1−Dj)−
∂Dj
∂rj
∂Sj
∂rj
1
Sj
+
∂Qj
∂rj
1
Qj
−
Full mark-up︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
∂Sj
∂rj
1
Sj
+
∂Qj
∂rj
1
Qj
− ∂Dj
∂rj
1
1−Dj
−
∑
k 6=j∈Jl
∂Sk
∂rj
PVk
tj
(
∂Sj
∂rj
Qj(1−Dj) + Sj ∂Qj∂rj (1−Dj)− SjQj
∂Dj
∂rj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Other products
. (1.8)
Note that if there is no default risk (
∂Dj
∂rj
= 0 and Dj = 0), all lenders offer only
one product and all households make only the discrete product choice (Qj = 1), then
equation (1.8) collapses to the standard mark-up pricing formula: r∗j = cj − Sj∂Sj
∂rj
.
Equation (1.8) characterizes the optimal interest rate for lenders in the absence
of regulatory constraints, but in reality lenders set rates accounting for regulatory
constraints. I focus on two leverage regulations that have been at the center of the
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recent policy and academic debate. First, I add a risk-weighted capital constraint
to the bank optimization problem. Even if lenders’ balance sheets have other assets
than mortgages, I assume that when they set rates for mortgages they behave so
that they account for the capital requirement constraint. Second, I embed in the
model regulation on household leverage, along the lines of recently implemented
policies in the US and the UK (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2013; Bank
of England, 2014). I achieve that by imposing a 15 percent quota on the share of
mortgages with a loan-to-income above 4.5, along the lines of Goldberg (1995) for
cars’ import.21 The problem for constrained lenders becomes:
max
r
Πlm(rjm) =
∑
j∈Jlm
Πjm(rjm)
s.t. Klm
∑
j∈Jlm
SjmQjmρjm ≤ Klm Capital constraint∑
j∈Jlm SjmI[LTI > 4.5]∑
j∈Jlm Sjm
≤ 0.15 LTI constraint,
where Klm is actual capital resources; Klm is the lender-specific minimum capital
requirement; ρjm is the risk weight for mortgage product j; and I[LTI > 4.5] is
an indicator for mortgages with a loan-to-income greater than 4.5. The Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the constraints represent the shadow value of leverage
regulations. The equilibrium in the mortgage market is characterized by lenders
optimal pricing subject to the leverage regulations and borrowers optimal mortgage
choice.
21The 15 percent limit comes from a recommendation by the Financial Policy Committee of the
Bank of England in June 2014. For more details see Bank of England (2014) and section 1.6.2.
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1.4 Estimation and Identification
In this section I take the model to the data. First, I describe how I build households’
choice sets, in the presence of unobservable choice sets and affordability criteria.
Then, I discuss the variation that I use for identification, endogeneity concerns and
supply-side instruments.
1.4.1 Counterfactual Choice Set
I proceed in three steps to determine the products available in borrowers’ choice set.
First, following the literature I focus on the most popular mortgage types offered by
the largest lenders, and I group mortgages offered by other lenders and mortgages
with a market share below 0.3% in a representative “outside” product.22
Second, within each market given by a borrower type-quarter pair I classify bor-
rowers into groups based on income, age and region. I construct the counterfactual
choice set for borrower i including all products sold in each market-group combi-
nation to which borrower i belongs.23 The rationale for this restriction come from
the fact that borrowers with similar observable characteristics will have access to
similar alternatives. Restricting the choice set using borrowers demographics could
partially compensate for the absence of data on mortgage application and on banks’
loan approval decisions. For example, a credit card company reports that in the UK
rejection rates are low in the mortgage market, but vary with demographics such as
age (observable) which can be correlated with credit history (unobservable).
A major drawback of the approach to define the choice set so far is that I can
include products that are not in households i choice set (Goeree, 2008; Gaynor et al.,
22Goeree (2008) studies households’ choice of their personal computer and consider as the outside
good non-purchase, purchased of a used computer and purchase of a new computer from a firm
not in the data. Egan et al. (2017) study households’ choice of their deposits and consider as the
outside good all the banks outside the top sixteen.
23In a recent paper Crawford et al. (2016) describe the use of the choice set of similar consumers
as the interpersonal logit model.
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2016). Maximum loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits can put an upper bound
on households leverage, while unobservable differences in wealth can put a lower
bound. As a result, two households in the same market-group may shop at different
maximum loan-to-values. I address these additional constraints in a third step, in
which I further restrict the number of products available to household i by limiting
the choice set to all products in household i group with a maximum loan-to-value
equal to the one chosen by i or just above and below.24 In this way I allow borrowers
to shop locally in terms of the down-payment decision, consistent with the bunching
behavior from Figure 1-4 (a).
Given the national nature of the market I do not impose additional restrictions
to the choice set based on geographical location, beyond the grouping by region.
My analysis focuses on the largest lenders, which have their portfolios widespread
across the UK, and even products from smaller lenders, with a more local business
model, can be sold nationally via Internet, phone and brokers. Ruling out products
from households’ choice sets based on their location seems to be somewhat extreme
and unrealistic in a market such as the UK. However, I allow for geography to play
a role by affecting the application cost, via the branch network of the lender.
1.4.2 Estimation
Demand. My demand model in Section 1.3.1 predicts for every household mortgage
demand and loan size as a function of observable household characteristics, random
preferences, products attributes and a vector of parameters to be estimated. I
estimate the demand model described with two assumptions on the structural un-
observables error terms. I assume that εijm in equation (1.1) is identically and
24As a example a household buying in equilibrium a product with a maximum loan-to-value of
90 percent will have in the choice set mortgage with a maximum loan-to-value of 90, 85 and 95
percent. As a robustness I redo my analysis when I stop at the first step of the choice set definition,
thus enlarging the choice set.
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independently distributed across households and mortgage products with a type I
extreme value distribution. Then, the conditional probability that borrower i in
market m chooses product j is given by:
Pr(i chooses j) = pijm(ζi) =
exp(V¯ijm)∑Ji
k=0 exp(V¯ikm)
, (1.9)
and the unconditional probability can be found by integrating out borrowers unob-
servable heterogeneity, which I assume follows a normal distribution with variance
σ (ζi ∼ N(0, σ)):
sijm =
∫
ζ
pijm(ζi)dF (ζi). (1.10)
I also make a parametric assumption on the indirect utility V¯ijm following Train
(1986):
V¯ijm =
γ
1− φY
1−φ
i + µ exp(−αrjm + βXj + ξjm + ηDi + ζi) + λAij(l). (1.11)
Using Roy’s identity I obtain the loan demand function qijm for borrower i in
market m, conditional on choosing mortgage j:
ln(qijm) = ln
(
−
∂V¯
∂r
∂V¯
∂y
)
= φ ln (Yi) + ln(
µα
γ
)− αrjm + βXj + ξjm + ηDi + ζi. (1.12)
From equation (1.12) and the normal distribution assumption for ζi, the proba-
bility of the conditional loan demand is:
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f(ln(qijm)|j, j 6= 0) = 1√
2piσ2
× exp
[
− 1
2σ2
(
ln(qijm)
−(φ ln(Yi) + ln(µα
γ
)− αrjm + βXj + ξjm + ηDi)
)2]
.
(1.13)
I address the simultaneity bias that can arise if I do not account for the discrete
product choice, when I estimate the continuous quantity choice, by estimating both
choices in one step. The joint log likelihood for individual i to buy product j and
borrow an amount qijm is given by:
ln(Li) =
Ji∑
j=0
Iijm [ln(sijm) + ln(f(ln(qijm)|j, j 6= 0))] , (1.14)
where Iijm is an dummy equal to one if borrower i chooses product j and zero
otherwise. I also take explicitly into account a possible correlation between the
interest rate (rjm) and unobservable product characteristics (ξjm). Let δjm =
−αrjm + βXj + ξjm be the product-market fixed effects. In the first step, I es-
timate the joint likelihood (1.14) with product-market fixed effects and obtain the
utility parameters (φ, η, λ), the scaling factors (σ, µ), and the product-market fixed
effects (δjm). In the second step, I recover the impact of the interest rate and other
product characteristics using the estimated fixed effects as dependent variable, as
follows:
δˆjm = −αrjm + βXj + ξjm. (1.15)
To account for endogeneity in the interest rate I estimate the second step with
instruments that I discuss in Section 1.4.3:
Supply. The estimation of the supply side parameters is based on the optimal
pricing formula derived in Section 1.3.2. To compute the full mark-up and isolate
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the marginal costs I need information on the average expected default rate and on
the increase in defaults as a result of changes in interest rates. I back out the latter
using a cross-section of data about mortgage performances as of June 2016 and a
linear probability model:
dijt = βrjt + ηXi + γt + γj + ijt, (1.16)
where dijt is a dummy equal to one if borrower i who took product j in period
t is in arrear in June 2016; Xi are borrower characteristics at origination; γt and
γj are cohorts and product fixed effects. The key parameter is β, which captures
the direct effect of the interest rate on arrears. To identify it I control for product
and cohort fixed effects and borrower level demographics. Equation (3.3) estimates
the effect of variables at originations on ex-post outcomes. As some variables will
change over time (e.g. income, house value) a fully specified model should control
for the actual value of these variables. Unfortunately I do not have a panel that will
allow me to do that. However, variables at origination play an important role for
pricing of the expected probability of arrears, which is the object of interest in the
pricing function.25
Using the estimated parameters from the demand side and additional information
about mortgage performances, I compute the marginal cost inverting equation (1.8).
I then obtain a two-step estimator of the cost parameters with the following model:
cjm = ψKlmρjm + τXj + γm + γj(l) + κjm, (1.17)
25I use the estimated parameters from equation (3.3) in my counterfactual exercises, as changes
in cost will have an impact on arrears via two channels. Lenders will pass changes in costs on
to interest rates, which have a direct impact on arrears, captured by β in equation (3.3), and an
indirect impact via both the discrete mortgage choice and the continuous quantity choice. To use
the parameters from the default model in the counterfactual analysis I need to assume that the
change in the regulation does not change the relation between interest rate and default.
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where the dependent variable is the estimated marginal cost at the product-market
level; Klmρjm is the risk-weighted regulatory capital requirement; Xj are the same
product characteristics that affect borrower demand (rate type, maximum loan-to-
value, lender); γm and γj(l) are market and lender fixed effects; and κjm is a structural
error term capturing unobservable cost determinants (e.g., advertising, screening).
1.4.3 Identification
I deal with endogeneity concerns, coming from both the simultaneity problem and
from unobservable attributes affecting demand. I address the simultaneity problem
by estimating the discrete and continuous choice jointly, as shown in equation (1.14).
In this way I solve the bias that can arise if I do not account for the discrete product
choice, when I estimate the continuous quantity choice. To achieve the separate
identification of the discrete and continuous choices, I assume that the lenders’ local
branch presence affects the borrower’s choice of the lender, but does not have an
impact on the conditional choice of the quantity. Since I estimate the model in
each region separately and I control for lender fixed effects, my assumption requires
that within a region, a larger branch presence of a lender in a postcode area does
not differentially affect the loan demand of borrowers choosing that lender.26 I
exploit variation in the branch network together with variation on the location of
the borrowers’ houses at the postcode level to identify application costs (Aij(l)).
I consider exogenous time-invariant characteristics (Xj), such as lender, interest
rate type and maximum LTV, but I allow for time-varying unobservable attributes
that can affect demand (e.g. advertising, screening, cash-back) to be correlated
26This exclusion restriction is supported by the empirical evidence. In Appendix A.1 I regress
market shares and loan amounts on quartiles of branches, controlling for differences across lenders
and postcodes with fixed effects. I find that a higher branch presence affect the lenders’ market
share, but has no differential effect on loan amounts. Furthermore, my assumption resembles
previous studies estimating discrete-continuous supermarket choice models (Smith, 2004; Dubois
and Jo´dar-Rosell, 2010).
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with the interest rate. The price setting decision of the lender can be taken as
exogenous from the point of view of the borrower, and I can also rule out reverse
causality from the “atomistic” individual borrower to the lender. However, the use of
individual data does not solve the endogeneity problem, as unobservable attributes
at the product level can be correlated with interest rates, thus biasing my results.
As an example consider a lender that relaxes screening for a specific product and
at the same time increases the interest rate on that product. Screening effort is
not observable, thus entering the error term (ξjm) and may be correlated with the
interest rate, such that E [ξjm|Xj, rjm] 6= 0. As a result, I may see borrowers still
choosing the product and mistakenly conclude that they are not responding to the
higher interest rate, while the effect of the higher price has been countervailed by
the differential screening effort.
To account for endogeneity in the interest rate I include dummies for markets
and lenders. In this way I control non-parametrically for time-invariant average un-
observable differences across lenders and I identify the interest rate elasticity from
the within lender variation across products and over time. Even in this difference-
in-difference setting, unobservable (to the econometrician) attributes can affect bor-
rower utility and be correlated with interest rates. I instrument interest rates using
variation in risk-weighted capital requirements that affects the cost for lenders of
issuing a particular product. Differently from previous papers that develop cost-
shifters at the firm level (Egan et al., 2017; Koijen and Yogo, 2016), I exploit the
institutional features of the leverage regulation in place in the UK, that I described
in Section 1.2.2, to construct cost-shifters at the product level. The identification
assumption for the demand parameters is:
E [ξjm|Xj, Zjm = Klmρjm] = 0. (1.18)
Equation (1.18) says that regulation is uncorrelated with demand shocks, con-
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ditional on observable characteristics. The reason behind this assumption is the
following exclusion restriction: the only way through which risk-weighted capital
requirements affect borrowers utility for a particular mortgage is via their effect
on interest rates. Endogeneity in the regulatory instrument that is correlated with
unobservable household preferences can pose a threat to my identification strategy.
However, my identification assumption is conditional on product characteristics,
which include lender fixed effects, thus requiring a differential change in risk weights
across loan-to-values within lender, as an average change will be captured by the
fixed effects. Furthermore, changes in the internal models need to be approved by
the regulators, thus limiting lenders’ discretion in setting them.27 Finally, I extend
the intuition in Berry et al. (1995) to instrument prices with exogenous character-
istics of competitor products and I exploit the regulation of other lenders as an
instrument for interest rates.
The identification of the supply side parameters comes from variation in refinanc-
ing risk, captured by the length of the initial period, and in default risk, captured
by the maximum loan-to-values. Variation in risk-weighted capital requirements
identifies the shadow value of leverage regulation. Given that capital requirements
vary across products offered by the same lender, due to the risk weights adjustment,
I control for lender average differences in cost by adding lender fixed effects. In this
way, I identify the shadow value of relaxing the constraint only with variation within
lender across products. My identification strategy for the shadow value of regulation
improves with respect to previous studies based on variation across lenders, as other
unobservable confounding factors can be correlated with average differences across
lenders. I also explore the heterogeneity in the shadow value of leverage regulation
27In a recent paper Behn et al. (2016b) show that lenders with internal models under-report risk
weights. In my context lender fixed effects control non-parametrically for lender-wide differences
in reported risk weights. Only differential reporting within lender across loan-to-values could be a
concern for the validity of the instrument to the extent that this behavior is also correlated with
unobservable factors affecting households utility.
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across lenders, by interacting the constraints with the lender type and the equity
buffer. Finally, to address any concern about endogeneity in the regulation and
omitted variable bias, I follow the same intuition for the demand estimation and I
use the regulation of other lenders as an instrument for a lender’s own regulation.
1.5 Estimation results
1.5.1 Demand Parameters
In this section I present the results from the estimation of the structural model, using
data from first-time buyers.28 Table 1.3 shows the estimated demand parameters
averaged across all groups.29
The main parameter of interest is α, which captures the effect of interest rate on
the indirect utility. As expected the coefficient is negative and this results is robust
to different cuts of the data. Given the functional form of the indirect utility, I
cannot directly interpret the magnitude of the interest rate coefficient, so I compute
the discrete and continuous elasticities using the formulas reported in Appendix A.2.
I find an average loan demand elasticity of 0.08 and a product demand elasticity of
6.4.30 A 10 basis points increase in the interest rate (a 3.5 percent increase) for a
mortgage product decreases loan demand by 0.25 percent and the product market
28 Consistent with previous work and my reduced form evidence in Appendix A.5, leverage
regulation has a larger impact on interest rates and credit access for borrowers with higher leverage,
while home movers and remortgagers may already have accumulated equity in their houses.
29Appendix A.3 presents averages by income, age and selected regions. I also plot the distri-
bution of the main parameters in each group. The parameter on mortgage attributes comes from
the second stage estimation. I present the instrumental variable estimates using the regulatory
instruments and I show results from alternative specifications in Appendix A.4.
30The loan demand elasticity is consistent with previous studies using bunching techniques (Best
et al., 2015; DeFusco and Paciorek, 2017) and survey data (Fuster and Zafar, 2015). The product
demand elasticity is higher than what Crawford et al. (2015) find for corporate loans. The difference
can be due to the standardized nature of mortgage products, which facilitates comparison and
shopping, relative to the corporate lending market, where relationships and soft information play
more important roles.
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Table 1.3: Structural demand estimates
Structural Demand Parameters
Interest Leverage Fix Period Branches Income Heterogeneity
(α) (β1) (β2) (λ) (φ) (log(σ))
Average -0.0251∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0192∗ 0.7003∗∗∗ -1.6080∗∗∗
0.0023 0.0019 0.0033 0.0112 0.0007 0.0091
Notes: the table shows the structural demand estimates of the econometric demand model of section 1.4.2. The
model is estimated separately in each group (income-age-region) and the table reports the average point estimate
and standard error in each group. The total number of borrowers is 370,575 and the average number of product-
market observations is 773. The standard error for the parameters in the first stage are computed by the inverse of
the information matrix; the standard errors for the mortgage attributes estimated in the second stage are computed
by bootstrapping. All estimates include lender and market fixed effect.
share by 22 percent, and it increases other products market share by 0.2 percent,
on average.
Given that my product definition combines several elements of horizontal differ-
entiation, I can compute elasticities at various levels. In Table 1.4 (a) I show the
average loan demand and own product demand elasticity across different mortgage
characteristics. The largest six lenders and building societies have similar loan de-
mand elasticity, while challenger banks face a higher demand elasticity. In terms of
product demand, building societies have the lowest elasticity, followed by the largest
six lenders. Challenger banks face the highest elasticities of mortgage demand. As a
result, for the same percentage increase in interest rate, challenger banks both lose
more customers and face a larger decrease in loan demand from customers who still
buy their products. I also explore heterogeneity across leverage levels. Both loan
and product demand elasticities increase with leverage. Mortgages with a maximum
loan-to-value above 85 percent have on average a loan demand elasticity of 0.9 and
a product demand elasticities of 7.5 relative to mortgages with a leverage below 70
percent whose elasticities are 0.6 and 4.8, respectively.31
In Table 1.4 (b) I report the estimated own- and cross-product demand interest
31Best et al. (2015) also find elasticities of demand that are larger at higher loan-to-value notches.
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Table 1.4: Elasticities
Loan demand Product demand
Mean Sd Mean Sd
All -0.073 0.022 -5.935 1.704
Lender type
Big 6 -0.073 0.022 -5.963 1.737
Challengers -0.076 0.022 -6.147 1.724
Building societies -0.073 0.022 -5.709 1.572
Maximum LTV
LTV ≤ 70 -0.058 0.012 -4.801 0.989
70 < LTV ≤ 80 -0.065 0.015 -5.295 1.163
LTV > 85 -0.096 0.018 -7.676 1.433
Fixed period
2 years -0.065 0.021 -5.284 1.638
5 years -0.083 0.019 -6.694 1.446
(a) Loan demand and own product demand
-5.66 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02
0.05 -6.92 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02
0.05 0.01 -4.95 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02
0.05 0.02 0.00 -2.90 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.02
0.05 0.01 0.00 0.08 -3.25 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02
0.05 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.07 -3.17 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02
0.05 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.07 -3.20 0.06 0.06 0.02
0.05 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -3.43 0.06 0.02
0.05 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 -5.73 0.02
0.05 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 -7.15
(b) Own and cross product demand
Notes: The tables report the interest rate elasticities for a random subsample of first-time buyers. In Panel (a)
I show the loan demand and own product demand elasticities. The elasticities are computed using the structural
parameters from Table 1.3 and the formulas in Appendix A.2. I report the average elasticities for all products and
by different product characteristics: lender type, maximum LTV and fix period. In Panel (b) I show the own- and
cross-product demand elasticities for the ten most popular products in a market.
rate elasticities for the ten most popular products in the first-time buyer market. A
one-percent increase in the interest rate decreases the market share of the mortgage
by 3-7 percent, while the shares of other mortgages increase by 0.01-0.07 percent.
In Table 1.3 I also study preferences for additional product characteristics, maxi-
mum leverage and the length of the fix period, which play a central role in mortgage
45
choice (Campbell and Cocco, 2003; Badarinza et al., 2014). I find that first-time
buyers value mortgages with a high leverage, which allow lower down-payments for
credit constrained borrowers. I also find that borrowers prefer longer fixed rate pe-
riod, which is consistent with the recent increase in products with longer duration.32
Finally, the fraction of branches in the postcode where households have their houses
has a positive impact on average.
So far I focused on average effects, but the estimated model allows for rich hetero-
geneity, both observable and unobservable. Table 1.3 shows the effect of individual
income and unobservable heterogeneity. The coefficient on income has a straight-
forward interpretation as it only enters in the quantity choice (φ in equation (1.12))
and measures the elasticity of loan demand to income. I find a positive and signifi-
cant elasticity around 0.7. I also find significant unobservable heterogeneity across
households even within my narrowly defined groups and controlling for observable
demographics within group. 33
Fit and Robustness
Table 1.5 looks at the ability of the model to predict some key variables of interest on
the demand side, namely loan demand, loan-to-income and market shares. Overall
the model fits the data well, both in terms of mean and variance. The main limitation
is that the model under-predicts the variance in loan-to-value shares, not being able
to capture well the extreme leverage levels that are sometimes observed in the data.
In Appendix A.3 I report additional statistics and distribution to test the fit of my
model.
Finally, in Appendix A.4 I discuss several robustness checks. First, I instrument
32In the UK mortgage market the vast majority of products has an interest rate fixed for a period
of two years, and there are few products with a fixed rate for more than five years. I explore the
preference to for a longer duration by comparing mortgages fixed for two versus five years.
33In Appendix A.3 I explore further heterogeneity across groups that may be potentially impor-
tant for evaluating the distributional effect of alternative leverage regulations.
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Table 1.5: Model fit
mean sd p10 p50 p90
Loan value
Data 136.4 64.6 75.0 121.7 212.2
Model 135.3 64.5 76.3 119.7 213.8
LTI
Data 3.5 0.8 2.3 3.6 4.6
Model 3.5 0.9 2.4 3.5 4.6
Shares
Data 1.2 2.1 0.1 0.4 3.0
Model 1.2 2.4 0.1 0.4 2.9
LTV
Data 80.7 11.2 62.5 84.8 90.0
Model 83.4 5.4 74.8 85.1 88.8
Notes: The table shows the fit of the estimated demand model. Loan value for the data is the actual loan value for
the chosen product, while for the model I use the predicted loan demand for the chosen product in the true data.
The LTI distribution use the true and predicted loan value for the chosen product and the income from the data.
The product shares in the data are computed as the sum of mortgage originations for each product in each market
divided by the total number of households. The market share for the model comes from the sum of the individual
predicted probabilities. The LTV from the data use the true LTV for the chosen product. The LTV distribution
for the model is computed by summing the predicted probabilities at each maximum LTV.
the endogenous interest rate for first-time buyers with the risk weights for the same
maximum loan-to-value by other lenders. Second, I construct an initial annual
percentage rate (APR) as a function of both the interest rate and the lender fee for
a representative mortgage and use it as the price of the mortgage instead of the initial
rate only. Third, I estimate the second step of the demand model (equation (1.15))
simultaneously with the supply side (equation (1.17)) using generalized method of
moments. My results are robust to these different instruments, variable definitions
and estimation methods.
1.5.2 Supply Parameters and The Cost of Capital Regula-
tion
First, I show the results for the default model, whose estimates enter the calculation
of the mark-ups and marginal costs. I run a linear probability model in which the
47
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the borrower is at least 3 months
late in the mortgage payment in June 2016. Table 1.6 shows the estimates. I find
a statistically significant and robust positive relation between the interest rate and
default: a 1 percentage point higher interest rate increases the probability of default
by 0.15 percentage points. I also study how loan-to-income and loan-to-value at
origination affect the probability of default. Mortgages with loan-to-income above
3.5 and loan-to-value above 85 are always more likely to default.
Given that the estimates pool together mortgages from different years in columns
(2) and (3) of Table 1.6 I split my sample into mortgages originated before and after
the crisis. The relation between interest rate and default is positive and significant in
both periods and stronger in magnitude before the crisis. For mortgages originated
before the crisis a one-percentage-point higher interest rate increases the probability
of default by one percentage point, while the effect is ten times smaller for mortgages
issued after the crisis. Mortgages with higher loan-to-income are more likely to
default when originated both before and after the crisis. Some differences emerge
for high leverage mortgages originated after relative to those originated before the
crisis. High loan-to-value mortgages issued before the crisis are significantly more
likely to default, while high loan-to-value mortgages issued after are less likely to
default. A possible explanation for the latter result can be the increase in supply
side restrictions and affordability checks after the crisis, which led to an overall low
volume of originations at high leverage to a selected pool of low risk households.
To address endogeneity concerns coming from omitted variables correlated to
both the interest rate and the default probability, I show the result of an instrumental
variable approach in column (4) of Table 1.6. I instrument the interest rate with
the risk weight, following the same identification assumption from section 1.4.3 for
demand parameters. The IV estimates are almost identical to the OLS estimates.
With the estimated demand and default parameters I compute the mark-ups
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Table 1.6: Default estimates
Full sample Pre-crisis Post-crisis
OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest (%) 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0004)
High LTI 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0003∗ 0.0003∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001)
High LTV 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Time F.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender F.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rate type F.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Postcode district F.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2708046 551840 2156171 2082421
Notes: the table shows the default estimates from equation (3.3). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to
one if a mortgage originated between 2005 and 2015 is in arrears in June 2016. We define arrears as being at least
3 months late in servicing the monthly payment. Column (1), column (2) focuses on mortgages originated before
2008, while columns (3) and (4) look at mortgages originated after 2008. Interest is the interest rate at origination
expressed in percentage terms. High LTI is a dummy for mortgages with loan to income at originations above 3.5;
High LTV is a dummy for mortgages with loan to value at origination above 85. Borrower controls include type of
borrower, employment status, income, age, maturity and property value. In column (4) the excluded instrument for
the interest rate is the mortgage risk weight.
and marginal costs. The average markup is about 0.53 percentage points in the
full sample, which correspond to about 18 percent of the average interest rate in
the data.34 The average marginal cost in the sample is 2.41 percentage points
and it increase by 2 basis points on average when we account for default risk. As
expected, high leverage and longer duration mortgages have higher costs. The effect
of accounting for default risk is strongest for high leverage products for which I see
an increase by more than 4 basis points, while cost for products with a maximum
loan-to-value below 80 increase by only 1 basis point.
I use the estimated marginal cost as a dependent variable in equation (1.17), to
34Button et al. (2010) perform a decomposition of new lending rates for UK mortgages, into
funding costs, capital costs and a residual. They find that after the financial crisis in 2008 the
residual, which includes operating costs and markup, has risen. As operating costs are unlikely to
have changed and if anything they may have decreased as results of consolidation, their finding is
consistent with increasing markups.
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Table 1.7: Structural supply estimates
Main Heterogeneity IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RW Capital Req (%) 0.640∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) (0.034) (0.020)
High LTV 1.056∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.044) (0.040) (0.039)
Fix 5 0.699∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
x Challenger -0.219∗∗∗
(0.030)
x Building Society 0.173∗∗
(0.088)
x High buffer -0.173∗∗∗
(0.033)
Market F.e. Yes Yes No No No Yes
Lender F.e. Yes Yes No No No Yes
Market-Lender F.e. No No Yes Yes Yes No
Marginal Cost (mean) 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42
R2 0.50 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.82
Observations 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046
Notes: the table shows the structural parameters of the supply model from equation (1.17). The dependent variable
is the effective marginal cost at the product level. Risk weights are the regulatory risk weights expressed in percentage
terms. High LTV is a dummy equal to one for products with a maximum LTV above 85. Fix 5 is a dummy for
mortgages with a fix period of 5 years. In column (6) the excluded instrument for the mortgage risk-weighted capital
requirements is the closest risk weight for the same loan-to-value and rate type offered by another lender. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis.
decompose the effect of product characteristics and identify the cost of capital reg-
ulation in the mortgage market. Table 1.7 shows the structural supply parameters.
The main parameter of interest captures the impact of risk-weighted capital require-
ments on the marginal costs. I identify it by exploiting variation in risk-weighted
capital requirements across lenders and leverage levels and over time. Column (1)
of Table 1.7 shows the effect of capital regulation on effective marginal cost control-
ling for market and lender fixed effects. I find that a one-percentage-point higher
risk-weighted capital requirement increases the marginal cost of lending to first-time
buyers by about 65 basis points.
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In column (2) of Table 1.7 I further control for other product characteristics that
have an impact on the cost of issuing mortgages. As expected, we find that high
leverage and longer fix rate mortgages have higher marginal costs. Once I control
for these product attributes the coefficient on the risk-weighted capital requirements
is reduced in magnitude, but the effect is still significant. A one-percentage-point
higher risk-weighted capital requirement increases the marginal cost of lending to
first-time buyers by approximately 27 basis points. The inclusion of the control for
leverage, which captures the decrease in risk for mortgages with a lower leverage
that is common across lenders, drives the decline in the effect.
In column (3) of Table 1.7 I add interacted market-lender fixed effects. In this
way I only exploit the variation in risk-weighted capital requirement within a lender-
time pair, ruling out concerns about other time-varying lender-specific factors af-
fecting the cost of issuing mortgages. The coefficient that captures the impact of
regulation on the cost of lending is still significant and the magnitude is larger than
in column (2).
In columns (4) and (5) of Table 1.7 I explore the heterogeneity in the cost of risk-
weighted capital requirements across lenders. Column (4) allows the effect of capital
requirements to vary with the type of lender. The baseline is the largest six lenders.
I find that the effect of capital regulation is stronger for building societies, whose
business model is centered around mortgages, and weaker for challenger lenders,
which have a more diversified portfolio. In column (5) I interact capital requirements
with the lenders’ capital buffer, defined as the difference between capital resources
and capital requirements. I find that lenders with more capital relative to the
requirement are less affected by the regulation.
Finally in column (6) of Table 1.7 I address possible concerns about endogeneity
in the regulation and omitted variable bias. I exploit the regulation of other lenders
as an instrument for own regulation. In particular, for each mortgage product I
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calculate the closest risk weight for the same loan-to-value and rate type offered by
another lender and I use it as an instrument for the lender risk weight. The IV
estimates are almost identical to the OLS estimates.
Magnitude
The baseline estimate in column (2) of Table 1.7 shows an increase in the marginal
cost of about 27 basis points for a one-percentage-point increase in the risk-weighted
capital requirement. Given an average marginal cost of 2.4 percent, marginal cost
increases by approximately 10 percent for the average mortgage product. To put
my estimates of the cost of capital regulation into context, I simulate an increase
in capital requirement by 10-percentage-points, along the lines of previous studies
(Hanson et al., 2011; Baker and Wurgler, 2015; Firestone et al., 2017).35 Previous
papers find a wide range of values going from 3 basis points (Kisin and Manela,
2016), to 25-45 basis points (Hanson et al., 2011), up until 60-90 basis points (Baker
and Wurgler, 2015). I find that increasing capital requirement by 10-percentage-
points increase marginal costs by about 60 basis points. This increase is on the
upper end of previous estimates. My number can be interpreted as an upper bound
to the cost of increasing capital requirements, as I allow lenders to adjust to the new
regulation only by increasing mortgage rates. In reality lenders can lower deposit
rates, issue new equity and retain earnings. These additional margins of adjustment
will likely decrease the cost of increasing capital requirements (Elliott, 2009).
1.6 Counterfactual Leverage Regulations
In this section I use the estimated model to study alternative leverage regulations
and their equilibrium impact on interest rates, market structure and risk. Section
35In Appendix A.5 I show the effect of a common increase in capital requirement by 10-
percentage-points on marginal costs, rates and several additional variables of interest.
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1.6.1 compares two alternative counterfactuals that remove the risk-weight gap be-
tween large and small lenders that I document in Figure 1-1. Section 1.6.2 analyzes
the interactions between risk-weighted capital requirements and regulations limiting
household leverage.
1.6.1 Equilibrium Effects of Risk Weights
The reduced form evidence from Section 1.2.3 suggests that risk weights affect pric-
ing and specialization.36 Figure 1-6 explores this relation further by exploiting
variation over time within lender and an exogenous change in risk weights, following
the approval of an internal rating-based model for a medium size lender. In this
way I address potential concerns about differences across lenders and selection into
treatment. I compare the average risk weight and the average interest rate for the
same lender for mortgages with a maximum loan-to-value of 95 percent relative to
those with a maximum 70 percent. The relative risk weight of the lender jumps from
slightly above one to more than four, as the lender adopts the internal model. At
the same time the relative interest rate of the high leverage product increase from
around one to approximately 1.5.
The adoption of an internal model by one lender is not enough to learn what
would have happened in the mortgage market if all or some lenders are affected
by changes in the leverage regulation. Furthermore, contemporaneous changes in
market power and business models (e.g., securitization) can confound the effects
of regulation. To address these issues, I explore with the estimated model the
equilibrium impact of changing risk-based capital requirements keeping all else equal.
First, I simulate an equilibrium without internal models for the calculation of capital
requirements (Counterfactual I: All Standard). Second, I allow lenders adopting a
36In Appendix A.5 I explore further the reduced form relation between risk weights and interest
rates.
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Figure 1-6: Model change
Model change
1
1.
5
2
R
el
at
iv
e 
In
te
re
st
1
2
3
4
5
R
el
at
iv
e 
ris
k 
w
ei
gh
ts
2011q3 2012q3 2013q3 2014q3 2015q3 2016q3
Risk weight Interest
Notes:The chart shows the relative risk weight and interest rate of a maximum 95 LTV relative to a maximum 70
LTV for a lender before and after the adoption of an IRB model.
standardized approach to develop an internal model, with the average risk weights
of large lenders (Counterfactual II: All Internal).37 The two policies are illustrated
in Figure 1-7.
To illustrate the mechanism, consider two mortgages with the same fix period and
maximum loan-to-value, and the same expected default and refinancing risk (both
equal to zero for simplicity). One mortgage is offered by a large lender adopting
an internal model for the calculation of risk weights, while the other is offered by a
small lender under the standardized regulatory approach. From (1.8), the difference
in prices between the two lenders for product j will be given by:
rj,small − rj,large = ρj,small − ρj,large︸ ︷︷ ︸
Regulatory advantage
−
 1
∂Qj,small
∂rj,small
1
Qj,small
− 1
∂Qj,large
∂rj,large
1
Qj,large

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incumbent advantage
(1.19)
37The practical implementation of this policy may involve the development of an internal model
by the central bank using data provided by private lenders.
54
Figure 1-7: Counterfactual risk-weighted capital requirements
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Notes: the charts show the risk weights distribution in the two counterfactual scenarios for the capital requirements.
In Figure (a) I show the first counterfactual, in which all lenders adopt the standard approach for setting the risk
weights. In Figure (b) I show the second counterfactual, in which I compute the mean risk weight across lenders
with the internal model and assign it to the small lenders with the standard approach.
The higher risk weights for the small lender translate into higher rates, ceteris
paribus. If the elasticity of the product offered by the large lenders is lower, due to
brand power, there is also an incumbent advantage, which further amplifies the price
gap. I explore the consequences of changing the regulatory advantage in equation
(1.19). Table 1.8 shows the results for several variables of interest in a random
subset of the first-time buyer market.
Panel A shows the effects of removing the heterogeneity in risk-weighted capital
requirements on market structure. I measure concentration in the market looking
at both the Herfindahl Index and the share of the largest six lenders for mortgage
originations. As a result of the abolition of internal models the market becomes more
competitive. Large lenders lose the regulatory advantage (first element in equation
(1.19)) and increase their prices following an increase in the regulatory capital they
have to hold. As a result of the higher rates, large lenders loose market shares in
favor of smaller lenders already adopting the standard regulatory approach. The
share of the largest six lenders drops from almost 85 percent to about 60 percent.
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The adoption of internal models for small lenders also has a pro-competitive effect
on the market.38 I find that the Herfindahl index declines from 15 percent to about
12 percent, as smaller lenders reduce prices and gain more than 10 percent of market
shares, following the decrease in regulatory costs. The redistribution from large to
small lenders is overall less pronounced than in counterfactual I, according to both
measures.
Panels B and C of Table 1.8 look at the aggregate pass-through and the impli-
cation for access to credit. I find that eliminating internal models increase the cost
in the market by about 49 basis points, which are passed on to borrowers via higher
initial rates. The latter increase by approximately 50 basis points from 2.70 to ap-
proximately 3.20 percentage points. As a result of higher mortgage prices, demand
decreases by 13 percent along the extensive margin, as more than 750 borrowers
switch to the outside option. The average loan size (intensive margin) decrease by
approximately £1.5K, which is slightly higher than one percent of the average base-
line balance. In the second counterfactual, marginal costs in the mortgage market
go down by about 13 basis points, as a result of lower capital requirements for small
lenders. This fall translates into a reduction in prices by about 14 basis points and
an increase in mortgage demand by slightly more than one percent. I use the model
to compute a measure of consumer surplus based on the sum of indirect utilities
(see Appendix A.2 for derivation and references). In counterfactual I, as a result of
overall higher prices, average consumer surplus decreases by more than 30 percent,
while in counterfactual II the lower prices increase consumer surplus.
Even if a full evaluation of the policy from a systemic point of view would require
a general equilibrium approach, I can learn from the model the effects of changing
capital regulation on risk in the mortgage market and its differential impact on
38In a recent paper Buchak et al. (2017) show that regulatory arbitrage can account for about
55 percent of the increase in shadow banks after the crisis. In this paper I study a different form
of regulatory arbitrage, that favors the large banks and may impair competition.
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Table 1.8: Counterfactual risk-weighted capital requirements
Baseline Counterfactuals
I: All standard II: All internal
Value ∆ ∆
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Market structure
Herfindahl index 15.97 -5.25 -2.87
Share top six 84.98 -25.69 -11.14
Panel B: Pass-through
Cost 2.23 0.49 -0.13
Price 2.72 0.50 -0.14
Panel C: Credit access
Demand (extensive) 5,529 -766 77
Demand (intensive) 134.96 -1.48 0.45
Consumer Surplus 1.12 -0.39 0.07
Panel D: Risk
Default:
Naive 1.47 0.16 -0.05
Full 1.47 -0.02 -0.04
Buffer:
All 2.21 2.57 -0.06
Top six 1.86 2.29 -0.01
Others 4.32 1.36 -1.34
Notes: the table shows the baseline estimate of the model and two counterfacuals in a market for first-time buyers.
In the first counterfactual scenario, all lenders adopt the standard approach for setting the risk weights. In the
second counterfactual I compute the mean risk weight across IRB lenders and simulate a scenario in which SA
lenders develop and internal model that gives them the average risk weight of their IRB competitors. Cost is the
marginal cost in percentage points; price is the interest rate in percentage points; demand (extensive) is the total
number of borrowers; demand (intensive) is the loan amount; consumer surplus is the log sum of the indirect utility
of a representative consumer (see appendix A.2); default is the average number of defaults in percentage points;
buffer is the difference between the equity and the predicted loss. Small lenders include challengers and building
societies. Value is the actual value in the benchmark and counterfactuals; ∆ is the absolute change of the value in
the counterfactual relative to the benchmark.
large systemic lenders. In Panel D of table 1.8, I first look at borrowers’ default. I
report both the naive effect, which accounts only for the mechanical price change,
and the full effect after both lenders and borrowers adjust their behavior to the new
regulatory regime. The expected default predicted by the model in the baseline case
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is about 1.5 percent, which is in line with the empirical evidence in Section 1.2.3.
With the abolition of internal models I observe an increase in the average default in
the mortgage market, as higher prices make it harder for borrowers to service their
monthly payments. However, as leverage and demand adjust the overall default
rate decreases. In the second counterfactual lower prices and relative small changes
in credit access translate into lower defaults, which decrease by approximately 0.04
percentage points.
In Panel D of Table 1.8 I also report a measure of resilience for the overall
mortgage market. I compute the equity buffer as the difference in pounds between
lenders’ equity and expected losses for each mortgage. Lenders’ equity is given by
the endogenous loan size multiplied by the lender-specific capital requirement and
the counterfactual risk weights; expected losses come from expected default given
by (3.3) after lenders re-optimize rates in reaction to the new risk-weighted capital
requirements and borrowers adjust demand with the new prices. Abolishing internal
models almost doubles the equity buffer in the mortgage market, as large lenders
are now forced to hold extra capital even for low risk mortgages. In the second
counterfactual there is a small reduction in the extra buffer in the economy, which is
exclusively driven by small lenders, experiencing a significant drop in risk weights,
especially for low-risk mortgages. However, the buffer of small lenders remains
positive and still higher than the one of large lenders, which experience almost no
change as a result of the policy. Given the central role played by large lenders
in a crisis (Acharya et al., 2012; Akerlof et al., 2014; Bianchi, 2016), my second
counterfactual suggests that the reduction of risk weights for small lenders will not
threaten the stability of the system.
I find that heterogeneous capital regulation accounts for between 20 and 30 per-
cent of the concentration in the market. The abolition of internal models addresses
the imbalance between large and small lenders in terms of capital requirements,
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but the higher capital reduces demand and consumer surplus. The provision of a
representative internal model to small lenders could also address the competitive
distortion due to the differential regulatory treatment, but with limited impact on
credit access, ex-post mortgage defaults and the resilience of large lenders.39
1.6.2 Limits of Leverage Limits
An alternative set of policies already implemented or currently under discussion
to prevent the build up of risk in the mortgage market concerns explicit leverage
limits (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2013; DeFusco et al., 2016). As an
example, in the UK the Financial Policy Committee issued a recommendation in
2014 to limit new mortgage originations with a loan-to-income above 4.5 to no more
than 15 percent of all new mortgage originations. In this section I use the model
to evaluate the equilibrium effects of an alternative policy that limits household
leverage via loan-to-value rather than loan-to-income limits. Most notably, I study
the interaction of this policy with the capital requirement regime in place, which
varies by loan-to-value as shown in Section 1.2.2. In this way I shed light on the
equilibrium effects from jointly regulating both lenders’ and borrowers’ leverage.
Figure 1-8 shows the distribution of market shares by loan-to-value for the two
cases in the baseline and after the elimination of mortgages with a leverage above
90 percent. Panel (a) shows the equilibrium with a common capital requirement
of 8 percent and a risk-weight of 50 percent for all lenders, as was the cases before
the crisis during the Basel I regime, while Panel (b) shows the equilibrium with
the actual risk-weighted capital requirements. As expected mortgages with loan-to-
values close to 90 percent experience the largest increase, but as prices adjust other
39The results in the second counterfactual are based on the assumption that the cost of developing
the internal model is paid by the regulator, while if the burden falls on lenders the potential benefits
may be limited. A back of the envelope calculation shows that the small lender that gains the most
from the model will see an increase in profits in the mortgage market equivalent to 22 percent of
its annual total profits.
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Figure 1-8: Counterfactual leverage limits
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Notes: the charts show of mortgages in the two counterfactual scenarios for leverage regulation. In both counter-
factuals I impose a maximum leverage limit at 90%, by excluding products with a maximum leverage above 90%
from the choice set of all borrowers. In (a) I show the counterfactual with homogeneous capital requirements; in
(b) I show the equilibrium with risk-weighted capital requirements.
products are affected in equilibrium. Table 1.9 shows the quantification of costs and
benefits, and explores potential unintended consequences due to the interaction of
leverage regulations. The marginal cost of lending in the market goes down, as a re-
sult of eliminating high leverage-high cost mortgages, and interest rates follow. The
reduction in cost and rates is larger in the current regime with risk-weighted capital
requirements, as high leverage mortgages require more equity funding because of
the higher risk-weights.
Panel B of Table 1.9 shows the effect on mortgage demand and profits. Despite
the overall lower rates, there is a reduction in mortgage originations for first-time
buyers, dropping between 4 to 7 percent.40 The reduction in consumer surplus as
a result of the policy is even larger, despite the decrease in prices which should
increase it. The large negative effect is driven not only by the extensive margin, but
40This decrease can be seen as a lower bound to the true decrease in originations, as in the model
only a small fraction of borrowers, less than 5% will be affected by this regulation. As we show
in Table 1.5 our model slightly under-predicts mortgages with a maximum loan-to-value above 90
percent with respect to the data.
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Table 1.9: Counterfactual leverage limits
Capital Regulation
Homogenous Heterogeneous
(Pre-crisis) (Post-crisis)
Value ∆ Value ∆
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pass-through
Cost 2.60 -0.11 2.23 -0.17
Price 3.09 -0.11 2.72 -0.18
Panel B: Credit Access
Demand 4,678 -356 5,354 -195
Consumer Surplus 0,7 -0,15 1,09 -0,09
Lender Profits 670,62 -77,58 810,48 -57,03
Panel C: Risk
Default 1.38 -0.15 1.45 -0.13
Buffer
All 3.95 0.01 3.03 -0.31
Large 3.95 0.01 2.59 -0.34
Others 3.96 0.01 4.38 -0.21
Notes: the table shows the baseline estimate of the model and two counterfacuals in a market for first-time buyers.
In both counterfactuals I impose a maximum loan-to-value limits of 90%. Cost is the marginal cost in percentage
points; price is the interest rate in percentage points; demand (extensive) is the total number of borrowers; demand
(intensive) is the average loan size; consumer surplus is the log sum of the indirect utility of a representative
consumer (see Appendix A.2); profits is the average profit across lenders in thousand £; default is the average
number of defaults in percentage points; buffer is the difference between the equity and the predicted loss. Value is
the actual value in the benchmark; ∆ is the change of the value in the counterfactual relative to the benchmark.
also by the positive valuation that households attach to high leverage mortgages, as
I show in Table 1.3. Lenders’ profits drop by more than 30 percent, as the regulation
removes a profitable segment of the market.
Panel C of Table 1.9 shows that regulating household leverage with loan-to-value
limits affects risk in the mortgage market. Specifically, the limit to high leverage
mortgages decreases defaults, which drop by about 9-10 percent in both cases as a
result of both lower prices and lower leverage. To capture the overall riskiness in
the mortgage market I also look at lenders’ equity buffers. In the counterfactual
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with homogeneous capital requirement there is almost no change in the buffer or
even a slightly positive change, as lower prices reduce defaults. In the scenario with
risk-weighted capital requirements there is a 10 percent decrease in the equity buffer
in the market as a result of the ban on mortgages with the highest risk, but also the
highest capital. According to my estimates, the decline in the buffer is even larger
for the largest lenders, which experience a drop of about 13 percent, thus increasing
their exposure to risk in the mortgage market.
I find that a regulation targeting loan-to-value can be effective in reducing de-
faults, but with significant impact on mortgage originations. This finding resembles
the results from DeFusco et al. (2016), who find a strong impact of demand and
limited impact on default after the introduction of a down-payment to income limit
in the US. Furthermore, I show how the interaction in equilibrium of two leverage
regulations can have unintended consequences. Most notably, leverage limits ap-
plied in a market with risk-weighed capital regulation can reduce the equity buffer
of large lenders, thereby increasing systemic risk.
1.7 Conclusion
Leverage regulation has been at the center of the academic and policy debate since
the global financial crisis and there is an ongoing effort to understand better the
channels through which it operates and evaluate its effectiveness. In this paper
I focus on leverage regulation in the UK mortgage market, in which lenders with
different capital regulations coexist and limits to household leverage have been re-
cently introduced. I develop a tractable equilibrium model of the mortgage market
that accounts for several features characterizing borrowers’ demand and lenders’
competition, and estimate it exploiting variation in risk-weighted capital require-
ments across lenders and loan-to-values. Using within lender variation in capital
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regulation, I provide new estimates of the demand elasticity to the interest rate
and decompose it into an extensive margin (product demand) and intensive margin
(loan demand). I quantify the cost of capital regulation for lenders and evaluate the
impacts of alternative capital requirements and limits to households’ leverage.
My model and counterfactual simulations have important implications for policy,
most notably regarding the interplay between leverage regulation and competition,
which go well beyond the specific context of my analysis. Optimal leverage regulation
should consider the impact on the transmission mechanism to the real economy of
mortgage market characteristics, such as competition and households’ choices. Reg-
ulation of the financial sector should take into account potential trade-offs between
financial stability and consumer welfare and unintended consequences on market
structure.
My paper can be extended in several directions. The lender problem can be
enlarged to account for the acceptance/rejection margin. This would allow leverage
regulation to affect the loan supply not only through changes in loan rates, but also
through changes in underwriting standards. So far, I have captured this channel in a
reduced form way through affordability constraints and capital regulation affecting
interest rates, as well as unobservable product characteristics. A more comprehen-
sive model and empirical strategy that feature both the pricing and the rejection
choices would be an interesting avenue for future research. In this work I focus
mostly on the costs of risk-weighted capital requirements, their transmission on in-
terest rates and their implications for market structure. It would be interesting to
enrich my framework to account explicitly for strategic default choices on both the
demand and the supply side. Adding the default option for borrowers will allow a
comprehensive measure of consumers’ surplus; while lenders’ bankruptcy choice will
provide an explicit micro-foundation for leverage regulation and a fully fledged quan-
tification of the trade-offs. Finally, a more general equilibrium approach requires
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house prices to adjust as well. This would create feedback effects and dynamic con-
sideration both on the demand side, affecting for example the timing of housing
choice across the life cycle, and on the supply side via foreclosure externalities.
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Chapter 2
Bank Competition and The
Pass-Through of Unconventional
Monetary Policy
2.1 Introduction
Since the global financial crisis central banks around the world have implemented
unprecedented measures to counteract the credit crunch and sustain economic ac-
tivity, such as quantitative easing, liquidity injections and policy announcements.
These new tools have spurred the academic and policy debate about the role of the
banking sector for their transmission to the real economy (Gertler and Karadi, 2011;
Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Acharya et al., 2015; Di Maggio et al., 2016; Rodnyansky
and Darmouni, 2017; Agarwal et al., 2017; Krishnamurthy et al., 2017).
Empirical studies of the effects of both conventional and unconventional mone-
tary policy on credit supply faces two well-known identification issues: simultaneous
causality between credit demand and supply, and selection into treatment as banks
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choose to borrow from the central bank (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jime´nez et al.,
2012, 2014). Furthermore, disentangling the role of the banking sector in the trans-
mission mechanism poses an additional identification challenge due to non-random
assignment of banks’ market power, which can be correlated in the cross-section
with other confounding factors (Scharfstein and Sunderam, 2014; Drechsler et al.,
2017; Agarwal et al., 2018).
In this paper we provide causal evidence on the effect of targeted unconventional
monetary policy on banks’ credit supply to firms and on the role of competition in
the banking sector for the transmission mechanism. We study a series of Targeted
Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) by the ECB announced on the
5th of June 2014 with the goal to enhance the functioning of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism by supporting lending to the real economy. We exploit
an allocation rule by the policy together with a rich dataset on transaction-level
bank-firm lending relationships and with exogenous variation in banks’ local market
power to address three identification challenges and shed light on the functioning of
the transmission of unconventional monetary policy through the banking sector.
First, the dynamics of credit in the lending market are driven by both demand
and supply. In equilibrium, borrowers’ willingness to take new loans and accept
different conditions as well as lenders’ incentives to supply and reprice loans jointly
determine the amount of credit and its price. Less risky borrowers may have a higher
demand for the liquidity coming through TLTROs so that a decrease in lending rates
comes from selection on the demand side, rather than from treatment on the supply
side. To control for demand factors, we leverage on a panel of firms borrowing
from multiple banks and estimate an empirical model with a full set of firm-time
interacted fixed effects, thus only exploiting the variation within a firm across banks,
as pioneered in Khwaja and Mian (2008).
66
A second identification challenge arises from selection into treatment. Even
after controlling for demand factors, the supply side variation across banks that
we use for identification may be endogenous because banks’ use of TLTROs is a
choice. To control for time-invariant bank level unobservables, we include in our
empirical model bank fixed effect. However, time-varying differences across banks
that affect both TLTROs borrowing and lending strategies, can still bias our results.
We construct an instrumental variable (IV) for banks’ treatment using a rule in
TLTROs guidelines, that set the maximum amount that banks can borrow in the
first two operations to 7% of their outstanding amount of eligible loans on April
2014. The threshold is set by the ECB for the whole euro area and is based on
a variable that is fixed before the announcement of the policy. The differences
in potential treatment across banks are therefore predetermined and orthogonal
to unobservables than may affect loan supply in the period after TLTROs. The
relevance of our instrument is ensured by the fact that in the first two TLTROs
more than 90% of the banks actively participating to the operations borrowed at
least 95% of their borrowing limit.
Third, to study how the transmission mechanism is affected by the structure
of the banking sector we need exogenous variation in competition. We define local
banking markets the Italian provinces, the equivalent of US counties, and we assume
that each firm borrows in the same province where it has its headquarter.1 We isolate
the effect of competition on the pass-through of unconventional monetary policy by
exploiting geographical variation in banks’ market shares across provinces. As the
latter may be correlated with other factors affecting the equilibrium in the local
1In our data we don’t observe from which branch of the bank the firm borrows, but previous
evidence for Italy (Bofondi and Gobbi, 2006; Felici and Pagnini, 2008; Crawford et al., 2018) and
other countries (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Mian, 2006) suggest that lending to firms has
a local dimension. This choice is also motivated by the fact that provinces are the geographical
units used by the regulator to approve branch openings. We use the structure of Italian provinces
existing in 2005.
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credit market, we design an IV strategy using variation in the presence of pawnshops
across Italian cities during the Renaissance as an instrument for the level of local
competition in the banking sector today.2
Our first set of results looks at the effect of unconventional monetary policy on
credit supply for firms. We find that banks participating to TLTROs decrease their
rates to the same firm by 20 basis points relative to banks that do not participate,
when we instrument banks’ borrowing choice using the exogenous allocation rule.
This effect is significant and represents approximately 5 percent of the baseline cost
of credit. We allow the pass-through to vary over time and find that treated banks
start decreasing rates about two quarters after the first liquidity injection. Our
IV estimates are significantly larger than the OLS estimates, where banks choosing
to borrow from TLTROs decrease rate by about 5 basis points relative to banks
choosing not to borrow.
Our second set of results examines the role of banks’ market power for the trans-
mission mechanism of unconventional monetary policy. We find that competition
plays a significant role for the pass-through of unconventional monetary policy, lim-
iting the sensitivity of the cost of corporate loans to the cost of bank funding. The
magnitude of the result is significant: a one-standard-deviation increase in concen-
tration reduces the impact of TLTROs on lending rates by approximately 14 basis
points. This corresponds to a 32% decline in the transmission of unconventional
monetary policy relative to the benchmark of perfect competition. Furthermore, we
find that in provinces with low concentration lenders pass-on the lower rates to bor-
rowers immediately, while in provinces with high concentration banks do not lower
rates immediately after the policy change, but start after two quarters.
2Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the world’s oldest surviving bank, was founded in Siena by the city
magistrates as a pawnshop in 1472. Guiso et al. (2004) and Pascali (2016) show the importance
of historical difference in access to credit for long-term financial development across region and
provinces in Italy.
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Finally, we explore heterogeneous effects in the transmission mechanism of TL-
TROs due to differences in firms’ and banks’ characteristics. Small firms and those
with better credit rating borrowing from a bank using TLTROs experience a de-
crease in the cost of credit, while the reduction is not significant for the other firms
of the same bank. Banks’ local market power affects the pass-through for smaller
and safer firms, but plays no role for larger and riskier firms. The differential effect
on small firms is consistent with previous studies showing that small firms have less
alternatives than large firms in raising funding and may be more affected by bank’
competition (Berger and Udell, 1995; Beck et al., 2004). The differential effect on
ex-ante safer firms is consistent with theories based on information asymmetries and
hold-up problems (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). Our heterogeneity analysis suggests
a flight-to-quality within the corporate sector, with large banks competing to allo-
cate the ECB liquidity toward smaller and ex-ante safer firms, especially in more
competitive provinces.
Related literature Our paper is related to two main strands of literature. First,
we contribute to the empirical macroeconomic literature about the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy and how this is affected by financial imperfections,
by studying how unconventional monetary policy affect the cost of credit for firms
with an innovative research design.3 The key empirical challenge is to identify how
monetary policy affects supply side-factors, when there are confounding demand
side effects (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). A stream of literature has used firm-time
fixed effects to controls for unobservable demand factors, together with exogenous
measures of exposure to a shock. This approach has been adopted to study the effect
of supply-side liquidity shocks (Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Schnabl, 2012; Gambacorta
3Theoretical works on the topic go back to the seminal contributions by Bernanke and Blinder
(1992) and Bernanke et al. (1999). After the global financial crisis new models have included an
active financial sector (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014) and studied
its implications in a general equilibrium setting (Gerali et al., 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
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and Mistrulli, 2014), sovereign shocks (Bofondi et al., 2013; Albertazzi et al., 2014;
De Marco, 2015), and the transmission mechanism of both conventional and un-
conventional monetary policy (Jime´nez et al., 2012; Drechsler et al., 2016; Jime´nez
et al., 2014; Acharya et al., 2015; Carpinelli and Crosignani, 2017; Di Maggio et al.,
2016).We are the first to study a new unconventional monetary policy which has
been implemented with the explicit goal of increasing lending to the real economy,
thus providing evidence on the value of setting a lending target for monetary policy
effectiveness. Differently from most previous empirical studies that look at quan-
tities our work focuses on the pass-through to interest rates, which have been less
studied by the previous literature because of limited data availability on prices at
the loan-level (Jime´nez et al., 2014; Krishnamurthy et al., 2017). Most notably, in
our setting we observe both actual and potential treatment based on an exogenous
allocation rule, while previous studies generate cross-sectional variation in banks’
exposure to a shock or a policy change using predetermined banks characteristics.
Second, our work contributes to the literature on the relation between compe-
tition and monetary policy. The industrial organization approach to banking liter-
ature has studied theoretically the link between competition and monetary policy
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008a; Rochet, 2009), but the empirical evidence about the
relationship between market power and pass-through is ambiguous (Berger and Han-
nan, 1989; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992; De Graeve et al., 2007). On the one hand, in
more competitive market the pass-through of borrowing rate to lending rates can be
larger, as a results of higher elasticities of firms’ loan demand and absence of smooth-
ing coming from relationship lending (Cottarelli et al., 1995; Van Leuvensteijn et al.,
2013). On the other hand, the response of lending rate can be higher in more con-
centrated market, if banks pass-through cost efficiency or exploit market power from
holdup situations to adjust their markups (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). We develop
a new identification strategy to study empirically the effect of competition on the
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transmission mechanism of unconventional monetary policy to corporate lending,
complementing recent studies that look at the effect of competition for the trans-
mission of monetary policy in the US mortgage and deposit markets (Scharfstein
and Sunderam, 2014; Drechsler et al., 2017). Our focus on targeted unconventional
monetary policy has the unique advantage that the treatment is by design hetero-
geneous across lenders, which allows us to separate differences across banks from
differences in market structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the institu-
tional background of TLTROs and the Italian banking system; Section 2.3 summa-
rizes the data; Section 2.4 explains the identification strategy; Section 2.5 presents
our results and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Setting
2.2.1 Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations
On the 5th of June 2014, the ECB decided to support bank lending to the euro
area non-financial sector through a first series of Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing
Operations (TLTROs). This policy measure is implemented through eight auctions,
one each quarter from September 2014 to June 2016, and participation is open to
institutions that are eligible for the Eurosystem open market operations. In July
2014 and February 2015 the ECB updated the rules on borrowing limits, maturities
and early repayment options. A second series of four operations starting in June
2016 has been announced on the 10th of March 2016.
The ECB has been actively involved in supporting the financial system since the
onset of the global financial crisis in September 2008. In October 2008, the ECB
switched to a fixed-rate full-allotment mode for its refinancing operations, where
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the central bank sets an interest rate and banks can borrow an unlimited amount at
that given rate. In this way the ECB provided a certain source of funding to banks,
especially valuable in crisis time when other funding sources are impaired. The
ECB also increased its support to the banking sector with Longer-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTROs), complementing the weekly liquidity-providing transactions,
that have usually a maturity of one to three months, with a one-year operation in
July 2009 and two three-years operations in December 2011 and February 2012.
This longer-term liquidity allows banks to relax the roll-over risk coming from the
mismatch between assets and liabilities, thus favoring longer-term investment. The
popularity of the two three-years LTROs is evident from banks’ participation and
take-up: these operations provided more than 1 trillion euros liquidity to euro area
banks, with Spanish and Italian institutions among the main beneficiaries (Carpinelli
and Crosignani, 2017). Banks used the provided liquidity for rolling over previous
debt, issuing new loans to firms and household and buying sovereign bonds.
The TLTROs come within the framework of increasing support by the ECB,
but with some novelties about both goals and rules. While previous operations were
designed to support the banking sector, TLTROs explicitly target lending to the real
economy. For this reason, this policy represents an ideal experiment to understand
the full transmission mechanism from the central bank to firms and households, via
the financial sector. Both the goals and the rules are implicitly designed to reduce
the incentives to banks to use the liquidity for buying sovereign debt, as happened
in previous operations (e.g. LTROs), and to roll over existing debt.4
Figure 2-1 shows the time-line of the first series of TLTROs. Participation to
the operations was possible both on an individual basis and as a “TLTRO group” of
banks, not necessarily all part of the same banking group. The individual institution
4It is worth noting that the TLTROs overlap with the end dates of the previous LTROs,
maturing on January 29, 2015 and February 26, 2015, and therefore part of the funds were anyway
used to roll over the expiring debts of LTROs. For this reason in our estimation strategy we
account for expiring debt.
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and the “lead institution” in the group should be an eligible Eurosystem counterpart.
The eligibility criteria, valuation, haircuts and rules on the use of assets for collateral
are the same of the other standard refinancing operations (ECB, 2014). The interest
rate on the TLTROs will be fixed over the life of each operation at the rate on
the Eurosystem Main Refinancing Operations prevailing at the time of take-up; an
additional fixed spread of 10 basis points has been added for the first two TLTROs.
The main differences of TLTROs’ rules relative to previous operations are on
borrowing limits. The borrowing limits rules are different for the first two operations
at the end of September and December 2014 and the last six, from March 2015 to
June 2016. Define qbk the quantity borrowed by bank b (single or “TLTRO group”)
in operation k. The initial borrowing limit for the first two operations is computed
using the following formula:
q1b + q
2
b ≤ 0.07× ELApril2014b ≡ Ruleb. (2.1)
Bank b borrowing in the first two TLTROs cannot exceeds 7% of its outstanding
amount of eligible loans on 30 April 2014 (ELApril2014b ). The eligible loans include
lending to domestic non-financial corporations and households in the euro area,
and exclude loans securitised or otherwise transferred without derecognition from
the balance sheet.5 Moreover, they exclude loans to household for house purchases
to emphasize even more the willingness of the ECB to channel new liquidity into
productive investment. In Section 2.4 we describe how we use the rules regarding
the borrowing limit for the first two TLTROs in our identification strategy, while in
Appendix B.2 we describe additional rules of the scheme for the last six operations
and repayments.
5The definitions are detailed in ECB (2014).
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2.2.2 The Italian Banking System
The supply of bank credit is particularly important in Italy as firms are heavily
dependent on intermediated credit, relative for example to U.S. firms (Langfield
and Pagano, 2016). Italian banks have traditional business models, based on loans
to the real economy and close relationship with their customers, through a developed
network of branches. Guiso et al. (2004) report that “The president of the Italian
Association of Bankers (ABI) declared in a conference that the banker’s rule-of-
thumb is to never lend to a client located more than three miles from his office”
and they show how distance continue to segment local markets. Between 2008 and
2013 the number of branches decreased by 7% from 34, 100 to 31, 700, mostly as
a results of large groups reorganizations. Despite this reduction in the network,
the number of banks’ employees working in local branches is stable at 65% and a
survey of senior executives of the main Italian banks reveal that business originations
through branches will continue to play a leading role together with online banking
(PwC, 2010). In our analysis we consider a province as the relevant market for
banks lending to firms. Provinces are geographical entities very similar to U.S.
counties and they are used by the Italian antitrust authority as proxies for the local
markets for deposits (Bofondi and Gobbi, 2006; Felici and Pagnini, 2008; Crawford
et al., 2018). Figure 2-2 shows the geographical distribution of the quartiles of the
Herfindahl index (HI) across provinces calculated on the outstanding amounts of the
term loans in the first quarter of 2014. It shows that, even if competition is slightly
stronger in the north-east, generally there is a lot of variability among geographically
neighboring provinces.6
Italian banks’ funding has experienced significant changes during the European
sovereign crisis. With respect to short-term funding, retail deposits remained a sta-
6The main exception here is Sardinia, that being a relatively distant island from the mainland
suffers from isolation.
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ble source for Italian banks, while short-term wholesale funding was affected by a
widespread flight-to-quality from peripheral to core countries. Long-term unsecured
wholesale funding became increasingly harder to obtain for Italian banks, which
restored to secured long-term funding via covered bonds. The rating of the debt
issued have deteriorated, mostly as a results of the increase in non-performing loans,
due to a fall by 9% of GDP and 25% of industrial production. These losses impacted
negatively on Italian banks’ capital and together with the deleveraging needed to
improve capital ratio, severely reduce the capacity to provide loans to the real econ-
omy. In this context, central bank liquidity become increasingly more important as
a source of funding for banks. The reliance of Italian banks on ECB funding, mea-
sures as a percentage of assets, grew from less than 1% at the end of 2010 to more
than 6% at the end of 2012 (Van Rixtel and Gasperini, 2013). The new TLTROs by
the ECB strengthen this trend, by providing additional long-term liquidity to banks
in the euro area, with the explicit goal of promoting loan to firms. In the first two
TLTROs, the banks of the euro area borrowed collectively 212 billion euros, with
Italian institutions in the first place borrowing 57 billion euros. The transmission
of TLTROs could have therefore important implications for lending to the Italian
economy. The local and bank-centered Italian loan market and the importance of
the ECB TLTROs for the liquidity of Italian banks’ make our environment particu-
larly suitable to investigate the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the
real economy.
2.3 Data
In this work we construct a unique dataset at the bank-firm-time level, combining
four different sources of data.7 The main one is the Italian Credit register, which
7We use the term bank to indicate both standalone banks and banking groups henceforth. For
banks belonging to a banking group we aggregate the data at the banking group level, which is
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collects individual data on borrowers with exposure above 30 thousand euros from
all the intermediaries operating in Italy. From this source we extract information
at a monthly frequency about the interest rates of term loans charged on bank
debt for each borrower. Each observation is a bank-firm pair and we observe a
unique identifier for both the lending and the borrowing institution. We collapse
the data at the level of firm-banking group relationship using the mapping from the
Supervisory register of the Bank of Italy, where the legal structure of all the Italian
banking groups is publicly available.
We complement this data with additional information from both the bank and
the borrower side. On the one hand, we collect quarterly data on the geographical
distribution of branches and the structure of its balance sheet for each bank from
the confidential Supervisory reports and the Supervisory register of the Bank of
Italy. On the other hand, we exploit the borrower identifier to add information on
the geographical location, the credit quality and the size of the firm, matching our
dataset with the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS) managed by Cerved, one
of the most comprehensive sources of information about balance sheets of Italian
firms, also used by banks for credit decision. A last piece of information includes
confidential data about participation and the amounts lent from the central bank
to the Italian banks after each TLTRO bid.
The final dataset is a quarterly balanced panel, in a time span between the start
of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015. Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics
of the variables of the dataset. Panel A shows the main dependent variable of the
analysis is the overall interest rate (rbft), including the accessory expenses, on the
stock of term loans, charged by bank b to firm f at time t, shown in panel A of the
table. The first and the last percentile of the distribution of the interest rates have
been winsorized, to minimize the impact of outliers in the sample. The charged
the relevant entity for borrowing from the ECB.
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interest rate has been equal on average to about 4% considering the whole time
series and the whole distribution is included between about 0.5% and 12%. For this
kind of loans the impact of the expenditures on the overall rate is not particularly
strong. We also show the statistics on the interest rate on the flow of new term loans
of each period, used in a robustness check, which are not substantially different from
those on the stocks.
Panel B shows the Herfindahl Index of the local term loans markets. The first
one is calculated using quantities of credit for each province in the first quarter of
2014.8 The credit market in Italy is relatively concentrated, with an average value
of the index of 0.17 and a range of values included between 0.09 and 0.36. In section
2.5.3 we assume in an extension of our empirical model that markets are segmented
according to the credit quality of the borrower, summarized in nine ordinal categories
by an index of credit riskiness taken from CADS and calculated from the available
balance sheet data. We construct for this exercise separate HI assuming that the
market of credit for firms of average and high credit quality (classes 1-6 of the rating
index) is different from the one for firms of low quality (classes 7-9).9 The statistics
for the HI of the two segmented markets are very similar both among them and to
those of the HI by province. We also show summary statistics for the total number
of pawnshops that opened during the Italian Renaissance across Italian province
that we compute aggregating the city level data from Pascali (2016). The average
number of pawnshop by province is about one and it ranges from zero to eight.
Panel C shows the variables regarding the first two TLTROs; 78 banks in our
sample participated at either the first or the second TLTRO and the average bor-
rowed amount was about 670 million euros. Several of those banks used anyway
either part or all the borrowed liquidity to rollover already existing debts with the
8We used the structure of 103 Italian provinces existing until 2005 to get a homogeneous clas-
sification of the provinces from the different datasets.
9We also segmented the credit market in three categories instead of two, but the final results
were the same as those presented here.
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Eurosystem; for this reason we calculated a corrected amount of the exposition to
central bank coming from the first two TLTROs, netting out the debts towards the
Eurosystem expiring in the same quarter. 43 banks had a positive net amount after
this correction and the average net borrowed amount was of about 550 million euros;
the distribution is skewed to the left and the range of values is included between
5 and about 5500 million euros. The borrowing limit for the first two TLTROs,
calculated for the whole sample of 104 banks was on average of about 550 million
euros too, but is more skewed to the left. From the comparison of the raw amount
borrowed from the 78 banks participating to the TLTROs with their borrowing limit
we find that more than 90% of those banks borrowed more than 95% of their limit.
In panel D we report the main structural characteristics of the banks in the first
quarter of 2014: they had on average 30 billion euros of assets, almost half of which
are loans and about 20% are government bonds. The riskiness of the credit portfolio
of the banks and capital adequacy are respectively measured by the ratio between
bad loans and overall loans, equal on average to about 9%, and by the capital ratio,
based on the Basel rules, equal on average to about 15%.
Last, in panel E we report some statistics regarding firm characteristics, taken
from the balance sheets in CADS for the year preceding the policy (2013) and used
in the analysis of heterogeneous effects in Section 2.5.3. We show the distribution of
firm assets, equal on average to 4 million euros, and the percentages of firms whose
credit quality is either high/average (about three quarters of the sample) or low.
We compare the statistics where the statistical unit is the firm with those where the
statistical unit is the firm-bank relationship (which is the relevant statistical unit in
our final dataset); the statistics are substantially similar in both cases, taking into
account that on average bigger firms have more credit relationships and therefore
their weight is bigger when the statistical unit is the relationship.
In Table 2.2 we compare the characteristics of the banks borrowing a positive ad-
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ditional amount of resources from the TLTROs and of their customer firms (treated
group) with the other banks and firms (control group). Panel A shows the existing
differences in the endogenous variables in the first three quarters of 2014, between
relationships of firms with a treated bank and the other relationships. We do not
find appreciable differences in the statistics. In panels B and C we check the bor-
rowing limit and the structural characteristics for treated and control banks. We
find that on average the former are bigger than the latter and have therefore a big-
ger borrowing limit, but they are substantially similar when checking for the other
characteristics. In panel D we contrast the statistics weighted by the number of
firm-bank relationships of the firms borrowing respectively from a treated or a con-
trol bank; also in this case we do not find evidence of relevant differences in the two
samples.
2.4 Identification Strategy
First, to study the effect of unconventional monetary policy on the cost of credit,
ideally one would randomly assign liquidity to identical banks lending to the same
firm. Any decrease in the lending rate from the bank receiving the liquidity will
come from the treatment and not from other banks characteristics (the two banks
are identical) or firms characteristics (they are lending to the same firm). Second, to
study the effect of bank competition on the pass-through of unconventional monetary
policy, ideally one would like that the bank receiving the random liquidity injection
operates in two identical markets, which differ only on the level of bank competition.
Any differential decrease in the lending rate from the bank receiving the liquidity
in the market with high bank competition will come from the differences in bank
competition and not from other banks characteristics (it is the same bank) or other
markets characteristics. Our empirical strategy proceeds in three steps to address
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the key identification challenges: simultaneous causality, selection into treatment
and omitted variables.
Simultaneous causality. TLTROs were designed and implemented by the
policymaker as a reaction to macroeconomic conditions to explicitly promote lending
to the real economy. Therefore, macroeconomic shocks correlated to the policy
may induce unobservable loan demand shifts that are contemporaneous to the ECB
interventions, leading to simultaneity and omitted variables bias. An upward bias
in the evaluation of the effects of the policy would result if safer firms demand from
banks borrowing from TLTROs; while a downward bias would emerge if riskier firms
increase their loan demand by more. To control for changes in lending opportunities
we include in our specification interacted firm-time fixed effects. In this way, we
capture firm-specific time-varying shocks to loan demand and we exploit only the
variation within each firm-time pair across banks for identification.
We address possible concerns about differences at bank level controlling for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity with bank fixed effects. In this way we capture,
among other things, constant differences across banks in lending strategies and fund-
ing costs and we exploit only variation within bank over time. Moreover, we include
time-varying bank controls (bank capital, non-performing loans, government bonds),
that can have an effect on both banks’ funding costs and borrowing decisions and
are exogenous with respect to the rate decisions regarding a single transaction.
We estimate a difference-in-differences model on a balanced panel of firm-bank
relationships.10 We include in our equation time varying coefficients to capture the
dynamics of the transmission mechanism and we cluster the standard errors both
10The use of the difference-in-differences methodology on a balanced panel implies that our
conclusions only regards the credit relationships already existing before the start of the policy
since the beginning of the pre-treatment period in the dataset (first quarter of 2014) and whose
existence continued until the second quarter of 2015.
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by firm and by bank-time. Hence, the resulting OLS empirical specification is:
Ybfmt =
∑
τ
ατ Iτ=t × TLTRObτ + γft + γb + θXbt + εbfmt, (2.2)
where Ybfmt is the loan rate from bank b to firm f in market m and period t;
TLTRObt is the treatment variable; γft are firm-time fixed effects; γb are bank fixed
effects and Xbt are time varying banks controls.
Selection into treatment. Even controlling for endogenous timing of TLTROs,
participation is on a voluntary basis, within the rules set by the ECB and described
in Section 2.2. This may add additional selection bias, due to non-random treatment
assignment: the evaluation of the policy may be biased upward if banks with higher
return to lending or lower funding costs choose to borrow more, or biased downward
if banks with unobservable funding problems or lower marginal propensity to lend
exploit more the ECB facilities. We explicitly address this self-selection problem,
exploiting the institutional setting of the policy: we instrument actual borrowing for
the first two TLTROs with the maximum borrowing limit rule described in equation
(2.1) in Section 2.2. Our first stage regression of actual participation (TLTRObt)
on the exogenous regressors and the excluded instrument is:
TLTRObt = φRuleb × Postt + γft + γb + θXbt + bfmt, (2.3)
where TLTRObt is the actual treatment variable; Ruleb is the allocation rule for
bank b from equation (2.1) and Postt is a dummy equal to one after the imple-
mentation of the TLTROs. The borrowing limit has been set by the ECB in its
announcement in June 2014 and it is based on an exogenous parameter, which is
common across banks, and pre-determined banks’ balance sheet characteristics.11
11We find a correlation of -0.007 between the loan-level interest rate in the pre-treatment period
and the borrowing limit, suggesting that the borrowing limit is essentially uncorrelated with the
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The identifying assumption is that the borrowing limit established by the ECB for
the first two TLTROs is a valid instrument for bank access to central bank liquid-
ity controlling for unobservable time-varying demand heterogeneity (firm-time fixed
effects), unobserved bank heterogeneity (bank fixed effects) and time-varying bank
characteristics. The resulting IV empirical specification is:
Ybfmt =
∑
τ
ατ Iτ=t × ̂TLTRObτ + γft + γb + θXbt + εbfmt, (2.4)
where ̂TLTRObt is the predicted participation and all other variables are as in
equation (2.2).
Omitted variables. In the second part of the paper we study the role of the
local banking system for the pass-through of TLTROs. To identify the effect of
competition among lenders on the pass-through of unconventional monetary policy,
we exploit variation in the competitive structure at the local geographical level. We
measure competition with the HI for corporate loans in the province where a firm
headquarter is located (HIm), as Figure 2-2 shows. We augment equation (2.4) with
time varying coefficients on the interaction between the treatment and the HI, to
capture the dynamic effect of market power on the transmission mechanism:
Ybfmt =
∑
τ
ατ Iτ=t× ̂TLTRObτ+
∑
τ
βτ Iτ=t× ̂TLTRObτ×HIm+γft+γb+θXbt+εbfmt.
(2.5)
Variation in the HI can be correlated with other factors affecting the pass-through
of unconventional monetary policy.12 To account for endogeneity in market power
we also instrument the HI using exogenous variation in the presence of pawnshops
dynamics of the cost of credit before the treatment.
12For example Beraja et al. (2017) show how the time-varying regional distribution of housing
equity influences the aggregate consequences of monetary policy through its effects on mortgage
refinancing.
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across Italian cities during the Renaissance. Pascali (2016) shows that variation in
the presence of Jewish communities and pawnshops during the Italian Renaissance is
correlated with the variation in financial development across Italian cities today. We
exploit the same historical variation to instrument for the level of competition in the
banking sector today. Figure 2-2 shows the distribution of HI today across Italian
provinces, while Figure 2-3 shows the number of pawnshops during the Renaissance
in the currently established provinces. From a graphical inspection of the two maps
we see that provinces with a high number of pawnshops during the Renaissance tend
to have a less concentrated banking sector today. The correlation coefficient is -0.27
and we formally test the relevance of our instrument with the first stage regression:
TLTRObt ×HIm = φRuleb × Postt × Pawnshopm + γft + γb + θXbt + bfmt, (2.6)
where Pawnshopm is the number of pawnshops across Italian provinces during the
Renaissance. To capture jointly the causal effects of unconventional monetary policy
and of competition on the transmission mechanism, we estimate the following IV
empirical specification:
Ybfmt =
∑
τ
ατ Iτ=t× ̂TLTRObτ+
∑
τ
βτ Iτ=t× ̂TLTRObτ ×HIm+γft+γb+θXbt+εbfmt,
(2.7)
where ̂TLTRObτ ×HIm is the predicted interaction between the policy and the HI
from the first stage regression of the actual interaction on the exogenous variables
and the excluded instruments (the allocation rule and the presence of pawnshops
during the Renaissance). The interaction term ̂TLTRObt ×HIm captures the causal
effect of competition on the pass-through of unconventional monetary policy.
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2.5 Results
In this section we describe our results. In Section 2.5.1 we show our first set of
results on the effect of targeted monetary policy on the cost of credit. In Section
2.5.2 we discuss our second set of results on the role of bank competition for the
transmission of targeted monetary policy. In Section 2.5.3 we study how the trans-
mission mechanism varies with firms’ and banks’ characteristics, namely credit-risk
and size.
2.5.1 The Effect of Targeted Monetary Policy
The first empirical result of interest is the identification of the causal effect of tar-
geted monetary policy on the dynamics of the overall cost of credit. We estimate
both one specification where the TLTRO variable is a dummy equal to one after the
start of the policy if the institution participates in one of the first two operations
and another specification where we use the log of the actual additional borrowed
amount measuring the intensity of treatment.
Table 2.3 presents our results for the OLS model. Column (1) shows the re-
sults for the full sample in which we control for bank, firm and time fixed effects
separately. Treated banks decrease interest rates relative to control banks, but the
effects are not significant. In column (2) we estimate the OLS model on the sample
of firms with multiple banking relationships and control for demand with interacted
firm-time fixed effects. The effects are stronger and marginally significant. Banks
borrowing from the ECB through TLTROs decrease lending rate relative to banks
not borrowing by approximately 3 basis points on average. Finally in column (3)
we add time-varying banks’ control. The results are stronger and marginally more
significant. In the last three columns of Table 2.3 we estimate the same model with
the actual amount borrowers from the ECB, rather than the binary participation
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dummy. The results are similar to the ones with the binary treatment.
Table 2.4 presents our results for the IV model.13 Column (1) shows the results
for the full sample in which we control for bank, firm and time fixed effects separately,
and we instrument the binary TLTROs participation with the ECB allocation rule.
When we instrument the actual amount borrowed in the first two TLTROs in column
(1) of Table 2.4, we find that treated banks decrease interest rates relative to control
banks. Most notably, we find a statistically significant negative coefficients in the
first and second quarter of 2015, therefore just after the implementation of the
second round of the policy.
In column (2) of Table 2.4 we estimate the benchmark case with interacted firm-
time fixed effects, to capture differences in firms credit demand. Treated banks
decrease rate to the same firm on average by about 23 basis point relative to control
banks in the first and second quarter of 2015. Finally, in column (3) we control for
time varying bank factors that can affect differentially the pricing within firm-time
across banks. The results are still significant and the magnitude is reduced to about
20 basis points. A comparison of columns (3) from Tables 2.3 and 2.4 shows that
our IV estimates are stronger than the OLS estimates, suggesting that unobservable
heterogeneity is likely to bias our estimates downward. For example banks choosing
to borrow from the ECB may have been the ones planning to lower corporate rates
for other reasons (e.g. business strategy), that can be correlated with the choice to
borrow from the ECB in the first place.
Overall, our results on price suggest an outward shift after the second TLTRO
in the supply of loan by banks exploiting the liquidity injection by the ECB. In the
next section we further corroborate this hypothesis and explore if the competitive
13In Appendix C.1 we show the first stage regression for the benchmark case with interacted
firm-time fixed effects. Predicted TLTROs participation has a significant positive effect on actual
TLTROs participation. The overall Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for the first stages, approximately
42 and 56 for dummy and continuous treatments respectively, are well above the 10% Stock and
Yogo (2002) weak identification test critical values of about 16.
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environment has an effect on the pass-through of unconventional monetary policy.
2.5.2 The Effect of Competition on the Transmission Mech-
anism
Our second set of results shows how bank competition affects the transmission mech-
anism of TLTROs to the cost of credit. Table 2.5 presents the results. Also in this
section, we focus on firms with multiple lending relationship, to isolate a credit sup-
ply shock, and control for differences across banks with both banks’ fixed effects and
time-varying controls. The effect of the instrumented TLTROs treatment broadly
confirm the results from Table 2.4: banks exploiting the ECB liquidity injections
decrease loan rates for firms more than banks not participating to TLTROs.
The coefficients of interest capture the interaction between TLTROs treatment
and bank competition, measured by the local HI. Our estimates in column (1) of
Table 2.5 imply that high concentration reduce the pass-through of unconventional
monetary policy to firms through the cost of credit. In markets with an average level
of concentration treated banks pass on the lower rates to borrowers immediately after
the treatment. In markets with higher level of concentration treated banks do not
lower rates immediately after the policy change, but start after two quarters. This
effect may be due to second round effects following the reactions of other competitors
in the market.
We find that competition plays a significant role for the pass-through of ECB
liquidity on the cost of credit. The magnitude of the result is also significant: a firm
in a province with a standard deviation higher level of concentration experiences
a 14 basis points lower decline in the cost of credit. Higher concentration reduces
the transmission mechanism of unconventional monetary policy to firms by approx-
imately 32% relative to the theoretical case of perfect competition.14 Our estimates
14We compute the effect using the estimates from column (1) of Table 2.5 and taking the average
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of the effect of competition on lending rates are slightly larger than the ones from
recent works on the pass-through of monetary policy to mortgage and deposits rates
(Scharfstein and Sunderam, 2014; Drechsler et al., 2017). There are many possible
reasons for this difference. First, relationship lending, information frictions and mar-
ket power may play a more important role for corporate lending than for mortgage
lending and bank deposits, in which products are more standardized. Second, the
type of policy we are looking at. Both Scharfstein and Sunderam (2014) and Drech-
sler et al. (2017) focus on the transmission of conventional monetary policy, while
we look at targeted monetary policy operations. Third, our identification strategy
differs in how we control for banks’ lending opportunities.
In column (2) of Table 2.5 we show the estimates of equation (2.7), thus instru-
menting for both participation to TLTROs and local competition with the number
of pawnshop in the same province during the Italian Renaissance.15 Column (2) of
Table 2.5 shows that our results on the competition channel are robust to confound-
ing factors at the market level. Higher concentration in the local banking market,
coming from exogenous historical variation, significantly reduces the pass-through
of central bank liquidity to lending rates to firms, confirming our baseline result. Fi-
nally in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.5 we report the estimates using a continuous
treatment variable and the results are robust.
In Appendix C.1 we show several robustness checks. First, we replicate the
analysis using the raw amounts borrowed by banks in the TLTROs instead of the
additional amount net of the rolled over already existing debts towards the Eurosys-
tem. The results are qualitatively similar to the previous ones. Second, we reply the
of the effect of a standard deviation increase in concentration in each period.
15In Appendix C.1 we show the first stage estimate for our IV strategy, when we instrument both
the TLTROs treatment and the interaction term TLTROs × HI. Our instruments are significant
and have the expected sign. The overall Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for the first stages for both
dummy and continuous treatments and both endogenous variables are well above the 10% Stock
and Yogo (2002) weak identification test critical values of about 7.
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analysis for rates constructed with interest expenditures only, excluding accessory
expenses from the calculation. As expected, the results are unaffected. Third, we
show the results considering the interest rate on the flows of new loans of the period
instead of the one on the overall stock. On one hand flows allow to better capture
the dynamics of the new credit loans period by period, on the other hand they are
less suitable than stocks to construct a representative balanced panel because the
firm would need to borrow a new amount of credit in each period to be included
in the sample. When considering the direct effect only, the results are stronger
than for stocks and it is already statistically significant at the end of 2014, even if
weaker than in the following quarters. The larger magnitude and significance can
be explained by the fact that we are now only focusing on the new credit contracts
agreed in each period and not on the overall stock of loans already agreed. When
including the interaction with competition, the results are qualitatively similar to
those for stocks, even if not strongly significant as the results of Table 2.5 because
of the loss of precision in the estimates due to the smaller number of observations.
2.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects Across Firms and Banks
In this section we study whether there are heterogeneous effects in the pass-through
of unconventional monetary policy and the impact of the competitive environment
due to differences in some relevant banks’ and firms’ characteristics. In particular,
we focus on riskiness and size, which the previous literature identified as important
determinants of access to credit (Jime´nez et al., 2014; Agarwal et al., 2018). In
both cases we take ex-ante measures of credit risk and size, to deal with possible
endogeneity concerns.
Table 2.6 shows the estimates of model (2.4) in the different subgroups.16 Columns
16In Appendix C.1 we report the estimates for the same specification using the continuous
TLTROs measure as treatment variable. Results are confirmed.
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(1) and (2) focus on firms’ credit risk. We assume that credit markets are segmented
by credit rating of the firm and calculated a different HI separately for each group of
firms. We split the full sample into two subgroups: firms with good or average credit
rating (classes 1-6) and those with a bad one (7-9).17 We find that the reduction in
the cost of credit is driven by loans to safer firms, while we do not find significant
reduction in the cost of credit for riskier firms. Moreover, competition affects the
pass-through of unconventional monetary policy to safer firms, but plays no role
for riskier firms. This result corroborates the hypothesis that banks using the ECB
facility to compete for the safest borrowers, as proxied by their ex-ante riskiness,
while there is less space for competition in riskier lending.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.6 look at differences in the pass-through between
large and small firms. Here we split the sample taking firms above and below the
median of the distribution of assets in the pre-treatment year (2013). We find that
both groups benefit from the reduction in the cost of credit following the first two
TLTROs, but the effect is stronger and only significant for smaller firms. Banks
taking the ECB facility lowered the cost of credit to small firms by about 60 basis
point, while the decrease is about 30 basis points smaller and not significant for large
firms. Competition affects the pass-through of policy to the cost of credit for small
firms, while it plays no significant role for large firms. This result is consistent with
the idea that small firms benefit more from competition between lenders, because
they have less alternatives than large firms in raising funding (Berger and Udell,
1995; Beck et al., 2004).
Finally, in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.6 we study heterogeneity on the supply
side and compare the largest five banks in Italy with other medium and co-operative
banks. Treated large banks decrease their lending rate relative to control banks,
while we do not find significant differences when the treated bank is of smaller size.
17We also considered a sample split in three categories (1-3) (4-6) (7-9) and the results were very
similar to the split in two groups presented here.
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Competition affects how large is the banks’ pass-through to lending rates of the
ECB liquidity. We find a positive significant interaction between the policy and the
HI. Large banks decrease lending rate as a response to the lower funding cost in
markets where they face competition from other banks, while they increase profit
margins in markets where they have market power.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we empirically study the transmission mechanism of unconventional
monetary policy to lending to firms and how it is affected by banks’ market power.
We exploit a rule set by the ECB on banks’ borrowing limit as an instrument to
identify an exogenous expansion in banks’ funding availability, together with rich
transaction-level dataset on term loans bank-firm lending relationship and exogenous
historical variation in competitiveness of local lending market.
We show three main new findings. First, banks participating to the first two
TLTROs decrease on average loan rates to the same firm by approximately 20 basis
points relative to banks not participating to the ECB liquidity injection. Second,
competition in the banking sector plays a significant role for the pass-through of
TLTROs on the cost of credit: a one standard deviation increase in concentration
reduces the decline in the cost by about 14 basis points, thus lowering the effect of
unconventional monetary policy by approximately 32% relative to a perfect com-
petition benchmark. Third, our effects are driven by large banks passing-through
the ECB liquidity injection via lower loan rates to smaller and ex-ante safer firms,
especially in more competitive markets.
Our results have important implications for both the implementation of monetary
policy and the design of regulation to promote competitiveness in lending markets.
Our analysis suggests that targeted monetary policy could be an effective tool for
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channeling banks funding into productive investment such as corporate lending, po-
tentially avoiding unintended consequences emphasized in recent studies (Acharya
and Steffen, 2015; Crosignani et al., 2017). However, variation in banking com-
petition changes the effects of monetary policy, potentially amplifying pre-existing
differences in credit access and local economic conditions. We leave a more thorough
analysis of optimal regulation and the effects for the real economy to future work,
but our results suggest that it is important for policy makers to consider the inter-
actions between monetary and competition policies, especially following the recent
changes in the competitive landscape due to consolidations, branch closures and the
rise of shadow banks (Buchak et al., 2017; Stackhouse, 2018).
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2.7 Main Figures and Tables
Figure 2-1: TLTRO timeline
The figure shows a timeline of the ECB TLTROs. On the 5th of June 2014, the ECB decided
the first series of Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs). The policy measure
is implemented through eight auctions, one at the end of each quarter from the end of September
2014 to the end of June 2016. Banks borrowing in the first two TLTROs cannot exceeds 7% of the
outstanding amount of eligible loans on 30 April 2014. All TLTROs will mature in September 2018,
but banks have the option to repay any part of the amounts they were allotted in a TLTRO after
24 months at a biannual frequency. The ECB imposes a mandatory early repayment in September
2016, if some lending requirements are not satisfied. A second series of four operations starting in
June 2016 has been announced on the 10th of March 2016.
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Figure 2-2: Geographical distribution of Herfindahl Index
The figure shows the geographical distribution of the quartiles of the Herfindahl index in the term
loan sector. The index is calculated using quantities of credit for each province in the first quarter
of 2014. We used the structure of 103 Italian provinces existing until 2005 to get a homogeneous
classification of the provinces from the different datasets. The credit market in Italy is relatively
concentrated, with an average value of the index of 0.17 and a range of values included between
0.09 and 0.36 (see Table 2.1).
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Figure 2-3: Geographical distribution of pawnshops
The figure shows the geographical distribution of the number of pawnshop during the Renaissance.
The index is calculated aggregating the number of pawnshops by cities using the structure of 103
Italian provinces existing until 2005. The number of pawnshops comes from Pascali (2016).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
The table shows the summary statistics for the main variables in our analysis. Panel A shows the
overall interest rate, with and without accessory expenses, on the stock of term loans and including
expenditure for the flows of new loans. In Panel B, Herfindahl index at province level is calculated
using quantities of credit for each province; the one at province and rating level is constructed
segmenting markets by province, separately for firms of average and high credit quality (classes
1-6 of the rating index) and firms of low quality (classes 7-9). Pawnshops is the total number
of pawnshops in each province using data from Pascali (2016). In Panel C amount borrowed is
the total amount borrowed in the first two TLTROs; additional amount borrowed is the corrected
amount of the exposition to central bank coming from the first two TLTROs, netting out the debts
towards the Eurosystem expiring in the same quarter; maximum allowance is the borrowing limit
computed from expression (2.1). In panel D we report the main structural characteristics of the
banks in the first quarter of 2014: total assets and ratio of government bonds, total loans, bad loans
and capital. In Panel E we report the distribution of firm assets and compare the statistics where
the statistical unit is the firm with those where the statistical unit is the firm-bank relationship
(which is the one we use in our final dataset); the statistics are substantially similar in both cases,
taking into account that on average bigger firms have more credit relationships and therefore their
weight is bigger when the statistical unit is the relationship.
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Panel A: Transaction level variables (1st quarter 2014-2nd quarter 2015)
Interest rate incl. expenditures (%) 671951 4.06 1.96 0.49 3.85 12.10
Interest rate w/out expenditures (%) 671951 4.05 1.95 0.49 3.85 11.83
Interest rate incl. expenditures (flows; %) 58098 4.85 2.30 0.50 4.56 14.31
Panel B: Province level variables (1st quarter 2014 for HI)
Province level HI on credit amount 103 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.36
Province - Rating 1-6 HI 103 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.36
Province - Rating 7-9 HI 103 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.48
Pawnshops (number) 103 1.02 0.50 0.00 0.0 8.00
Panel C: I-II TLTRO variables (bank level)
Amount borrowed (million euros) 78 670.0 1843 5 85.72 12500
Additional amount borrowed (million euros) 43 542.7 1167 5 123 5495
Maximum allowance (million euros) 104 560.3 1635 16.11 83.49 12500
Panel D: Other bank level variables (1st quarter 2014)
Assets (billion euros) 104 30.19 101.27 0.46 2.97 777.91
Loans over assets ratio (%) 104 54.07 11.64 8.21 55.75 74.86
Bad loans over loans ratio (%) 104 9.33 5.44 0.09 8.75 27.57
Government bonds over assets ratio (%) 104 18.26 8.86 1.09 18.25 43.30
Capital ratio (%) 104 15.48 9.24 0.25 13.86 94.89
Panel E: Firm level variables (2013)
Assets (million euros; by firm) 73174 3.95 30.08 1 0.59 2548.20
Assets (million euros; by relationship) 113246 7.24 40.66 1 0.95 2548.20
Percentage distribution
Classes: 1-6 7-9
Credit rating (by firm) 73% 27%
Credit rating (by relationship) 74% 26%
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for treated and controls
The table shows the summary statistics for the main variables in our analysis in the group of
treated and control banks. Panel A shows the main the overall interest rate, with and without
accessory expenses, on the stock of term loans and including expenditure for the flows of new loans.
In Panel B maximum allowance is the borrowing limit computed from expression (2.1). In panel
C we report the main structural characteristics of the banks in the first quarter of 2014: total
assets and ratio of government bonds, total loans, bad loans and capital. In Panel D we report the
distribution of firm assets and the percentages of firms whose credit quality is either high/average
(about three quarters of the sample) or low, using as statistical unit the firm-bank relationship
(which is the relevant statistical unit in our final dataset).
Treated Controls
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Transaction level variables (1st-3rd quarter 2014)
Interest rate incl. expenditures (%) 220776 4.23 2.04 115046 4.14 1.84
Interest rate w/out expenditures (%) 220776 4.22 2.03 115046 4.12 1.82
Interest rate incl. expenditures (flows; %) 21243 5.21 2.27 7806 4.74 2.16
Panel B: I-II TLTRO variables (bank level)
Max allowance (million euros) 43 841.7 2238 61 359 979.1
Panel C: Other bank level variables (1st quarter 2014)
Assets (billion euros) 43 47.87 145.61 61 17.72 48.81
Loans over assets ratio (%) 43 53.20 10.25 61 54.68 12.58
Bad loans over loans ratio (%) 43 7.85 2.65 61 10.38 6.57
Government bonds over assets ratio (%) 43 17.93 7.79 61 18.50 9.60
Capital ratio (%) 43 16.75 12.68 61 14.58 5.64
Panel D: Firm level variables (2013)
Assets (million euros) 74372 6.75 38.14 38874 8.17 45.04
Percentage distribution
Treated Controls
Classes: 1-6 7-9 1-6 7-9
Credit rating 75% 25% 72% 28%
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Table 2.3: Targeted monetary policy - OLS estimates
The table reports the estimated parameters and their standard errors from the OLS estimation of
equation (2.2). Column (1) reports the estimates with the full balanced dataset. Columns (2) and
(3) report estimates with the balanced panel of relationships for firms with more than one lender.
The dependent variable is the interest rate including expenditure on the stock of loan from bank
b to firm f in quarter t. Binary treatment is a dummy equal to one if the bank borrows from
the TLTROs. Continuous treatment is a continuous variable equal to the logarithm of the actual
additional amount the bank borrows from the TLTROs. Bank-time controls include bank capital,
non-performing loans, government bonds. All standard errors are double clustered by firm and
bank-quarter. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Binary treatment Continuous treatment
All Within All Within
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TLTROs (bt) ×
2014 - Q3 -0.034 -0.025 -0.032 -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0017
(0.041) (0.028) (0.028) (0.002) (0.0015) (0.0014)
2014 - Q4 0.025 0.011 -0.013 0.001 0.00047 -0.00061
(0.035) (0.022) (0.023) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0011)
2015 - Q1 -0.011 -0.024 -0.047* -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0026**
(0.039) (0.024) (0.025) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0012)
2015 - Q2 -0.019 -0.051** -0.065** -0.0014 -0.0027** -0.0033***
(0.047) (0.024) (0.025) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Observations 654,948 354,600 354,060 654,948 354,600 354,060
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.36 0.36 0.71 0.36 0.36
Fixed effects
Firm (f) Yes No No Yes No No
Time (t) Yes No No Yes No No
Bank (b) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-time (ft) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls (bt) No No Yes No No Yes
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Table 2.4: Targeted monetary policy - IV estimates
The table reports the estimated parameters and their standard errors from the IV estimation of
equation (2.4). Column (1) reports the estimates with the full balanced dataset. Columns (2)
and (3) report estimates with the balanced panel of relationships for firms with more than one
lender. The dependent variable is the interest rate including expenditure on the stock of loan
from bank b to firm f in quarter t. Binary treatment is a dummy equal to one if the bank
borrows from the TLTROs. Continuous treatment is a continuous variable equal to the logarithm
of the actual additional amount the bank borrows from the TLTROs. Both the binary and the
continuous treatment are instrumented. Bank-time controls include bank capital, non-performing
loans, government bonds. All standard errors are double clustered by firm and bank-quarter. *,**,
*** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Binary treatment Continuous treatment
All Within All Within
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TLTROs (bt) ×
2014 - Q3 -0.18 -0.12 -0.12 -0.0067 -0.0043 -0.0044
(0.14) (0.097) (0.082) (0.005) (0.0035) (0.003)
2014 - Q4 -0.049 0.039 0.076 -0.0018 0.0014 0.0026
(0.12) (0.083) (0.069) (0.004) (0.0028) (0.0023)
2015 - Q1 -0.39** -0.23** -0.20*** -0.014** -0.0085** -0.0073***
(0.18) (0.098) (0.076) (0.0057) (0.0033) (0.0026)
2015 - Q2 -0.36* -0.24* -0.19* -0.013* -0.0087** -0.0071*
(0.21) (0.13) (0.11) (0.0071) (0.0044) (0.0041)
Observations 654,948 354,600 354,060 654,948 354,600 354,060
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.36 0.36 0.71 0.36 0.36
Fixed effects
Firm (f) Yes No No Yes No No
Time (t) Yes No No Yes No No
Bank (b) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-time (ft) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls (bt) No No Yes No No Yes
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Table 2.5: Targeted monetary policy and competition
The table reports the estimated parameters and their standard errors from the IV estimation of
equations (2.5) and (2.7). All columns report estimates with the balanced panel of relationships for
firms with more than one lender. The dependent variable is the interest rate including expenditure
on the stock of loan from bank b to firm f in quarter t. Binary treatment is a dummy equal to
one if the bank borrows from the TLTROs. Continuous treatment is a continuous variable equal
to the logarithm of the actual additional amount the bank borrows from the TLTROs. Bank-time
controls include bank capital, non-performing loans, government bonds. All standard errors are
double clustered by firm and bank-quarter. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and
0.01 levels, respectively.
Binary treatment Continuous treatment
(IV-OLS) (IV-IV) (IV-OLS) (IV-IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TLTROs (bt) ×
2014 - Q3 -0.48** -1.60** -0.018** -0.061**
(0.23) (0.69) (0.0088) (0.025)
2014 - Q4 -0.44* -1.38** -0.016* -0.054**
(0.25) (0.69) (0.009) (0.025)
2015 - Q1 -0.38 -2.08*** -0.014* -0.077***
(0.24) (0.8) (0.0086 ) (0.028)
2015 - Q2 -0.42* -1.71** -0.016* -0.063**
(0.24) (0.76) (0.0086) (0.027)
TLTROs (bt) × HI (m) ×
2014 - Q3 2.61* 10.8** 0.097* 0.41**
(1.56) (4.87) (0.058) (0.18)
2014 - Q4 3.72* 10.4** 0.13** 0.40**
(1.91) (4.97) (0.065) (0.18)
2015 - Q1 1.29 13.6** 0.052 0.50**
(1.81) (5.68) (0.064) (0.20)
2015 - Q2 1.66 10.9** 0.065 0.40**
(2.02) (5.46) (0.071) (0.19)
Observations 354,060 354,060 354,060 354,060
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.35
Fixed effects
Firm-time (ft) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank (b) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (bt) Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.6: Targeted monetary policy and competition - Heterogeneity
The table reports the estimated parameters and their standard errors from the IV estimation of
equation (2.5) in different subsets of the data. All columns report estimates with the balanced
panel of relationships for firms with more than one lender. The dependent variable is the interest
rate including expenditure on the stock of loan from bank b to firm f in quarter t. TLTROs is a
dummy equal to one if the bank borrows from the TLTROs. High risk firms are firms with a bad
credit score (7-9), while low risk are firms with a good or average credit rating (classes 1-6). Small
firms are firms below the median of the distribution of assets in the pre-treatment year (2013).
Large banks are the top 5 banks in Italy. Bank-time controls include bank capital, non-performing
loans, government bonds. All standard errors are double clustered by firm and bank-quarter. *,**,
*** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Firm risk Firm size Bank size
High Low Small Large Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TLTROs (bt) ×
2014 - Q3 -0.59 -0.34** -0.65** -0.37 -0.43** 0.46
(0.48) (0.19) (0.33) (0.27) (0.21) (0.80)
2014 - Q4 -0.25 -0.28 -0.58 -0.32 -0.55*** 1.30
(0.54) (0.19) (0.39) (0.27) (0.19) (1.02)
2015 - Q1 -0.58 -0.20 -0.53 -0.30 -0.55*** 1.18
(0.50) (0.18) (0.37) (0.26) (0.17) (1.34)
2015 - Q2 -0.18 -0.43** -0.78** -0.22 -0.36 0.05
(0.47) (0.18) (0.36) (0.28) (0.23) (1.40)
TLTROs (bt) × HI (m) ×
2014 - Q3 4.35 1.36 3.29 2.18 1.90 -3.56
(3.77) (1.22) (2.37) (1.87) (1.22) (6.85)
2014 - Q4 2.84 2.36** 4.95* 2.76 3.71*** -9.61
(3.89) (1.35) (2.90) (2.00) (1.26) (9.85)
2015 - Q1 3.04 -0.03 1.72 1.11 3.20*** 9.81
(3.47) (1.27) (2.62) (2.07) (1.12) (12.30)
2015 - Q2 0.65 1.43 3.61 0.60 2.64* 1.14
(3.16) (1.32) (2.60) (2.43) (1.33) (11.90)
Observations 81,930 272,130 154,458 199,602 135,936 106,680
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.36 0.31 0.34 0.41 0.34
Fixed effects
Firm-time (ft) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank (b) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (bt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
100
Chapter 3
Down Payment and Mortgage
Rates: Evidence from Equity
Loans
3.1 Introduction
Down payments are a ubiquitous feature of mortgage contracts (Stein, 1995). Inter-
est rates are higher on lower down payment mortgages to reflect higher risk (Bester,
1985; Adams et al., 2009).1 Low down payments can increase risk through two
channels. First, low down payments attract riskier borrowers (Campbell and Cocco,
2003, 2015; Corbae and Quintin, 2015). Second, a lower down payment also means
less protection for the lender against falls in the value of the housing collateral and
a higher expected loss in case of borrower default (Admati and Hellwig, 2014). Dis-
entangling these two channels is fundamental to understand whether lenders are
concerned about the quality of the pool of borrowers or about house price risk—
1Across countries, house buyers with a larger down payment get better mortgage rates (Al-
Bahrani and Su, 2015; Andersen et al., 2015; Benetton et al., 2017; Basten and Koch, 2015).
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both important channels that contributed to the global financial crisis (Mian and
Sufi, 2009).
In this paper we study the causal effect of down payment on interest rate through
asymmetric information. In other words, we isolate how lenders price the risk signal
from down payment size. We exploit the institutional features of a UK affordable
housing scheme that offers households equity loans to top up their down payment.
The equity loans generate variation in down payment for mortgages with the same
collateral and the same loan-to-value ratio (LTV). In standard mortgages, a 20
percentage points lower down payment increases the interest rate at origination by
about 200 basis points, but this combines the effect of a higher default probability
and a higher LTV. Using our experiment, we find that only 22 basis points (c. 10%)
can be attributed to unobservable borrower quality signaled by the down payment.
We provide supporting evidence that, ex-post, borrowers with 5% down payment
are twice as likely to miss mortgage payments than those with 25% down payment.
This result is important for the innovative mortgage products that we study. Equity
loans can make house purchases more affordable, in particular for households with
limited down payment, and may dampen the adverse macroeconomic effects of house
price volatility (Mian and Sufi, 2015; Greenwald et al., 2017). The benefits of equity
loans would however be muted if lenders charged substantially higher mortgage rates
when households contribute only a small portion of the home equity.
We design an identification strategy that exploits variation in down payment for
the same collateral and LTV, leveraging on unique contractual features of the UK
Help to Buy - Equity Loan (EL) scheme. The scheme was introduced in 2013 and
offers households a 20% equity loan—a contribution to the down payment to pur-
chase a property—in exchange for a 20% share of any future capital gains resulting
from a sale of the property. The borrower contributes a 5% down payment. The
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mechanics of the contract is better explained with an example, that we graphically
show in Figure 3-1. Consider two mortgages both with a 75% loan-to-value ratio:
a “standard” mortgage where the borrower pays a 25% deposit; and a EL where
the borrower pays only a 5% deposit and the remaining 20% is provided by the
scheme. The LTV on the two mortgages is the same but the down payment from
the borrower is different, and we test whether this difference affects pricing.
We build a novel dataset which contains about 92,000 mortgages originated be-
tween April 2013 and June 2016 and combines information on the EL scheme (from
the Homes and Communities Agency), mortgage origination and performance (Fi-
nancial Conduct Authority) and house prices (Land Registry). We create two groups
of borrowers with different down payments but same LTV and we test whether the
group with the lower down payment pays a higher mortgage rate, controlling for
observable borrower and product characteristics. These characteristics capture the
hard information used in mortgage pricing and available to both the lender and the
econometrician. Soft information (observable to the lender, but not to the econome-
trician) is unlikely to matter given the centralized pricing strategies in the mortgage
market—the UK mortgage market is a “supermarket”, with standardised products
priced on a limited number of variables (Best et al., 2015; Benetton, 2017).
We find a 16 basis points premium on EL mortgages when we compare the
interest rates on EL mortgages and “standard” 75% loan-to-value mortgages. As
expected, we find a large difference in terms of the size of the down payment (in
monetary terms), while differences in terms of house prices and borrower character-
istics, such as age and income, are more muted. Compared to standard borrowers,
EL borrowers purchase, on average, houses that are £21,000 (8%) cheaper but their
down payment is £51,000 (80%) smaller. The EL premium increases to 22 basis
points when we compare EL and standard mortgages issued by the same lender, in
the same period, with the same product characteristics (eg. fixed vs variable mort-
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gage rate). These are the main characteristics on which mortgages are priced in the
UK market. The premium is robust to additional regional and borrower controls
that are not explicitly priced but could vary between EL and standard mortgages.
Only when we control for the down payment the EL premium disappears.
To corroborate our story based on higher unobservable risk we test whether
EL borrowers with a low down payment also have a higher delinquency rate than
borrowers with standard mortgages and similar loan-to-value ratios. We find that
delinquency rates are higher for EL mortgages compared to standard 75% loan-
to-value mortgages. Finally, we assess competing explanations for the difference
in mortgage rates between the two groups. We test whether there is less bank
competition in the supply of EL mortgages or whether properties bought with EL
have a higher depreciation risk (in which case the same LTV might result in different
loss given default), but these explanations are not supported by the data.
Related literature Our paper contributes to two related streams of literature.
First, we contribute to the household finance literature that looks at mortgage prod-
ucts (see among others Campbell and Cocco, 2003; Guiso et al., 2013; Campbell and
Cocco, 2015). The 2008 crisis has revamped the debate about optimal mortgage de-
sign (Cocco, 2013; Campbell, 2013; Miles, 2015), and several recent papers have
suggested and analyzed alternative mortgage products, such as shared appreciation
mortgages (Shiller, 2007; Greenwald et al., 2017); option adjustable rate mortgages
(Piskorski and Tchistyi, 2010); fixed rate mortgages with underwater refinancing
(Campbell, 2013); and convertible fixed rate mortgages (Eberly and Krishnamurthy,
2014). We build on this literature and study a new government scheme designed to
promote affordability in the UK mortgage market by providing an equity loan to the
borrower. We look at the supply side and study how lenders react to the scheme by
adjusting their pricing strategy, thus affecting the benefits of alternative mortgage
products.
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Second, our work contributes to the literature that tests empirically whether
lenders use collateral as a screening device (Adams et al., 2009). Despite the im-
portance of the mortgage market, this paper is, to our knowledge, the first to look
at how down payment is used as a screening mechanism in this context. Most of
the literature uses collateral data to evaluate corporate or small-medium enterprise
lending—see Berger et al. (2011) for a survey. For households, Adams et al. (2009)
analyse the relationship between down payment and borrower quality in the market
for subprime car loans; while Agarwal et al. (2016) study home equity release prod-
ucts and find that less creditworthy borrowers choose contracts with less collateral.
Our identification approach exploits contractual features of mortgages to estimate
the effect of information asymmetries on pricing, along the lines of recent papers by
Ambrose et al. (2016) and Hansman (2017). Similarly to these paper we look at the
effect of down payment on contract choice and default, but we also consider how
this is reflected on pricing with an innovative research design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the setting and
the data. Section 3.3 presents our identification strategy and shows the main result.
Section 3.4 provides additional evidence on mortgage performances and addresses
alternative explanations for our findings. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Setting and data
EL is a UK shared home equity scheme that allows households to buy new properties
with a lower down payment. In this section we highlight the importance of down
payment in the UK mortgage market and explain how the EL scheme works. We also
show that, in the data, a lower down payment is associated with higher mortgage
rates and more frequent delinquencies.
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3.2.1 The UK mortgage market
In international context, the UK mortgage and housing markets are characterized
by high household indebtedness, medium levels of home ownership, and adjustable
rate contracts with short initial fixed-rate periods (Campbell, 2013; Jorda` et al.,
2016).
Mortgage originations Since April 2005 UK mortgage lenders have been re-
quired to report all their mortgage originations to the Financial Conduct Authority
(the Financial Services Authority until 2013). The submissions include detailed
information on loan, borrower and property characteristics. This information is
collected in the FCA’s Product Sales Data (PSD), on which we base our analysis.2
In the UK mortgage leverage—as measured by the LTV ratio—is driven by the
size of the down payment rather than the value of the house. Figure 3-2 uses the full
set of PSD originations to show the distribution of house values and down payments
by LTV. The average house price is relatively flat (about £200,000) up to 75% LTV
and then decreases gradually. The average down payment instead falls steadily with
LTV.
Moreover, UK lenders set an interest rate schedule that increases with the LTV.
Mortgages are priced on a limited number of variables, typically LTV, borrower type
(first-time buyer, home mover, remortgager) and rate type (length of fixed period).
Other indicators of borrower quality, such as loan-to-income and credit rating are
used to approve or reject the application, but do not affect mortgage rates.3 To
demonstrate the importance of LTV for UK mortgage rates, we follow Best et al.
(2015) and regress the interest rate at originations on a set of product and time
2The PSD includes remortgages and excludes buy-to-let mortgages. Some of the variables
contained in the PSD are: borrower type (first-time buyer, home mover, remortgagor), age, income,
loan value, loan-to-income ratio (LTI), maturity, product type (e.g. fixed, floating), property value,
location (full six-digit postcode).
3Moreover, rates are not dependent on the location of the property.
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dummies and LTV bins. Figure 3-3 shows the results. The conditional interest rate
increases with discrete jumps at the relevant LTV thresholds. The jumps in the
interest rate are largest for LTVs above 85 and 90.
Mortgage performance data Since summer 2015 UK mortgage lenders have
been required by the FCA to provide a loan-level snapshot of their current mort-
gage holdings. These mortgage performance data are part of the PSD and include
a number of loan characteristics, such as date of origination, original and current
loan balance, remaining mortgage term, and whether the mortgage has ever been
delinquent.4 We define delinquent borrowers (or borrowers in arrears, in UK termi-
nology) as those that missed payments for a total amount exceeding the value of
three regular monthly payments.
We use the mortgage performance data in Section 3.4 where we evaluate the
repayment performance of EL borrowers against other purchasers of equivalent,
non-EL mortgages. We employ the snapshot of owner-occupied mortgages as of
December 31, 2016 and single out loans that have been in arrears at least once since
origination.
In general, mortgages with higher leverage (and hence lower down payment) are
more likely to be delinquent. Figure 3-4 shows that the proportion of delinquent
borrowers increases more than proportionally with LTV. This fact holds both un-
conditionally (Figure 3-4a) and when we control for a rich set of borrower and loan
characteristics (Figure 3-4b).
3.2.2 The Help To Buy - Equity Loan scheme
The UK government started the EL scheme in April 2013, with the objective of
supporting “credit-worthy but liquidity constrained” households and increase the
4These variables do not perfectly overlap with the ones in the origination data, but the two
datasets can be combined by matching on the postcode and date of birth of the borrower.
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supply of new housing.5 The government originally planned to phase out the scheme
in 2016, but it has now extended it until 2021. The scheme is available in England
and Wales. A similar, but separate, scheme is available in Scotland.
While there had been other schemes to support home ownership prior to EL,
these were on a smaller scale. For example, its immediate predecessor, FirstBuy,
had a budget of £250 million. The UK government initially set a maximum budget
for EL of £3.7 billion. In October 2017 it pledged a further £10 billion and promised
to continue to scheme until 2021.
The EL scheme provides an equity loan of up to 20% of the value of the house.
In exchange, the scheme receives interest and participates in any capital gains or
losses resulting from the sale of the property. To be eligible, the borrower has to
provide a minimum 5% down payment. The bank or building society provides a
mortgage for the remaining balance (up to 75%).6 In case of default, the EL scheme
holds a “second charge” on the property. The proceeds from a sale of the property
go first to the bank or building society that provided the mortgage.
Eligibility is not subject to income restrictions and there are no checks on whether
the borrower could provide a larger down payment. However, borrowers must meet
affordability requirements to ensure that they will be able to repay the mortgage.7
5First-time buyers and new builds were particularly affected by the housing downturn of 2007-
08. The supply of high LTV mortgage in the UK fell sharply following the crisis of 2007-08, as
mortgage lenders sought to reduce credit risk. First-time buyers experienced an increase in the
average down payment (15% pre-crisis to over 25% in 2010) and a fall in mortgage lending (which
halved between 2007 and 2008). Younger households were affected most. In 1991, 67% of the 25 to
34 age group were homeowners. By 2014, this had declined to 36% (Office for National Statistics,
2016). The sharp fall in house prices also affected house construction, which fell from over 200,000
per annum in 2007 to less than 150,000 in 2010 . Demand was constrained by limited mortgage
availability for new properties, in particular at high LTVs.
6The description of the EL scheme is based on National Audit Office (2014), Gov.uk (2016a)
and Gov.uk (2016b).
7These include, for instance, a 4.5 loan-to-income (LTI) limit based only on the mortgage. The
affordability measures do not include the equity loan. One possible reason for the low EL premium
that we measure on mortgage rates could be that lenders take reassurance from the additional
checks that the Government carries out on borrowers. However, given that there is no additional
requirement on borrowers compared to other mortgages, and the LTI constraints are in fact eased
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The scheme is available to both first-time buyers and home movers, but not for
second homes or buy-to-let investment. The property must have a purchase price of
£600,000 or less. The borrower has to pay to the scheme only a £1 fee for the first
five years. After that, the annual interest fee is 1.75%, increasing each year with
the Retail Price Index (RPI). Payments of this fee do not amortize the equity loan
capital. The borrower can make principal repayments at any time. The minimum
repayment is 10% and is calculated on the basis of the market valuation of the
house.8 The borrower must repay the full value of the loan when the property is
sold or after a maximum of 25 years.
The scheme is administered by the Department for Communities and Local Gov-
ernment (DCLG) and the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) through a net-
work of local agents, who process the applications. EL operates under slightly
different criteria in Wales and the Greater London area. In Wales, the maximum
property price is £300,000.9 In London, the EL limit was increased from 20% to
40% in February 2016.10 We exclude Wales and London (after January 2016) from
our analysis.
EL originations and performance data We obtained from the HCA the com-
plete database of all EL loans for the first 39 months of the scheme, from April 2013
to June 2016. The dataset includes 91,759 loans with information on full postcode,
size of the mortgage, purchase price, lender name, and expected completion date.
Appendix Table C.1 shows descriptive statistics for the EL dataset. The total
value of these equity loans is £4.17 billion, whereas the total value of properties
sold under the scheme is £20.82 billion. According to the England and Wales Land
by the equity loan, this effect is likely to be small or nonexistent.
8For example, if the value of the property has increased from £200,000 to £220,000 the minimum
repayment is £22,000.
9See Welsh Government (2016).
10See HM Government (2016).
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Registry there were 286,593 sales of new properties in England between April 2013
and June 2016, implying that one third of the new build market was financed by EL.
Since new builds correspond to approximately 10 percent of all housing transactions,
EL financed 3 percent of all housing sales in England.
We match the EL dataset to the PSD to identify mortgage originations that are
associated with an EL.11 We then restrict our analysis to two groups of borrowers
with the same collateral but different down payment. The first group is composed
of EL borrowers that contribute with a 5%-10% down payment (with the vast ma-
jority putting down the minimum 5%—see Appendix Figure C-1), while the scheme
finances an additional 20% of the purchase price. The second group is composed of
borrowers that contributed a 25%-30% down payment with a standard 70-75% LTV
mortgage. For simplicity, from now on we refer to the first group as EL borrowers
and second group as “standard” borrowers.12
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for EL and standard borrowers, while Figure
3-5 shows the different distributions of house purchase prices, incomes, mortgage
sizes, and down payments. By construction, the size of the down payment constitutes
the main difference between the EL and standard borrowers. EL allows borrowers
to purchase similar (but slightly cheaper) houses with similar (but slightly smaller)
mortgages. Table 3.1 also shows that EL borrowers are younger and have lower
incomes, are more likely to be first time buyers, and are less likely to buy a property
in London.
As an anticipation of the main result of this paper, we show in Table 3.1 that the
average interest for the EL group is 11 basis points (4%) higher than for standard
borrowers. Moreover, EL borrowers are more likely to become delinquent: the
delinquency rate for EL borrowers is 0.29%, almost double the rate for the standard
11Data cleaning and matching are described in Appendix Table C.2.
12These groups are neither the universe of EL borrowers (a few EL borrowers contribute a down
payment higher than 5%) nor that of “standard” mortgages (we exclude mortgages with other
LTVs).
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borrowers (0.15%).13
As with the universe of UK mortgages, in our subsample of interest we observe
a correlation between down payment, mortgage rates, and delinquencies. In this
sample we can exclude that the correlation between down payment and mortgage
rates is caused by different losses in the event of default, which are set equal for all
loans, suggesting that the EL premium is driven by the higher default risk of low
down payment borrowers. In the next section, we develop an identification strategy
to test whether the correlation between down payment and mortgage rates is robust
to controlling for observable borrower and loan characteristics.
3.3 Down payment and mortgage rates
Theories of collateral as a screening mechanism predict that lower collateral—in the
case of mortgages, down payment— should be associated both with higher interest
rate and higher risk (Bester, 1985). In this section we measure the effect of collateral
on mortgage rates, while in section 3.4 we focus on mortgage delinquencies.
3.3.1 Hypothesis
The mortgage rate r needs to compensate for the risk the borrower will not repay
in full, which depends on the probability of non-repayment p and on the loss in case
of non-repayment l. The mortgage rates also need to compensate operational costs
c and a mark-up m:14
r = p(X, d) · l(∆h, d) + c+m, (3.1)
13Given the recent introduction of the EL scheme (2013), the number of loans in arrears is
limited. In our sample, 110 EL borrowers are in arrears, compared to 24 standard borrowers.
14The components l, c and m are all expressed as a proportion of the loan. We do not assess
whether lenders are pricing risk correctly.
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where the probability of non-repayment p is a function of observable X and non-
observable χ risk characteristics: p = p(X,χ). If the down payment d is a signal of
non-observable risk (d = d(χ)), then: p = p(X, d).
The down payment however affects the interest rate in another way, too. In case
of default, the lender can repossess the property. The lender incurs a loss if the
current value the property is below the value of the outstanding loan, which can
happen if the fall in house value ∆h is larger than the original down payment d.
Equation (3.1) highlights our channel of interest - the effect of down payment (d)
on mortgage rate (r) through the probability of non-repayment (p) - and the main
confounding factors that we need to control for. All else equal, we expect lower d
to be associated with (a) higher mortgage rates r and (b) higher risk p.
3.3.2 Research design
Our goal is to establish a causal link from down payment to interest rate, only
through default risk. This objective requires us to observe the interest rates for
two identical mortgages by the same lender, for the same property, taken by two
borrowers who differ only in the size of the down payment. This is unlikely in
most mortgage markets because, even conditioning on all observable borrower and
mortgage characteristics, a lower down payment affects interest rates through both
p and l in equation (3.1).
To isolate empirically the effect of d through unobservable risk χ we proceed
as follows. First, we keep l constant by comparing the two groups of mortgages,
EL and standard (as defined in the previous section), with the same collateral but
different down payment and adding regional fixed effects to control for house price
volatility ∆h. Second, to remove variation in operational costs c and mark-up
m we add interacted product-time fixed effects, which also remove differences in
risk across products and time. Third, we control for observable risk X by adding
112
exogenous borrower characteristics. At this point, we attribute any remaining EL
premium after introducing these controls to the lower down payment provided by
EL borrowers. As a last step, we check this by introducing the down payment d in
the regression and verifying that the EL premium disappears.
We estimate the following empirical model:
rijkt = αELi + βjt + γk + δXi + ηZi + ijt (3.2)
where rijkt is the interest rate paid at origination by borrower i for product j to
purchase a property in region k in month t; ELi is a dummy variable equal to one if
the mortgage is under the government scheme; βjt are interacted product-time fixed
effects;15 γk are geographic fixed effects; Xi are exogenous borrower characteristics
and Zi are additional borrower controls—house prices and down payment.
Our coefficient of interest is α which captures the EL interest rate premium. Our
hypothesis is that that α falls to zero only when we add the down payment as a
control, but remains positive otherwise.
3.3.3 Results
Table 3.2 presents our main result on mortgage rates. We test different explanations
for the interest rate differential shown in section 3.3.2 by gradually introducing the
controls in equation (3.2).
Column (1) in Table 3.2 shows the regression of the loan-level interest rate on the
EL dummy. As shown in the descriptive stats in Section 3.2.2, lenders on average set
an interest rate that is 11 basis points higher for EL mortgages than for mortgages
within the same LTV band.
In column (2) we add the interacted product-time fixed effects (βjt) to control
15A product in our setting is the combination of a lender, an interest rate type (e.g. fixed or
variable) and a borrower type (first time buyer, home mover).
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non-parametrically for differences in product characteristics. We exploit only the
variation in interest rate within product-month-LTV, effectively comparing the in-
terest rate on mortgages offered by the same lender, in the same month, to the same
borrower type (first-time buyer vs. home mover) at the same conditions (e.g. fixed
rate for two years). We find that the EL premium increases to 22 basis points.
In column (3) we include geographic fixed effects γk. The EL premium may
be driven by local factors if borrowers with EL mortgages tend to buy houses in
locations with higher house price volatility or macroeconomic risk. However, when
adding geographic fixed effects, we find that the coefficient on the EL dummy de-
creases by only 1 basis point.
In column (4) we control for exogenous borrower characteristics (Xi). We include
age and income of the borrower, employment status (employee or self-employed) and
type of mortgage application (joint- or single-income application). Even if mortgage
pricing in the UK is not borrower specific, selection into certain types of products
can affect the pricing strategy of lenders (see section 3.2). If low-income borrowers
systematically choose EL mortgages, the higher interest rate associated to EL will
capture the effect of lower income. The EL premium stays stable at about 22 basis
points.
In our data we are unable to observe all the information that lenders have on
borrower risk characteristics. For example, we do not have data on credit scores. As
explained in Section 3.2.1, this additional information is not used directly to price
UK mortgages, but may affect pricing indirectly through average borrower risk.
However, we note that adding observable borrower characteristics to the regression
has a small effect on the EL premium, suggesting that product fixed effects are able
to absorb a substantial amount of variation in borrower risk characteristics.
Finally, we control for additional borrower variables (Zi) to test our main mech-
anism. In column (5) we add the house value to compare mortgages for houses with
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similar prices, in the spirit of Figure 3-1. The EL premium remains around 22 basis
points. Income becomes insignificant when we add house value, due to the high
correlation between the two variables. In column (6) we control for loan size instead
of house price. Given that we restrict the estimation sample to loans with the same
LTV, controlling for house value or loan size yields the same result.
In column (7) we add down payment to the regression in order to test explicitly
whether differences in down payment explain the interest rate difference between
EL and standard borrowers with similar LTV, mortgage product, and houses. The
price difference between EL and standard borrowers decreases by 10 basis points.
Finally in column (8) we allow the down payment to enter nonlinearly in the model,
making the whole EL premium insignificant.
To summarize, the size of the down payment provides information on borrowers
over and above their risk characteristics and housing choices. We find that lenders
price EL mortgages about 22 basis point higher than equivalent standard mortgages.
This premium is explained by the lower down payment. In our restricted sample,
the down payment contributed by EL borrowers is 20 percentage points lower than
that contributed by standard borrowers (5% and 25% respectively)—a difference of
about £50,000.
Heterogeneity Table 3.3 shows the results on heterogeneity in EL mortgage rates
across borrowers and lenders. In the first two columns we compare first-time buyers
and home movers. The EL premium is larger for home movers by about 10 basis
points. This finding may seem counterintuitive given that first-time buyers have no
credit history in the mortgage market. However, the inability to make a large down
payment seems to carry a particularly bad signal for home movers, who may have
had the possibility to build home equity with their previous house.
In the remaining columns of Table 3.3, we study heterogeneity across lenders.
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Previous studies have shown that pricing of risk can vary with lender characteristics,
such as size and funding structure (He et al., 2012; Jime´nez et al., 2014; Dagher and
Kazimov, 2015). In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.3, we look at lender size. We
compare the top four lenders in our sample with the smaller lenders and building
societies. The EL premium for the lenders accounting for the vast majority of
originations is close to the baseline of 20 basis points, as expected. The other
lenders charge EL mortgages more, at almost 35 basis points. This difference can be
attributed to both demand and supply factors. Borrowers taking EL from smaller
lenders may be relatively riskier than the standard borrowers. Alternatively, smaller
lenders may be more cautious in pricing unobservable risk.
For the largest lenders we collect additional information on their capital buffers
and funding costs. In columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.3 we study heterogeneity
based on capital buffers, defined as the difference between a bank’s capital resources
and the minimum regulatory capital requirement (both measured as a percentage
of total assets). We find that the EL premium is almost 30 basis points for lender
with a low buffer and around 12 basis points for lenders with a larger buffer. Better
capitalized lenders pass on the scheme to borrowers at lower prices. Moreover, this
result seems to suggest that lenders with lower capital do not extend cheap credit to
riskier borrowers, in contrast with recent evidence in other settings (Jime´nez et al.,
2014).
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3.3 compare lenders with different funding costs,
which we proxy lenders’ credit default swaps. We find that for lenders with high
funding costs the EL premium reaches 34 basis points, while lenders with low funding
costs price it at about 16 basis points. Lenders with lower funding costs pass on the
scheme to borrowers at lower prices.
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3.4 Down payment and risk
In the previous section we showed that lenders price EL mortgages higher than
equivalent standard mortgages and the difference is due to unobservable factors
related to the size of the down payment. In this section, we provide evidence that
EL mortgages are ex-post riskier, consistent with our main finding of an EL premium
in mortgage rates. We also address alternative mechanisms that could explain the
premium.
3.4.1 Ex-post performance
In equation (3.1), the down payment affects the mortgage rate because it signals
unobservable borrower characteristics that increase the probability of default. But to
extract the signal, the lender must observe that, all else equal, lower down payment
borrowers are ex-post riskier. In Section 3.2.2 we have shown that, unconditionally,
EL borrowers are twice as likely to become delinquent than standard borrowers. In
this section we show that this relation holds after controlling for observable borrower
and loan characteristics.
To measure the effect of down payment on ex-post performance controlling for
confounding factors, we estimate a model similar to (3.1) but with the probability
of delinquency as dependent variable. This takes the form of the following probit
model:
Delinquent ilt = βELi + γl + γt + αZi + δXi + ilt. (3.3)
where Delinquent ilt is a dummy equal to one if borrower i borrowing from lender l
in year t has been delinquent at any point before the end of 2016. Our coefficient
of interest is β which captures the additional risk associated with EL mortgages;
with this variable we aim to isolate only the effect of the unobservable risk on
delinquencies that the borrower signals via a lower down payment. To control for
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other factors affecting the probability of delinquency we include a full set of year
of origination and lender fixed effects, borrower and property level controls. We
also estimate (3.3) with the interest rate at originations (rijt) among the controls,
although the results of this specification have to be taken with caution, given the
endogenous nature of mortgage rates.
Table 3.4 presents the results. Column 1 replicates the unconditional marginal
effect of EL on the delinquency rate (0.13 percentage points). In column 2-4 we
add similar controls to those in the price regression in Table 3.2. We incrementally
add year and region fixed effects (column 2), borrower characteristics and house
value (column 3) and lender fixed effects (column 4). Due to the limited number
of observed delinquencies, we use separate lender and year fixed effects rather than
the full set of product-by-month fixed effects. We find that the effect of EL on the
delinquency rate remains around 0.10 percentage points, and is still significant at
the 10% level, despite the small number of delinquencies in the sample.
In the last column of Table 3.4 we show the results including the mortgage in-
terest rate in the regression. This specification checks that the different delinquency
probabilities between EL and standard borrowers are not simply due to the fact that
EL borrowers pay higher rates (as shown in the previous section) and therefore have
a harder time servicing their mortgage. However, mortgage rates are themselves an
endogenous outcome variable, which hinders the interpretation of the conditional ef-
fects estimated by the regression: EL borrowers are charged more precisely because
of their higher delinquency probability. With this caveat in mind, column 5 shows
that EL borrowers are still 0.07 percentage points more likely to become delinquent
than standard borrowers, but the difference is now statistically insignificant.
What unobservable risk characteristics does the down payment signal? Our find-
ing of a higher delinquency rate for EL borrowers could be due to either lower bor-
rower quality at origination or stronger incentives to default due to higher leverage.
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Under the first interpretation, borrowers that are illiquid today are also likely to be
illiquid tomorrow, and unable to pay in case of income shock (Adams et al., 2009).
This intuition can be formalized in models where households save for precautionary
reasons. In Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Campbell and Cocco (2015) impatient
mortgage borrowers with a higher discount rate accumulate a smaller buffer stock
on liquid financial assets and are more likely to miss mortgage payments.
Under the second interpretation, EL borrowers are more leveraged and hence
more likely to fall into negative equity than the control group. For example, a fall in
property value from £100,000 to £90,000 would be sufficient to push into negative
equity an EL borrower with a £5,000 deposit at origination, but not a standard
75-percent LTV mortgage with £25,000 home equity at origination. This higher
leverage increases the probability of negative equity and hence the opportunities for
strategic default (for a recent example see Hansman, 2017).
It is worth pointing out, however, that the incentive to strategically default are
not as high for EL borrowers as for other homeowners that put a 5% down payment.
Figure 3-6 shows how the home equity position of borrowers varies depending on
house prices and type of mortgages, assuming an initial house value of 100. For
simplicity, we assume an interest only mortgage, where payments cover only the
interest and none of the principal is repaid until sale. The initial home equity of EL
owners is the same as that of 95%-LTV borrowers, but its sensitivity to house price
movements is lower. Because of the cushion provided by the government scheme,
the EL household will reap lower gains for any increase in house value, but will also
suffer lower losses for any house price decline. It takes a fall in house prices of more
than 6.25% for a EL borrower to be in negative equity.16
Two additional considerations point towards a bigger role for borrower qual-
16In the simplified case of an interest-only mortgage, EL borrower home equity is Et = 0.8HPt−
Qt = 0.8HPt− 0.75HP0, where HPt and Qt are, respectively, the house price and the outstanding
mortgage balance at the end of the period, while HP0 is the purchase price of the house.
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ity as opposed to strategic defaults. First, between 2013 and 2016 average house
prices grew across all regions in England. All 370 local authorities experienced an
increase in house prices except for Redcar and Cleveland (in North East England)
and Allerdale (in North West England).17 Therefore arrears in our sample are not
driven by negative equity.
Second, the UK framework for treating mortgages in default is full recourse. UK
mortgage borrowers can be pursued for up to six years for any remaining mortgage
obligation (Lambrecht et al., 2003; Aron and Muellbauer, 2016). They remain liable
for their debt even after the property has been repossessed by the lender, if the
sale value of the property does not cover the value of the debt. Lambrecht et al.
(2003) find that UK lenders’ foreclosure decisions depend more on cash flow shocks
(income, interest rates) than on leverage.18 Evidence for the US indicates that
full recourse significantly reduces, but does not completely eliminate, incentives for
strategic default (Ghent and Kudlyak, 2011).
We conclude with a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the effect of down pay-
ment on mortgage rates. Borrowers for EL mortgages put the same down payment
(5%) as borrowers with standard 95%-LTV mortgages. However, standard 95%-LTV
mortgages entail a significantly different loss given default for lenders. Figure 3-3
shows that in the UK the average difference in mortgage rates between 75 and 95%-
LTV mortgages is around 200 basis points. In this paper we show that borrowers
who put only a 5% down payment pay, ceteris paribus, a mortgage rate premium
of 20 basis points relative to borrowers who put a 25% down payment. We can
therefore conclude that probability of default explains approximately 10% of the
differential between 5% and 25% down payment mortgages, with the bulk of the
17We checked local house price trends using the house price in-
dices available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/
uk-house-price-index-data-downloads-march-2017.
18This is confirmed by regulatory surveys in which strategic default does not seem to be a concern
for lenders operating in the UK market.
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differential (90%) explained by differences in loss given default.
3.4.2 Alternative explanations
The analysis in section 3.4.1 is consistent with an interpretation of the EL premium
in terms of default risk, driven by ex-ante selection. But our results could also be
consistent with alternative mechanisms. First, the EL premium could also reflect
higher repayment risk. Second, the premium could be compensating lenders for
higher depreciation risk for EL properties. Third, the EL premium could reflect a
markup due to lower competition in the EL segment, compared to standard mort-
gages, within the new build market. We explore each explanation in turn, but find
limited evidence in their support.
Lenders are exposed to the risk that the borrower terminates the contract early
to refinance at a lower rate (Campbell and Cocco, 2003). The borrowers in our
sample have an incentive to refinance at the end of the fixed-rate period (typically
two or five years) after which the mortgage rate reverts to a higher “standard vari-
able rate” (Miles, 2004). The original lender receives lower cash flows, compared
to the standard variable rate, if it offers a new fixed-rate contract, but loses all
future cash flows if the borrower switches to another provider or sells the property.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 however indicate that, unconditionally, EL
borrowers are less likely than standard borrowers to refinance or sell the house.19.
We test this result by substituting refinancing and sale as the dependent variables
in probit regressions similar to Equation 3.3. The results in Table 3.5 indicate that
differences between the two groups in the probability of resale or refinance with the
same bank are either not significant. The difference is statistically significant but
economically marginal in the case of refinance with another bank (EL borrowers are
slightly less risky).
19We consider all refinancing ans sales activity between origination and the end of 2016.
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New houses usually sell at a premium compared to other properties of comparable
characteristics.20 For our identification strategy, this premium is only problematic to
the extent that it affects EL properties more than other equivalent new builds. This
differential impact could be due to: (1) lower price elasticity of EL buyers, (2) less
maintenance effort by EL buyers (possibly because of the risk sharing component
of the EL contract as in Shiller and Weiss, 2000), or (3) developers using EL as an
alternative to the variety of incentives that have been on offer to other buyers, which
might include discounts to list price, or higher specifications of homes or features.21
To check that our results are not driven by depreciation risk, we identify which
properties in the treatment and control group were resold within the sample period.
We match the PSD mortgage flow dataset with the England and Wales Land Reg-
istry and find 485 cases of sales (186 in the control group and 299 in the treatment
group). We compute the appreciation of properties as the (log) ratio between the
transaction price at sale and the purchase price. Table 3.6 shows that, uncondition-
ally, EL properties have lower appreciation rates, by approximately four percentage
points. However, once we control for purchase year, or for purchase year and sale
year, the difference becomes insignificant. Additional controls for region fixed effects
drive the difference close to zero.
Lower competition in the EL market compared to standard mortgages on new
builds could lead to a higher markup for EL mortgages. For example, the admin-
istrative burden associated with offering EL mortgages could inhibit entry by some
lenders, especially smaller banks. Mortgages lenders interviewed as part of DCLG
(2016)’s evaluation of the EL scheme indicate that mortgage lending for the new
build market is more concentrated than for the overall property market. The main
barrier to entry are the fixed costs required to establish a relationship with devel-
20“[H]ouses are a bit like new cars, which lose value immediately upon being driven off the lot.”
(Coulson et al., 2016)
21EL mortgages could be issued in areas with higher house price volatility, and this would also
induce higher depreciation. However, our geographic fixed effects address this problem.
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opers’ sales offices. However, what matters for our analysis is whether entry in the
EL segment is more difficult than for standard mortgages in new build. According
to DCLG (2016) the EL scheme helped smaller lenders establish these relationships
with developers and increased their appetite to enter the new build market.22
We test for differences in concentration between the supply of EL and standard
mortgages. In our dataset, we find that supply is more concentrated for EL mort-
gages: the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (HHI) is .26 compared to .20
for standard mortgages. Higher concentration does not lead to lower competition if
consumers are able to switch across providers. Most EL borrowers are first-time buy-
ers and have not developed brand loyalty from previous experiences in the mortgage
market. Lenders could have built brand loyalty through other financial products,
in particular current accounts. However, only about 20%-30% of UK mortgages are
sold by the the same bank that the borrower has a current account with.23
We also examine concentration at the full (six-digit) postcode level,24 which we
use as a proxy for concentration within individual new developments. Developers can
enter agreements to steer mortgage demand for their new built properties towards
specific lenders.25 If the EL scheme strengthens vertical relations between developer
and lender, this should result in higher concentration at postcode level. In fact, as
Figure 3-7 shows, we find that concentration is lower in postcodes with EL scheme
participation.
Price discrimination between EL and standard mortgages could also lead to
price differences. This explanation requires that EL have a higher willingness to
pay for mortgages. However, when addressing depreciation risk, we showed that EL
borrowers do not pay more than other borrowers for the same property. For this
alternative mechanism to be true, we would need EL borrowers to be willing to pay
22Lenders do not need to register with DCLG or HCA to provide EL mortgages.
23Oliver Wyman (2012), Competition and Markets Authority (2014)
24In the UK, a full postcode corresponds on average to 10-15 properties.
25See Stroebel (2016) on vertical relations between developers and lenders.
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relatively more for the mortgage, but not for the house, which we consider unlikely.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the causal effect of down payment on interest rate through
asymmetric information. Using a UK affordable housing scheme that offers house-
holds equity loans to top up their down payment, we find that 22 basis points can
be attributed to unobservable borrower quality signaled by the down payment. We
provide supporting evidence that, ex-post, EL borrowers with 5% down payment
and a 20% EL top-up are twice as likely to miss mortgage payments than non-EL
borrowers with 25% down payment (on similar mortgage products).
The effect of asymmetric information that we uncover can be driven by adverse
selection and moral hazard. The menu of available mortgage contracts provides
incentives to choose a larger down payment, because of the lower associated interest
rate. Low down payments may attract borrowers that are less able or willing to
save. Borrowers that are illiquid today are likely to be illiquid tomorrow and have
limited savings to absorb future shocks (Campbell and Cocco, 2003, 2015).26 An
alternative explanation of higher expected defaults for low down payment borrowers
is based on ex-post moral hazard (Adams et al., 2009; Guiso et al., 2013; Campbell
and Cocco, 2015). A low down payment increases the probability of negative equity,
which gives borrowers an incentive to default and walk away from their losses. We
do not disentangle these potential explanations, but the institutional features of
the scheme and of the UK mortgage market suggest that adverse selection is the
26Mortgage borrowers, in particular first-time buyers, have very little financial assets left after
purchasing the property (as the “wealthy hand-to-mouth” in Kaplan and Violante, 2014 and Cloyne
and Surico, 2017).
This explanation is consistent with an interpretation of a higher down payment as a signal of family
wealth. According to this view, a borrower with a high down payment could have parents or other
family members who are willing and able to help financially.
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predominant channel.
Our paper has implications for both housing and macroprudential policies. Eq-
uity loans may become increasingly common if growing house prices threaten the
affordability of homeownership (Miles, 2015). On top of their potential to improve
affordability, these type of contracts have been suggested to improve risk sharing
between borrowers and lenders (Mian and Sufi, 2015; Greenwald et al., 2017). Our
results indicate that affordable housing policies that promote ownership by offering
equity loans (and other policies that seek to supplement the down payment) are
likely to attract riskier borrowers. The more lenders are concerned about adverse
selection, the more expensive the mortgages associated with equity loans become,
potentially lowering the benefits of these products for house buyers. For the mort-
gage products that we study, our results suggest that lenders see the size of the down
payment as a signal for unobservable risk, but its relative importance is limited, as
it accounts for only 10% of the difference in mortgage rates between loans with 5%
and 25% down payment.
Under the Help To Buy EL scheme, house purchases require financing from mort-
gage lenders, households and the government. This paper focuses on the supply of
mortgages. In future research we plan to study the scheme from the borrower’s
perspective to understand what drives the choice to participate in the scheme. An-
other possible avenue of research would assess the scheme from the perspective of
the government, and its stated objectives to address barriers to homeownership and
encourage developers to build more new homes (National Audit Office, 2014).
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3.6 Main Figures and Tables
h = £200
q = £150
d = £50
Normal 75%
h = £200
q = £150
e = £40
d = £10
Equity Loan
Figure 3-1: Standard mortgage vs. Help To Buy Equity Loan (EL) mort-
gage: Borrower’s balance sheet
The figure show the liability side of two borrowers that buy a house (h) worth £200K and borrow
(q) £150K from a bank. The left-hand side household makes a £50K down payment (d) and uses
a standard mortgage. The right-hand side household makes a £5K down payment and borrows
£40K from the government through the EL scheme (e).
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Figure 3-2: Evidence on the relation between loan-to-value ratio (LTV)
and down payment
The figure shows the distribution of down payment and house prices at different LTVs. Data
are taken from the UK Financial Conduct Authority’s Product Sales Data (PSD), which contains
information on all owner occupied mortgages issued in the UK since 2005 (including remortgages).
To facilitate visualization we restrict the scatter plot to a random 0.025% sample of the data (3750
mortgages) and exclude properties with price above £400K (corresponding to the 90th percentile
of the distribution of house prices in the PSD).
127
2.
5
3
3.
5
4
4.
5
5
C
on
di
tio
na
l i
nt
er
es
t r
at
e
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Loan-to-value
Figure 3-3: Evidence on the relation between down payment and mortgage
interest rate
The figure shows the conditional interest rate (ri) as a function of the loan-to-value (LTV) bin from
the following specification: ri =
∑95
k=60 LTV bink + controli. The sample is made of the universe
of mortgage originations since 2015 from the FCA’s Product Sales Data. Control variables include
the characteristics of the mortgage—whether it is a first-time buyer or a home-mover mortgage,
or a remortgage; whether the interest rate is fixed or variable; the name of the lender; the term of
the mortgage.
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Figure 3-4: Evidence on the relation between down payment and default
The figure shows the correlation between the initial loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and the fraction
of delinquent mortgages. Panel (a) shows the unconditional correlation. In Panel (b) we control
for mortgage characteristics: whether it is a first-time buyer or a home-mover mortgage, or a re-
mortgage; whether the interest rate is fixed or variable; the name of the lender; the term of the
mortgage. We use mortgage performance data by the UK Financial Conduct Authority. Delin-
quencies are defined as missing payments for a total amount exceeding the value of three regular
monthly payments.
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Figure 3-5: Distribution of key variables
The charts show the distribution of the purchase price, income, loan value, and down payment for
the the group of EL mortgages and the group of standard 70-75% LTV mortgages. All mortgages
are on new build properties and were issued in England between 2013 and 2016.
130
House value
Home equity value
80 90 110 120
25
5
Standard 75%-LTV mortgage
Standard 95%-LTV mortgage
EL mortgage with 5% down payment
Figure 3-6: Home equity values under different mortgages
The horizontal axis in the diagram represents the value of the property, whose purchase price is
normalised to 100. The vertical axis represents the equity invested by the homebuyer, which equals
the down payment at the moment the house is purchased. The three diagonal lines represent the
final home equity values for homebuyers using three different types of mortgages, as a function of
how the house value evolves. The owner is in negative equity when the mortgage line is below the
horizontal axis. The diagram shows that an EL mortgage with 5% down payment is less likely to
be in negative equity than a standard 95%-LTV mortgage.
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Figure 3-7: Competition between lenders within postcodes
The two histograms show the number of lenders that have issued a mortgage in any of the full 6-
digit postcodes that form our estimation sample. The left-hand side chart includes all the postcodes
where at least one standard 70-75% mortage on a new property was issued. The right-hand side
chart includes all the postcodes where at least one EL mortgage was issued. The sample refers to
the 2013-2016 period.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
The table compares two groups of mortgages on new properties with 70-75% LTV issued in 2013-
2016. The first group includes mortgages associated with an equity loan, while the second group
only include standard mortgages. The first row of the table simply reports the size of the two
groups of observations. The remaining rows show the mean value of the relevant variables for each
group as well as their standard deviation. The last column of the table shows the mean difference
between the two groups; ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05. Down payment, delinquencies,
and the interest rate are highlighted in bold. LTI stands for loan to income ratio; MTI stands for
mortgage payment to income ratio.
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70-75% LTV
Equity Loans Standard mortgages
Mean SD Mean SD Diff
Obs 37,744 10,036
Downpayment 12,393 5,980 64,107 29,834 -51,714∗∗∗
Interest 2.72 0.60 2.61 0.59 0.11∗∗∗
Delinquencies 0.003 0.057 0.002 0.046 0.001∗∗
Sold 0.008 0.089 0.019 0.135 -0.011∗∗∗
Refinanced (same bank) 0.000 0.010 0.003 0.052 -0.003∗∗∗
Refinanced (other bank) 0.001 0.037 0.016 0.125 -0.015∗∗∗
Purchase price 224,718 88,006 246,017 111,511 -21,300∗∗∗
Loan value 167,956 65,690 181,911 82,209 -13,955∗∗∗
HTB equity loan 44,759 17,590 0 0 44,759∗∗∗
Gross income 51,007 22,411 55,471 28,231 -4,464∗∗∗
Age borrower 31.45 6.89 34.49 8.32 -3.03∗∗∗
Self employed 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.26 -0.03∗∗∗
Joint income 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.02∗∗∗
Single income 0.17 0.37 0.30 0.46 -0.13∗∗∗
Fixed 2 years 0.57 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.05∗∗∗
Fixed 3 years 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.01∗∗∗
Fixed 5 years 0.35 0.48 0.25 0.43 0.09∗∗∗
Fixed (unknown) 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.39 -0.16∗∗∗
First-time buyer 0.76 0.42 0.52 0.50 0.25∗∗∗
LTV 74.59 1.03 74.01 1.73 0.58∗∗∗
Mortgage term 29.24 5.04 26.96 5.92 2.28∗∗∗
Monthly payment 710.16 300.53 814.21 403.03 -104.05∗∗∗
LTI 3.41 0.70 3.43 0.89 -0.01∗∗
MTI 0.17 0.04 0.18 0.05 -0.01∗∗∗
London 0.04 0.20 0.17 0.37 -0.12∗∗∗
S and E England 0.40 0.49 0.41 0.49 -0.01∗∗
Rest of England 0.55 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.13∗∗∗
2013 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.38 -0.16∗∗∗
2014 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.41 -0.09∗∗∗
2015 0.57 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.16∗∗∗
2016 0.29 0.45 0.19 0.39 0.10∗∗∗
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Table 3.2: Main regression results, mortgage rates
The table shows results from our main regression of mortgage rate at origination on loan character-
istics, including an indicator variable for EL, our variable of interest. All standard errors are double
clustered at the month-product level. The first column contains an estimate of the unconditional
interest rate difference between EL mortgages and standard 70-75% mortgages. The remaining
columns of the table show results from different specifications obtained by progressively adding
controls to the regression. In the second column, product-time fixed effects capture the effect of
the combination of type of borrower (first time buyer or home mover), lenght of fixed period (two,
three, five years or unknown), lender and month. In the third column, Region corresponds to
one of the nine English regions: Greater London, South East, South West, East of England, North
West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, North of England. In the fourth
column, Joint and Single describe whether the income provided in the documentation of the
mortgage comes from an individual or from a couple—the omitted category is made of mortgages
where this detail is unknown. Columns (5)-(8) refer to regressions that include endogenous choice
variables such as the value of the house, the size of the loan or the down payment. These variables
are expressed in British pounds.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
interest interest interest interest interest interest interest interest
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
EL 0.106 0.225∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.037
(0.083) (0.046) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
Income(log) -0.103∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.008 -0.016 -0.014
(0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Self employed -0.033∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.022∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Joint -0.067∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Single -0.088∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
House value (.000) -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loan size (.000) -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Downpayment (.000) -0.002∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Downpayment2 (.00,000,000) 0.002∗∗
(0.001)
Product-Time No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.01 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
Observations 47,780 47,754 47,754 47,754 47,754 47,754 47,754 47,754
135
Table 3.3: Mortgage rates and heterogeneity
This table shows results from regressions with the same specification as column (4) in Table 3.2 for
different subsamples of the data. All standard errors are double clustered at the month-product
level. We examine heterogeneity along the following dimensions: first-time buyers (FTB) vs. home
movers (HM) (columns 1-2), top 4 UK banks vs. other banks (columns 3-4), high vs. low capital
buffers (columns 5-6), and high vs. low funding costs (columns 7-8). Lenders have high capital
buffers when they exceed the median value in the sample. The same applies to lenders with high
funding costs.
Borrower Size Buffer Funding cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FTB HM Big 4 Others High Low High Low
EL 0.166∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.056) (0.040) (0.114) (0.048) (0.065) (0.059) (0.045)
Income(log) -0.010 0.008 -0.001 -0.039∗∗ -0.005 -0.001 0.031 -0.017∗
(0.008) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.021) (0.009)
Age -0.002 -0.009∗ 0.001 -0.010 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Age2 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Self employed -0.009 -0.040∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.069∗∗ -0.014 -0.019 -0.017 -0.021
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.028) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Joint -0.070∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.066∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.069∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.005) (0.015)
Single -0.093∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.038∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.061∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.020) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (.)
House value (.000) -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Product-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.80 0.70 0.77 0.73 0.78 0.76 0.83 0.72
Observations 34030 13724 41125 6629 20819 23205 14308 29716
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Table 3.4: Probability of being delinquent
The table shows results from a probit regression of delinquencies (defined as missing payments
for a total amount exceeding three regular months) on mortgage characteristics. The parentheses
contain Huber-White robust standard errors. Results are displayed in terms of marginal effects
computed at the mean value for all variables.
Unconditional Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EL 0.0013∗ 0.0013∗ 0.0015∗∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Income(log) -0.0026∗∗ -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Age 0.0000 -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Self employed 0.0030∗ 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Joint -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Single 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006)
House value (.000) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Interest (%) 0.0004
(0.0003)
Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender No No No Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 .002 .022 .034 .076 .077
Observations 41,499 41,499 41,499 41,448 41,448
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Table 3.5: Probability of property sale and refinancing
The three panels show results from probit regressions of different outcomes in the mortgage perfor-
mance data, comparing EL mortgages with standard mortgages. The parentheses contain Huber-
White robust standard errors. Results are displayed in terms of marginal effects computed at the
mean value for all variables.
Panel A: Property sale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EL -0.0085∗∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Time No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes
Lender No No No Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 .014 .129 .137 .139 .139
Observations 47,780 47,780 47,780 47,435 47,435
Panel B: Refinancing with same bank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EL -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗ -0.0001∗ -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Time No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes
Lender No No No Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 .121 .209 .271 .314 .315
Observations 47,780 23,460 23,460 21,679 21,679
Panel C: Refinancing with another bank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EL -0.0064∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Time No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes
Lender No No No Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 .108 .242 .255 .256 .286
Observations 47,780 35,033 35,033 24,291 24,291
138
Table 3.6: Property appreciation
The table shows results from a robustness analysis of the 486 properties in the sample for which
we can observe a subsequent sale. The coefficients in the table come from a regression of the
log appreciation of properties in this restricted sample on the EL indicator variable and some
fixed effects. The parentheses contain Huber-White robust standard errors. Column (1) shows
the unconditional difference in appreciation between properties bought through the EL scheme
and properties bought with a standard mortgage. Column (2) includes region fixed effects in the
regression, column (3) adds purchase-year fixed effects (2013, 2014, 2015 or 2016), and column (4)
includes sale-year fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆p ∆p ∆p ∆p
EL -0.041∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗ 0.003 -0.004
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Region No Yes Yes Yes
Purchase year No No Yes Yes
Sale year No No No Yes
R2 0.03 0.35 0.38 0.42
Observations 485 485 485 485
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Appendix A
Appendix Chapter 1: Leverage
Regulation and Market Structure:
An Empirical Model of the UK
Mortgage Market
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A.1 Facts: Additional Material
Figure A-1: Pricing: mortgage supermarket
 Model 1: Product fixed effects
 Model 2: Product-market fixed effects
 Model 3: model 2 + Other price
 Model 4: model 3 + Postcode fixed effects
 Model 5: model 3 + Borrowers controls
.75 .8 .85 .9
Adjusted R2
(a) Interest
 Model 1: Product fixed effects
 Model 2: Product-market fixed effects
 Model 3: model 2 + Other price
 Model 4: model 3 + Postcode fixed effects
 Model 5: model 3 + Borrowers controls
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7
Adjusted R2
(b) Fee
Notes: the chart reports the ajusted R2 of regressions of borrower level interest rates and fees (rijm and fijm) on
a set of dummy variables. Model (1) includes only dummy for the product, defined by the interaction of mortgage
type, lender and loan-to-value band. Model (2) adds dummies for the market, defined by borrower type and month.
Model (3) adds dummies for the other price, fee when rate is the dependent variable and viceversa. Model (4) adds
dummies for the location of the house of the borrower and Model (5) includes borrower level controls (e.g. income,
age).
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Table A.1: Market shares
FTB HM RMGT
Full sample 81.5 72.5 72.5
Type
Fix 2 years 61.7 52.8 50.7
Fix 5 years 19.9 19.7 21.8
Max LTV
50-60 4.2 9.4 17.8
60-70 5.0 9.9 17.2
70-75 5.8 9.3 13.3
75-80 7.7 9.8 10.8
80-85 15.8 14.2 8.9
85-90 29.8 16.6 4.4
90-95 13.3 3.2
Lender
Big six 69.9 58.5 55.6
Challenger 4.9 5.7 7.4
Building society 6.7 8.2 9.4
Notes: the table reports the market share for different categories of product and borrower type. Shares are expressed
as a ratio of the full sample of borrowers and mortgage products. The table exclude mortgages from the smaller
lenders and product with a market share below 0.03%.
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Figure A-2: Branches and mortgage choice
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(b) Difference-in-difference
Notes: the upper panel shows the correlation between the share of branches and the share of mortgages across
postcode area in the UK for the largest six lenders. The lower panel the coefficients β from the following difference
in difference specification: sharela = γl + γa +
∑5
k=1 β
kbranchkla, where γl and γa are lender and area (postcode)
fixed effects and branchk are quintile of the branch share distribution. We normalize the constant to be the case of
no branches in the postcode area.
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Figure A-3: Branches and loan choice
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Notes: The figure shows the coefficients β from the following difference in difference specification: qila = γl + γa +∑5
k=1 β
kbranchkla, where qila is the loan amount taken by borrower i borrowing from lender l in area a, γl and γa
are lender and area (postcode) fixed effects and branchk are quintile of the branch share distribution. We normalize
the constant to be the case of no branches in the postcode area.
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A.2 Model: Additional Material
Demand elasticities. The discrete-continuous choice model loan demand elasticity
and product share demand elasticity are respectively given by:
qijm =
∂qijm
∂rjm
rjm
qijm
=
∂ ln(qijm)
∂rjm
rjm = −αrjm (A.1)
dijm =
∂sijm
∂rjm
rjm
sijm
= −µ exp(−αrjm + βXj + ξjm + ηDi + ζi)sijm(1− sijm)× rjm
sijm
= −αµ exp(−αrjm + βXj + ξjm + ηDi + ζi)(1− sijm)rjm (A.2)
The elasticity at the product-market level are computed by averaging across
consumers:
qjm =
1
Njm
Njm∑
i=1
∂qijm
∂rjm
rjm
qijm
(A.3)
djm =
1
Njm
Njm∑
i=1
∂sijm
∂rjm
rjm
sijm
(A.4)
Profit maximization. Here I derive the more general model for the pricing of
mortgages, that accounts for a fraction of households not refinancing at the end of
the initial period. The present value adjusted for refinancing risk is given by:
PV (q, r, R, t, T ) = q
t∑
k=1
[
r(1 + r)T
(1 + r)T − 1 −
c(1 + c)T
(1 + c)T − 1
]
+
γb
T∑
k=t+1
[
R(1 +R)T−t
(1 +R)T−t − 1 −
c(1 + c)T−t
(1 + c)T−t − 1
]
, (A.5)
where R > r is the reset rate, t is the length of the initial period and b the remaining
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balance at the end of the initial period. I also allow for the possibility that borrowers
default like in the model from Section 1.3.2, assuming that lenders setting interest
rate do not forecast the probability of default in each period, but consider an average
proability of default, as in Crawford et al. (2015). The net return becomes:
PV (q, r, R, t, T ) ≈ q [t(r − c) + γ(T − t)(R− c)]− dq [tr + γ(T − t)R] =
q [tr + γ(T − t)R] (1− d)− q [tc+ γ(T − t)c] . (A.6)
Given the demand system and the present value of the net revenue from interest
payment A.6, the problem of the lender becomes:
max
r
Πlm(rjm) =
∑
j∈Jlm
Πjm(rjm) =
∑
j∈Jlm
∑
i∈It
sijm(rjm, r−jm)× PV (rjm) =
∑
j∈Jlm
∑
i∈Im
sijm(rjm, r−jm)× qijm(rjm)×
[(tjrjm + γj(Tj − tj)Rj)(1− dijm)− (tj + γj(Tj − tj))cjm]︸ ︷︷ ︸
χjm=Effective mark-up
. (A.7)
If we assume that the initial interest rate does not affect the probability of
remortgaging ∂γ
∂r
= 0, the derivative of the profits with respect to the price of
product j is given by (we remove the market subscript m for simplicity):
∂Πj
∂rj
= SjQj(1−Dj)tj+
Sj
∂Qj
∂rj
[(tjrj + γj(Tj − tj)Rj)(1−Dj)− (tjcj + γj(Tj − tj)cj)] +∑
k∈Jl
∂Sk
∂rj
PVk − SjQj ∂Dj
∂rj
(tjrj + γj(Tj − tj)Rj) = 0, (A.8)
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where the capital letters denote aggregate values at the product level. Solving for
the initial interest rate gives:
r∗j =
Effective marginal cost︷ ︸︸ ︷
cj(tj + γj(Tj − tj))
tj
(
(1−Dj)−
∂Dj
∂rj
∂Sj
∂rj
1
Sj
+
∂Qj
∂rj
1
Qj
) +−
Full mark-up︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
∂Sj
∂rj
1
Sj
+
∂Qj
∂rj
1
Qj
− ∂Dj
∂rj
1
1−Dj
− γjRj(Tj − tj)
tj︸ ︷︷ ︸
“Add-on” effect
−
∑
k 6=j∈Jl
∂Sk
∂rj
PVk
tj
(
∂Sj
∂rj
Qj(1−Dj) + Sj ∂Qj∂r (1−Dj)− SjQj ∂Dj∂rj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Other products
.
(A.9)
Note that if there is no default risk (
∂Dj
∂rj
= 0 and Dj = 0), all borrowers remortgage
at the end of initial period (γj = 0) and demand one unit of loan (Qj = 1), and all
lenders offer only one product then equation (A.9) collapses to the standard mark-
up pricing formula: r∗j = cj − Sj∂Sj
∂rj
. Compare to the optimal price from Section 1.3.2
the marginal cost is higher to account for the fraction that does not refinance the
loan, but the add-on effects lower the optimal rate, as the lenders are getting the
revenues from the reset rate.
Consumer surplus. Finally I report the formula that I use in the calculation of
several variables and indexed in the counterfactual simulations of section 1.6. I cal-
culate expected consumer surplus following Small and Rosen (1981). To convert the
utility measure into money terms I face a complication due to the fact that income
enters non-linearly. Herriges and Kling (1999) discuss alternative options to allow
for non-linear income effects. I adopt the representative consumer approach and
compute welfare within each group type, thus allowing for observable heterogeneous
effects for different income and age groups and regions. The expected compensating
variation E[cv] for a change in interest rate, all else equal, is given implicitly by:
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E[
max
j∈J0
U(y, r0j , Xj, j)
]
= E
[
max
j∈J0
U(y, r1j − cv,Xj, j)
]
(A.10)
Where r0j is the price of product j before the change and r
1
j is the price after
the change. The expected compensating variation when I remove products from the
choice set as a result of the leverage limit, is given by:
E
[
max
j∈J0
U(y, r0j , Xj, j)
]
= E
[
max
j∈J1
U(y, r1j − cv,Xj, j)
]
(A.11)
Where J1 is the new choice set. The change in consumer surplus is then given
by:
∆E[CS] =
1
λ
[
ln(
J1∑
j=1
exp(V 1j ))− ln(
J0∑
j=1
exp(V 0j ))
]
(A.12)
With λ =
−αµ exp(−αrj)
q
.
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A.3 Fit: Additional Material
Figure A-4: Demand parameters: first stage
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Notes: the charts show some of the structural demand parameters estimated in the first step by maximum likelihood
for each group. The standard error are computed by the inverse of the information matrix. In each panel the
coefficients are ordered in ascending way. The blue dot represent the point estimate; the red bar the 95% confidence
interval.
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Figure A-5: Model fit: product and loan demand
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Notes: the upper panel show the kernel density for the market share of all product. The lower panel show the kernel
density for the loan value. The blue bars are the data, while the red bars the model. The market share in the data
are computed as the sum of mortgage originations for each product in each market divided by the total number of
households. The market share for the model comes from the sum of the individual predicted probabilities. Loan
demand is the actual loan value for the chosen product, while for the model we use the predicted loan demand for
the chosen product in the true data. We use a random subsample of 10% of the whole population.
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Figure A-6: Model fit: LTV and LTI
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(b) Loan-To-Income
Notes: the upper panel show the percentage of borrowers in each LTV band. The lower panel show the percentage of
borrowers in each LTI band. The blue bars are the data, while the red bars the model. The LTV distrution from the
data is computed as the share of LTV within each maximum LTV. The LTV distrubution for the model is computed
by summing the predicted probabilities at each maximum LTV. The LTI distribution use the loan demand from
chart A-5 and sum across maximum LTI. We use a random subsample of 10% of the whole population.
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Figure A-7: Model fit: Lender
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Notes: the upper panel show the percentage of borrowers for each lender type. We divide lenders into three groups:
largest six lender, challengers lenders and building societies. The blue bars are the data, while the red bars the
model. The lower panel show the correlation between the market share in the data and the market share predicted
by the model. We use a random subsample of 10% of the whole population.
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Table A.2: Structural demand estimates: heterogeneity
All Income Age Region
poor rich young old London West Mid Scotland
Demographics
Income (φ) 0.7003 0.7342 0.6664 0.7005 0.7000 0.8298 0.6509 0.6849
0.0007 0.0006 0.0008 0.0006 0.0008 0.0005 0.0007 0.0008
Age (η) 0.0003 -0.0011 0.0017 0.0040 -0.0052 0.0012 -0.0011 0.0012
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
house price (η) 0.2658 0.2202 0.3115 0.2495 0.2904 0.1083 0.3077 0.3027
0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005
Mortgage attributes
Interest (−α) -0.0251 -0.0261 -0.0241 -0.0246 -0.0257 -0.0334 -0.0258 -0.0227
0.0023 0.0022 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023 0.0028 0.0023 0.0023
High LTV (β) 0.0103 0.011 0.0095 0.0101 0.0105 0.0156 0.0106 0.0057
0.0019 0.0018 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018 0.0023 0.0018 0.0019
Fix 5 (β) 0.0247 0.0255 0.0237 0.0244 0.025 0.0318 0.027 0.021
0.0033 0.0032 0.0034 0.0033 0.0033 0.0043 0.003 0.0033
Application costs
Branches (λ) 0.0192 0.0479 -0.0095 0.0020 0.0451 -0.0149 0.0731 0.0176
0.0112 0.0121 0.0103 0.0120 0.0100 0.0167 0.0112 0.0084
Heterogeneity-scaling
σ (log) -1.6080 -1.7213 -1.4948 -1.7097 -1.4556 -2.0137 -1.5974 -1.4159
0.0091 0.0090 0.0091 0.0092 0.0088 0.0109 0.0088 0.0084
µ 24.6685 31.9220 17.4150 25.2748 23.7590 46.3085 18.5678 19.9492
0.0575 0.0731 0.0419 0.0562 0.0594 0.1013 0.0452 0.0479
ln(αγ ) -2.0815 -2.2392 -1.9239 -2.0300 -2.1588 -2.3085 -1.8684 -2.1812
0.0026 0.0022 0.0031 0.0024 0.0030 0.0020 0.0026 0.0030
Elasticities
Loan demand -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07
Product demand -6.40 -6.46 -6.29 -6.32 -6.51 -7.12 -6.34 -5.94
Fixed effects
Lender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F stat 178 190 164 180 176 167 197 177
N likelihood 609,878 652,732 567,024 661,456 532,510 719,920 577,760 586,975
N second stage 773 819 720 772 774 682 853 776
N borrowers 370,575 185,291 185,286 191,209 179,368 48,018 32,781 35,919
Notes: the table shows the structural demand estimates of the econometric demand model of section 1.4.2. The
model is estimated separately in each group and the table report the average point estimate and standard error in
each group. The standard error for the paramters in the first stage are computed by the inverse of the information
matrix; the standard errors for the mortgage attributes estimated in the second stage are computed by boostrapping.
The loan demand and product demand elasticities follows from assumption on the indirect utility and are described
in appendix A.2. The F stat is the average F statistics for the exluded instrument in the second stage instrumental
variable regressions in each group. N likelihood is the average number of observation in the first stage (borrower-
product pairs); N second stage is the average number of observation in the second stage (product-market); N
borrowers in the total number of borrowers in each column.
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Table A.3: Mark-ups
Obs Only disc Disc-Cont Full
(pp) (%) (pp) (%) (pp) (%)
All 1,070 0.525 19.3 0.496 18.3 0.493 18.1
Lender type
Big 6 662 0.510 18.9 0.482 17.9 0.480 17.8
Challengers 168 0.550 19.2 0.519 18.1 0.517 18.0
Building societies 240 0.549 20.5 0.517 19.4 0.515 19.3
LTV band
LTV ≤ 70 224 0.477 22.0 0.451 21.0 0.449 20.7
70 < LTV ≤ 80 512 0.525 21.1 0.495 19.9 0.492 19.8
LTV > 85 334 0.558 14.8 0.527 14.0 0.525 13.9
Deal type
2 years 576 0.522 21.6 0.492 20.3 0.489 20.2
5 years 494 0.529 16.7 0.501 15.8 0.498 15.7
Notes: The tables report the markups for first-time buyers. The number of observations is given by the product-
market pairs. Only disc indicates the case with only the discrete choice. Disc-cont reports the markup of the discrete-
continuous choice model, without additional information about performances. Full includes both the discrete-
continuous choice and default risk, captured by average arrears at the product level and the average response of
arrears to the interest rate estimated in section ??. PP stays for percentage points, while % is then we divide the
markup in percentage points by the interest rate, also in percentage points. We report the average elasticities for
all products and by different product characteristics: lender type, maximum LTV and fix period.
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Table A.4: Marginal costs
Obs Marginal Cost Effective marginal cost
(No default) (With Default)
No add-on With add-on No add-on With add-on
All 1,070 2.411 4.780 2.431 4.828
Lender type
Big 6 662 2.420 4.995 2.434 5.036
Challengers 168 2.525 4.576 2.543 4.615
Building societies 240 2.306 4.330 2.341 4.402
LTV band
LTV ≤ 70 224 1.783 4.362 1.793 4.396
70 < LTV ≤ 80 512 2.095 4.070 2.104 4.092
LTV > 85 334 3.316 6.148 3.358 6.245
Deal type
2 years 576 2.117 5.605 2.098 5.543
5 years 494 2.775 3.890 2.796 3.921
Notes: The tables report the marginal costs for first-time buyers. The number of observations is given by the
product-market pairs. Marginal cost indicate the case of equation (1.8) without default risk (Dj = 0 and
∂Dj
∂rj
).
Effective marginal cost includes both the discrete-continuous choice and default risk, captured by average arrears at
the product level and the average response of arrears to the interest rate estimated in section ??. Without add-on
is the case of equation (1.8) with every borrowers refinancing at the end of the initial period t (γj = 0), while with
add-on is the case with a fraction γj > 0 paying the higher standard variable rate. The marginal costs are expressed
in percentage points. We report the average elasticities for all products and by different product characteristics:
lender type, maximum LTV and fix period.
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A.4 Robustness
In this section I show several robustness checks. Figure A-8 shows the structural
parameters capturing the demand elasticity to the interest rate for the OLS model
and two IV models. Panel b shows the case in which we use the risk-weights of the
lender originating the mortgage as an instrument for the interest rate; Panel d shows
the case in which we use the average risk-weights of other lenders as an instrument
for the interest rate. Figure A-9 reports the same parameter for two additional
exercises. In Panel a I estimate the model using the Annual Percentage Rate (APR)
as the price variable, thus also including information on the fees. In Panel b I
estimate jointly the second step demand parameters and the supply parameters
with simulated method of moments. I construct the moments using the structural
demand error term in each group of borrowers from (1.15) and the structural supply
error term from (1.17). The two set of moments are related by the markup and
given by:
E
[
ξgjm(α
g, βg)
∣∣ zjm] = 0, g = 1, ..., G Demand
E
[
κjm(α
1, ..., αG, τ)
∣∣ zjm] = 0 Supply, (A.13)
in the population, and:
m(α, β, τ) =

∑M
m
∑
j∈Jm
[
δˆgjm − (−αgrjm + βgXj)
]
zjm = 0, g = 1, ..., G∑M
m
∑
j∈Jm
[
rjm − (τXXj + τccjm + τRKltρj + τt) +
∑
i∈I sijqij∑
i∈I(sij
∂qij
∂rj
+
∂sij
∂rj
qij)
)
]
zjm = 0,

(A.14)
in the sample. The method of simulated moments estimator is given by:
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(αˆ, βˆ, τˆ) = arg max
[
G∑
g=1
m(βg, αg)′W−1m(βg, αg) +m(τ, α)′W−1m(τ, α)
]
. (A.15)
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Figure A-8: Demand parameters: second stage - robustness
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Notes: the charts show the coefficient on the interest interest rate (α) of the structural demand model. Figure
(a) and (c) report the ordinary least square estimates; Figure (b) reports the instrumental variable estimates using
regulatory risk weights; Figure (d) reports the instrumental variable estimates using regulatory risk weight of other
lenders. Groups are defined as in Section 1.4.1 based on region, income and age. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. In each panel the coefficients are ordered in ascending way. The blue dot represent the point estimate;
the red bar the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure A-9: Demand parameters: second stage - further robustness
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(a) Annual Percentage Rate (APR)
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(b) Joint estimation
Notes: the upper panel shows the correlation between the alpha coefficient for our baseline model and the same
model in which we substitute the initial interest rate with the annual percentage rate (APR). The APR is computed
using the initial interest rate and origination fee andds a representative loan size, as advertised in https://www.
moneysupermarket.com/mortgages/. The lower panel show the correlation .
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A.5 Counterfactuals: Additional Material
A.5.1 Reduced-Form Evidence
In this section I provide reduced-form evidence about the effects of the leverage
regulations, that I study in my counterfactual exercises. I look at the effects of risk
weights on mortgage rates and of loan-to-income limits on mortgage originations.
Risk-weighted capital requirements. I test more formally the effect of risk
weights on interest rates using the full variation across lenders, loan-to-values and
over time with the following fixed effect model:
rjm = βRWjm +Xj + γm + jm (A.16)
where rjm is the interest rate in market m for product j; RWjm is the risk weight;
Xj are time-invariant product characteristics (fix rate period, lender dummies); γm
are market fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the reduce
form effect of risk weights on mortgage rates.
Table A.7 shows the results. I find that a one-percentage-point higher risk weight
leads to an approximately 1.5 basis point higher interest rate. In column (2) I
show the specification with the full set of fixed effects, to control for time invariant
differences across lenders and for time varying common factors that affect pricing,
and in column (3) I add a full set of interacted market-lender fixed effects. The
results are similar across these specifications. In the remaining columns I run model
(A.16) separately for the different borrower types. I find a strong and significant
effect of risk-adjusted capital requirements for first-time buyers. A one-percentage-
point higher risk weight translates into a 3.4 basis points higher mortgage rate.
The effect is lower, but significant for home movers, and not different from zero for
remortgagers.
Leverage limits. I provide reduced-form evidence about the effects of regulat-
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Table A.5: Risk weights and pricing
Whole sample Borrower type
(1) (2) (3) (FTB) (HM) (RMGT)
Risk weights (%) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Fix 5 0.731∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.061) (0.063) (0.049)
Min down (%) -0.043∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Market F.e. Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Lender F.e. No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Market-Lender F.e. No No Yes No No No
R2 0.17 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.72 0.75
Observations 3423 3423 3423 1070 1248 1105
Notes: The table shows the coefficients of regression (A.16). The depedent variable is the interest rate at the product
level. Risk weights are the regulatory risk weights expressed in percentage terms. Fix 5 is a dummy for mortgages
with a fix period of 5 years. Max LTV is the maximum LTV the mortgage product. The columns FTB, HM and
RMGT shows the result of the models with lender and time fixed effects in the subsample of first-time buyers, home
movers and remortgagers, respectively. All standard errors are double clustered at the product-time level.
ing household leverage, exploiting variation from a recommendation by the Financial
Policy Committee (FPC) in June 2014 that limited mortgage originations with a
loan-to-income (LTI) above 4.5 to 15 percent of the total number of new mortgage
loans (Bank of England, 2014).1 I divide lenders into two groups based on their
fraction of mortgages with a loan-to-income above 4.5 before the date of the rec-
ommendation, and I define as treated the lenders with a fraction above the median.
Figure A-10 shows the quarterly change in the share of mortgages above the limit
for the two groups. Until the recommendation date, the two groups’ trend are very
similar, while a gap opens between them after the event. Lenders in the treatment
1For more details about the recommendation see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
financialstability/Pages/fpc/loanincome.aspx. The main statement says: “The Pruden-
tial Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) should ensure that
mortgage lenders do not extend more than 15 percent of their total number of new residential
mortgages at loan to income ratios at or greater than 4.5. This recommendation applies to all
lenders which extend residential mortgage lending in excess of £100 million per annum. The
recommendation should be implemented as soon as is practicable.”
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Figure A-10: Loan-to-income limit and originations
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Notes: the chart shows the change in the percentage of mortgages with a loan-to-income (LTI) above 4.5 for two
groups of lenders in each quarter. Treatment includes all lenders in the sample with an average share of LTI above
4.5 higher than the median in the period before the treatment.
group reduce more new high loan-to-income mortgages relative to the control group.2
To study the effect of loan-to-income limits on mortgage originations, I exploit
variation coming from the FPC recommendation in a difference-in-difference setting:
Sharelm = β1Treatmentl + β2Postm + β12Treatmentl × Postm + lm (A.17)
where Sharelm is the portfolio share of mortgages offered by lender l with an LTI
above 4.5 in market m; Treatmentl is a dummy equal to one if the lender is above
the median market share of high LTI before the introduction of the limit; Postm is
a dummy equal to one from June 2014 onwards. The coefficient of interest is β12,
which captures the reduce form effect of the policy change on high loan-to-income
originations.
Table A.6 shows the results. In column (1) I show the baseline difference-in-
2In Appendix A.5 I explore further the effect of the FPC recommendation on high loan-to-
income originations.
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difference model and I find that treated lenders reduce their fraction of high LTI
mortgages by almost four percent more relative to control lenders. In column (2) I
add a full set of time and lender fixed effects. The result is still significant and the
magnitude is unaffected. Finally, in the remaining columns of table A.6 I explore
heterogeneity across borrower types. I find that the impact of the FPC recom-
mendation on loan-to-income limits is strongest for first-time buyers and lower for
home movers and remortgagers. In the next section I focus on the effects of regu-
lating household leverage on the first-time buyer market that is the most likely to
be affected, as the reduced form evidence suggests.
Table A.6: LTI limits and originations
Whole sample Borrower type
(1) (2) (FTB) (HM) (RMGT)
Treatment 0.066∗∗∗
(0.011)
Post 0.018∗∗
(0.007)
Treatment × Post -0.039∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.025∗ -0.015∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.025) (0.012) (0.008)
Time F.e. No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender F.e. No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.18 0.37 0.47 0.73 0.78
Observations 756 756 252 252 252
Notes: The table shows the coefficients of regression (A.17). The dependent variable is the share of LTI above 4.5
in lenders’ portfolio share. Treatment is a dummy equal to one is the lender is above the median in the fraction
of mortgages with an LTI above 4.5 before the date of the recommendation. Post is a dummy equal to one in all
periods after the FPC reccommendation in June 2014. The columns FTB, HM and RMGT shows the result of the
models with lender and time fixed effects in the subsample of first-time buyers, home movers and remortgagers,
respectively. All standard errors are double clustered at the lender-time level.
A.5.2 Extra Charts and Tables
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Table A.7: Common increase in capital requirements
Value ∆ ∆ (%)
Cost 2.23 0.60 28.51
Price 2.71 0.63 23.89
Demand 5,364.60 -812.04 -15.14
Quantity 134.91 -2.43 -1.80
Monthly payment 662.59 60.79 9.21
PTI 20.28 1.86 9.21
Consumer surplus 1.10 -0.47 -53.73
Lender profits 798.64 -121.95 -39.40
Default 1.08 0.11 10.27
Buffer 3.03 2.68 88.44
HI 16.71 7.19 43.03
Big Six 86.27 6.73 7.80
Notes: The table shows the results from the counterfactual simulation in which I increase the capital requirements
by 10 percentage points for all lenders in a random subsample of first-time buyers. Cost is the marginal cost in
percentage points; price is the interest rate in percentage points; demand is the total number of borrowers; quantity
is the average loan amount; monthly payment is the monthly payment from the mortgage; PTI is the monthly
payment divided by the gross income of the borrower; consumer surplus is the log sum of the indirect utility of a
representative consumer (see appendix A.2); lender profits is the average profit across lenders in thousand £; default
is the average number of defaults in percentage points; buffer is the difference between the equity and the predicted
loss. Value is the actual value in the benchmark and counterfactuals; ∆ is the absolute change of the value in the
counterfactual relative to the benchmark; ∆% is the percentage change of the value in the counterfactual relative
to the benchmark.
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Figure A-11: Pass-through of risk-weighted capital requirement
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Notes: the chart shows the risk-weighted capital requirements for large and small lenders. The blue bar denote the
case in which all banks have a capital requirement of 8 percent and a risk-weight of 50 percent, as in the Basel I
regime. The red bar show the counterfactual risk-weighted capital requirement after an exogenous increase by 1
percentage point.
165
Figure A-12: Interaction of different leverage regulations
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(a) Counterfactual I: Homogenous
Capital Requirement + 90% LTV
Limit
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(b) Counterfactual II: Heteroge-
neous Capital Requirement + 90%
LTV Limit
Notes: the charts show the risk-weighted capital requirements for different counterfactuals at different loan-to-value
levels. Panel a shows at the top the case in which all banks have a capital requirement of 8 percent and a risk-weight
of 50 percent, as in the Basel I regime; Panel b shows at the top the risk-weighted capital requirement in the current
system, averaging across banks with both internal model and standardized approach. The bottom panels show the
two cases after removing mortgages with a loan-to-value above 90 percent.
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B.1 Additional Figures and Tables
Table B.1: Targeted monetary policy - First stage
The table reports the estimated parameters and their standard errors for the first stage of the IV
model of equation (2.4). All columns report estimates with the balanced panel of relationships for
firms with more than one lender. The dependent variables are the TLTROs binary and continuous
treatments. Rule is the allocation rule for bank b from equation (2.1), Post is a dummy equal to
one after the implementation of the TLTROs. Bank-quarter control includes bank capital, non-
performing loans, government bonds. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic test for weak instruments
with cluster-robust standard errors. The Kleibergen-Paap LM-statistic test for underidentification
with cluster-robust standard errors. All standard errors are double clustered by firm and bank-
quarter. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Binary treatment Continuous treatment
(1) (2)
TLTROs Rule (bt) 2.15*** 0.080***
(0.287) (0.012)
Observations 354,060 354,060
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.82
Fixed effects
Firm-time (ft) Yes Yes
Bank (b) Yes Yes
Controls (bt) Yes Yes
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Table B.2: Targeted monetary policy and competition - First stage
The table reports the estimated parameters and their standard errors for the first stage of the IV
model of equation (2.7). All columns report estimates with the balanced panel of relationships for
firms with more than one lender. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (3) are the TLTROs
binary and continuous treatments, while in columns (2) and (4) the dependent variables are the
interactions with the HI. Rule is the allocation rule for bank b from equation (2.1). Post is a dummy
equal to one after the implementation of the TLTROs. Pawnshop is the number of pawnshops
across Italian provinces during the Renaissance. Bank-time controls include bank capital, non-
performing loans, government bonds. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic test for weak instruments
with cluster-robust standard errors. The Kleibergen-Paap LM-statistic test for underidentification
with cluster-robust standard errors. All standard errors are double clustered by firm and bank-
quarter. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Binary treatment Continuous treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TLTROs Rule (bt) 1.825*** -0.548 0.073*** -0.001
(0.278) (0.058) (0.011) ( 0.003)
TLTROs Rule (bt) × HI (m) 2.428* 2.645*** 0.051 0.091***
(1.313) (0.461) (0.054) (0.021)
Observations 354,060 354,060 354,060 354,060
Adjusted R2 0.8231 0.8129 0.8186 0.8086
Fixed effects
Firm-time (ft) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank (b) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (bt) Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table B.3: Targeted monetary policy and competition - Main - Robustness
The table reports the estimated parameters and their standard errors from the IV estimation of
equation (2.5) for different robustness exercises. All columns report estimates with the balanced
panel of firms with more than one lender. The dependent variable is the interest rate on the loan
from bank b to firm f in quarter t. Binary treatment is a dummy equal to one if the bank borrows
from the TLTROs. Continuous treatment is a continuous variable equal to the logarithm of the
actual additional amount the bank borrows from the TLTROs. Bank-time controls include bank
capital, non-performing loans, government bonds. All standard errors are double clustered by firm
and bank-quarter. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
No correction No expenditure
Binary Continuous Binary Continuous
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TLTROs ×
2014 - Q3 -0.92 -0.024* -0.53** -0.020**
(0.56) (0.014) (0.23) (0.0086)
2014 - Q4 -0.78 -0.021 -0.52** -0.019**
(0.54) (0.014) (0.25) (0.0087)
2015 - Q1 -0.85* -0.021* -0.46** -0.017**
(0.51) (0.013) (0.23) (0.0082 )
2015 - Q2 -0.96* -0.024* -0.51** -0.019**
(0.54) (0.013) (0.23) (0.0083)
TLTROs × HI ×
2014 - Q3 4.91 0.13 3.01** 0.11**
(3.57) (0.091) (1.53) (0.056)
2014 - Q4 6.37 0.17* 4.22** 0.15**
(3.95) (0.099) (1.91) (0.063)
2015 - Q1 3.17 0.081 1.78 0.07
(3.54) (0.09) (1.71) (0.061)
2015 - Q2 3.84 0.099 2.26 0.087
(3.92) (0.099) (1.88) (0.067)
Firm-time f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 354,060 354,060 354,060 354,060
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
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Table B.4: Targeted monetary policy and competition - New loans - Ro-
bustness
The table reports the estimated parameters and their standard errors from the IV estimation of
equations (2.4) and (2.5) for the flows of new loans. All columns report estimates with the balanced
panel of firms with more than one lender. The dependent variable is the interest rate on the loan
from bank b to firm f in quarter t. Binary treatment is a dummy equal to one if the bank borrows
from the TLTROs. Continuous treatment is a continuous variable equal to the logarithm of the
actual additional amount the bank borrows from the TLTROs. Bank-time controls include bank
capital, non-performing loans, government bonds. All standard errors are double clustered by firm
and bank-quarter. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Direct effect only Including interaction
with competition
Binary Continuous Binary Continuous
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TLTROs ×
2014 - Q3 -0.12 -0.004 -1.92 -0.054
(0.15) (0.004) (1.78) (0.034)
2014 - Q4 -0.34** -0.014*** -1.77 -0.055*
(0.15) (0.003) (1.38) (0.028)
2015 - Q1 -0.73*** -0.025*** -2.42 -0.073*
(0.15) (0.004) (1.64) (0.032)
2015 - Q2 -0.91*** -0.031*** -2.31* -0.071*
(0.23) (0.005) (1.33) (0.025)
TLTROs × HI ×
2014 - Q3 8.17 -0.23
(8.32) (0.16)
2014 - Q4 6.51 -0.18
(6.22) (0.12)
2015 - Q1 7.71 0.22
(7.15) (0.14)
2015 - Q2 6.4 0.18*
(5.56) (0.11)
Firm-time f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,528 33,528 33,528 33,528
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.69
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Table B.5: Targeted monetary policy and competition - Heterogeneity -
Robustness
The table reports the estimated parameters and their standard errors from the IV estimation of
equation (2.5) in different subsets of the data. All columns report estimates with the balanced
panel of relationship for firms with more than one lender. The dependent variable is the interest
rate including expenditure on the stock of loan from bank b to firm f in quarter t. TLTROs is
the logarithm of the actual additional amount the bank borrows from the TLTROs. High risk
firms are firms with a bad credit score (7-9), while low risk are firms with a good or average
credit rating (classes 1-6). Small firms are firms below the median of the distribution of assets in
the pre-treatment year (2013). Large banks are the top 5 banks in Italy. Bank-quarter controls
include bank capital, non-performing loans, government bonds. All standard errors are double
clustered by firm and bank-quarter. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01
levels, respectively.
Firm risk Firm size Bank size
High Low Small Large Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TLTROs (bt) ×
2014 - Q3 -0.018 -0.013* -0.024** -0.014 -0.018* 0.034
(0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.01) (0.008) (0.071)
2014 - Q4 -0.006 -0.011 -0.02 -0.012 -0.023*** 0.094
(0.015) (0.007) (0.013) (0.01) (0.008) (0.12)
2015 - Q1 -0.02 -0.008 -0.02 -0.012 -0.023*** -0.09
(0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.16)
2015 - Q2 -0.006 -0.017** -0.029** -0.009 -0.014 -0.011
(0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.01) (0.009) (0.12)
TLTROs (bt) × HI (m) ×
2014 - Q3 0.13 0.054 0.12 0.082 0.08 -0.28
(0.099) (0.047) (0.083) (0.07) (0.05) (0.62)
2014 - Q4 0.078 0.088* 0.17* 0.098 0.16*** -0.73
(0.10) (0.049) (0.094) (0.074) (0.054) (1.08)
2015 - Q1 0.097 0.001 0.067 0.045 0.14*** 0.75
(0.10) (0.048) (0.091) (0.075) (0.048) (1.42)
2015 - Q2 0.024 0.058 0.13 0.026 0.11* 0.15
(0.094) (0.05) (0.091) (0.087) (0.058) (1.03)
Observations 81,930 272,130 154,458 199,602 135,936 106,680
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.36 0.31 0.34 0.41 0.33
Fixed effects
Firm-time (ft) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank (b) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (bt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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B.2 Additional Features of TLTROs
In this appendix we briefly describe some additional features of the TLTROs.The
borrowing limit on the third to eight TLTROs is differently computed from the first
two operations. The ECB defines a benchmark BEkb for each bank b in each TLTRO
k given by the formula:
BEkb = 0 for k = 3, ..., 8 if NL ≥ 0
BEkb = NL× nk for k = 3, ..., 8 if NL < 0
(B.1)
where NL =
(NLMay2013b +...+NL
Apr2014
b )
12
is the average eligible net lending of insti-
tution b from May 2013 to April 2014 and nk = 9 for k = 3 and nk = 12 for
k = 4, ..., 8.1 The additional borrowing limit is then computed as:
qkb ≤ 3(CNLkb −BEkb )−
k−1∑
j=3
qjb for k = 3, ..., 8 (B.2)
where CNLkb = NL
May2014
b + ...+NL
Month(k)−2
b is the cumulative net lending in
operations from May 2014 until two months before operations k takes place.
Finally, the ECB set also some special rules for the TLTROs on repayment.
Even if all TLTROs will mature in September 2018, there are prepayment options
and a mandatory repayment rule. On the one hand, intermediaries have the option
to repay any part of the amounts they were allotted in a TLTRO after 24 months
at a biannual frequency. On the other hand, the ECB imposes a mandatory early
repayment (MRb) in September 2016, if some lending requirements are not satisfied.
The early repayment rule is applied according to the following formula:
1“Eligible net lending”means gross lending in the form of eligible loans net of repayments of
outstanding amounts of eligible loans during a specific period. For details see again ECB (2014).
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MRb =
∑8
j=1 q
j
b if BE
8
b > CNL
8
b
MRb =
∑8
j=3 q
j
b − 3(CNL8b −BE8b ) if BE8b ≤ CNL8b .
(B.3)
Thus the bank has to repay the whole borrowed amount through the TLTROs
if the total eligible net lending in the period May 2014-April 2016 (CNL8b) is less
than the benchmark for the last operation. Otherwise, the bank has to pay back
in September 2016 the amount borrowed in the last six TLTROs in excess of the
amount used for the calculation of the additional allowance for the last operations,
that is thrice the cumulative net lending exceeding the benchmark.
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Appendix Chapter 3: Down
Payment and Mortgage Rates:
Evidence from Equity Loans
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C.1 Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure C-1: Down payments of EL borrowers
The histogram shows data from the Help To Buy Equity Loan dataset from the UK Home and
Communities Agency (HCA). All EL borrowers who joined the scheme since its inception, in April
2013, to June 2016.
Table C.1: Descriptive statistics: EL data
The table displays aggregate statistics for all Equity Loans issued between April 2013 and June
2016 in England. Values are in British pounds.
Number of loans 91,759
Average purchase price 226,887
Average equity loan 45,442
Total value purchased properties 20,818,909,184
Total value equity loans 4,169,738,752
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Table C.2: Matching the data and constructing the estimation dataset
The table describes the sequential steps taken to construct the estimation sample. The dataset
construction has three parts. In the first part, we open the universe of residential mortgage
originations in the UK (the Product Sales Data from the Financial Conduct Authority) and we
restrict the sample to the period and geographic area of interest, and we exclude mortgages for
refinancing purposes (remortgages). In the second part, we match the data on Help To Buy Equity
Loans (EL) from the Homes and Communities Agency into the mortgage originations data. In the
third part, we restrict the data to the EL group and the standard mortgage group used in the main
analysis of the paper; these include only mortgages on new build and with a loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio between 70 and 75%. (In practice we set the LTV limit at 76 because in the UK mortgage
fees are often rolled over into the principal, raising the measured LTV).
Sample Observations
1) Preparing mortgage originations data
Full Product Sales Data, 4/2005 - 3/2017 15,520,210
England only, 4/2013 - 3/2017 3,432,251
No remortgages 2,177,956
No duplicates in price, lender, date of birth, postcode, loan value 2,170,761
2) Matching EL data and mortgage originations data
Joinby 1 (full postcode, price, lender) 66,617
Drop duplicates and implausible matches 63,413
Joinby 2 (postcode district, price, lender) 16,290
Drop duplicates and implausible matches 9,179
Total matched (joinby 1 + joinby 2) 72,592
3) Bringing back matched loans into mortgage originations data; creating treatment and control groups
Loans with interest rate information 1,851,595
Only lenders doing EL mortgages 1,344,357
Only fixed-rate mortgages with 2, 3, 5 or unknown fixed period 1,151,455
Only new builds 185,604
Only properties with value below or equal to £600,000 180,886
Only LTVs between 70 and 76 69,832
Drop special mortgages, outliers, singletons 68,550
Drop if EL in London after January 2016 67,001
Drop if not EL and origination is after 30 June 2016 47,780
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